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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The estimable Larson treatise is, by tradition, the critical 
reference to which to turn for analysis of workers’ compensation 
issues.  One of the book’s many essential declarations is addressed to 
adjudication within the system.  The late Professor Larson’s book 
perceptively declares, as it always has, “in the spectrum of 
administrative agencies . . . the compensation commission . . . while 
deciding controverted claims . . . is as far towards the judicial end of 
the spectrum as it is possible to go without being an outright court.”1  
This enduring, correct observation is critical to the understanding of 
the workers’ compensation adjudicative process.  The hearing officer, 
in this regard, is adjudicating a dispute between two private parties.2  
Though interpreting and enforcing a law of public importance, he or 
she is not implementing agency policy.3  
                                                          
National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ) 
Fellowship Paper (2011).  A preliminary version of this article was presented at the 
annual meeting of the NAALJ at Santa Fe, NM, on September 18, 2011.   
 
*A.B., 1982, West Virginia University; J.D., 1985, Duquesne University 
School of Law.  Workers’ Compensation Judge, Pennsylvania Department of Labor 
& Industry, Pittsburgh, PA; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law.  Thanks to Timothy P. Schmidle, Ph.D. and to Mark Cowger, Esq. 
(Pitt Law 2011); and also to Mr. Andrew Horowitz, Esq. (Pitt Law 2011), and Ms. 
Jennifer Fink (Pitt Law 2012), for their invaluable legal research assistance.  Any 
opinions expressed are strictly those of the Author and not of the Department of 
Labor & Industry.  Contact: DTorrey@pa.gov.            
 
1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, § 79:90 (Desk ed. 2000).   
2 Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. 1990) (“[W]orker’s 
compensation is a matter of great public interest and is subject to extensive 
governmental regulation as to the nature and extent of the remedy. However, while 
the Legislature in the field of worker’s compensation defined relationships, rights 
and duties that the parties are not free to derogate by contract, the litigation 
nevertheless adjudicates a dispute between private parties and results in a money 
judgment affecting only those parties.”).  
3 See generally Thomas E. Wing, Oregon’s Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. 
NATL.  ASSN. ADMIN. LAW. JUDICIARY 57, 69 (2003) (drawing general distinction 
between “one party” and “two party” cases entertained by administrative law 
judges); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 271, 282 (1994) (describing the role of federal administrative law judges).    
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The Larson treatise also addresses the issue of the fact-finding 
status of the hearing officer in workers’ compensation adjudication as 
he or she resolves such disputes.  The treatise has always identified 
as the majority and “orthodox” rule one having the commission – not 
the first-level hearing officer or referee – the arbiter of credibility and 
final fact-finder.  Notably, early courts occasionally analyzed this 
relationship by analogy to the equity offices of  “special master” (a 
subordinate), and “chancellor” (the trial court and fact-finder).4 
 The treatise, indeed, considers as aberrant a system which 
maintains the hearing officer as final fact-finder.  “A small group of 
states and the Longshore Act,” Larson complains, “have deliberately 
separated themselves from the majority on this point.”5  The 
December 2007 version of the text identifies nine states as 
subscribing to this purported aberration, setting forth in discrete 
subsections the “minority rule” as maintained by Florida, Arizona,6 
                                                          
4 United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 
1951) (“The chancellor … should give due consideration to the findings of facts 
made by a special master and should consider the many advantages which the 
master had in personally hearing and observing the witnesses. . . . However, 
although the Chancellor may  use the services of a special master. . . and receive 
from him his advisory findings and recommendations, the fact remains that it is the 
Chancellor who under the law is charged with the duty and responsibility of 
making findings of facts and entering the final decree.”); Rodriguez v. Indus. 
Comm’n, 21 N.E.2d 741,743 (Ill. 1939) (“[t]he arbitrator in his consideration of the 
case is but the agent of the commission, similar in character to that of  a master in 
chancery. . .”).  Compare Hamby v. Everett, 627 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1982) (“Most any law school graduate is aware that our Court reviews chancery 
cases de novo.  However, where credibility issues arise, we will not reverse the 
findings of the chancellor unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”).  This 
approach is familiar to administrative law specialists as the standard that prevails 
under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) 
(2006) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision, that decision then 
becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an 
appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule.  On 
appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it 
would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice 
or by rule.”).  See generally WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.09 (Lexis Pub., 4th ed. 2000). 
5  LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[4].   
6 The Larson treatise states that this rule was created in 1967 with the 
decision in Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). LARSON, 
supra note 1, § 130.03[4].  That decision, however, was unambiguously reversed 
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Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Michigan, Colorado, Kentucky, Nebraska, 
and the Longshore Act.7    
This Author’s research has not, however, found this analysis 
to be particularly convincing in the present day.  The survey of states 
upon which he reports in this article does not, in this regard, support 
the proposition that having the hearing officer as final fact-finder 
currently reflects an aberration.  The “typical compensation system” 
of the 1950’s, when Larson first penned his book, is not the 
overwhelming contemporary model.  (This article will hereafter use 
the title Workers’ Compensation Judge or WCJ to refer to this 
office.)  
Indeed, this Author’s research demonstrates that a sizeable 
minority of states now maintains systems where the WCJ is 
statutorily the final fact-finder.  The tendency over the years is for 
legislatures to prefer the first level hearing officer in such role.  Of 
course, this preference echoes the common law, which generally calls 
for deference to the fact-findings of the individual who saw and 
heard the witnesses and assessed their demeanor.8  This policy may 
be seen at work in the trend to make the first-level hearing officer the 
final fact-finder.  Still, this legislative preference, manifested during a 
                                                          
by the Arizona Supreme Court.  Powell v. Indus. Comm’n,, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 
1967) (“The Commission of course was not bound by the finding of its referee.”).  
A subsequent decision, Ohlmaier v. Indus. Comm’n, 776 P.2d 791 (Ariz. 1989), 
explains that the legislature changed the law in 1973 to have it comport with the 
holding of the appeals court.  See infra Section V(C).     
7  LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[4].   The book also recognizes that this 
rule is followed in the District of Columbia. Id.; § 130.03[4], n.8.1 (citing Potomac 
Elec. Power Co., v. Dep’t of Emp’t Serv., 835 A.2d 527 (D.C. 2003)).  At another 
section, the treatise recognizes a change to the Minnesota Act to make the ALJ the 
fact-finder.  Id. at § 130.03[8] (citing Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 
1984)).    
8 Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949) (“Trial on oral 
testimony, with the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses in open 
court, has often been acclaimed as one of the persistent, distinctive, and most 
valuable features of the common-law system. For only in such a trial can the trier 
of the facts (trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses’ demeanor; and that 
demeanor – absent, of course, when trial is by affidavit or deposition –  is 
recognized as an important clue to witness’ credibility.”).  See James P. Timony, 
Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903 (2000).  See also Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (U.S. 1951) (indicating that an agency, 
though not bound by ALJ decision, should not ignore the findings of fact and 
credibility determinations contained in initial federal ALJ order).  
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long period of reform, exists mainly because finality at the first level 
of adjudication is thought to enhance efficiency in the litigation of 
contested cases.9  In a number of jurisdictions, meanwhile, including 
Pennsylvania and the Longshore Act, establishing the judge as fact-
finder was part of a general restructuring of the administrative agency 
responsible for enforcing the law.10  In still others, the change was 
effected as part of the most fundamental institutional reform: 
changing the forum for contested cases from civil court to an 
administrative forum.11  
 The appendixed tables show that, of fifty-two critical 
jurisdictions – fifty states, the Longshore Act (LHWCA), and the 
District of Columbia (D.C.) – twenty-six state programs hew to the 
majority rule.  A full twenty-two states, plus the LHWCA and D.C., 
subscribe to the minority rule.  This Author places Alabama and 
Tennessee, which entertain the litigation of contested cases in civil 
court, in their own category.12  Even here, however, a plain 
distinction exists.  In Alabama, the trial judge is the final fact-finder, 
whereas in Tennessee the appellate courts reserve the right to 
reassess credibility and change the facts.13    
The contents of the tables are distilled below.  The Author 
sets forth this distillation with a caveat: a great deal of variety and 
nuance attends the issue of WCJ adjudicative finality.  An ironclad 
taxonomy is thus impossible.  This phenomenon has been noted from 
the very earliest days of the program.  The early treatise writer 
Bradbury declared, “The administration and procedure under no two 
of the compensation acts of the American states are exactly alike. 
The revolution wrought by the adoption of the compensation 
principle is nowhere more strongly emphasized than in the manner in 
which controversies growing out of claims for compensation are 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS 
COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 40 (1991) (critics 
complaining that “. . . . costs are likely to be greater and the role of attorneys 
enhanced when appellate review, whether administrative or judicial, is not limited 
to questions of law but rather can include reconsideration of the questions of fact 
determined at the initial hearing.”).  See also Section V (B).    
10 See infra Section V(D).  
11 See infra Section V(F).    
12 See infra Section III.   
13 See infra Section III.   
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determined.”14  This Author nevertheless offers the following general 
delineation:15      
 
Majority and “Orthodox” Rule:  
Board, Commission, or judicial branch  
is final fact-finder   
AR, CA, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IO, KS, 
MD, MS, MO, NV, NH, NY, ND, NC, 
OH, OR, SC, SD, UT, VT, VA, WA, 
WI 
Minority Rule:  
WCJ is final fact-finder;  
Board, Commission, or judicial branch  
exercises appellate review or the like  
AK, AZ, CO, CN, DE, FL, KY, LO, 
ME, MA, MI, MN, MT, NE, NJ, NM, 
OK, PA, RI, TX, WV, WY, DC, 
LHWCA 
States where workers’ compensation 
cases  
are litigated in civil court  
AL, TN 
States where appeal from agency 
adjudication may involve jury trial  
MD, OH, TX, VT, WA 
States where appellate court reserves 
right to reassess credibility 
SD, TN 
States where workers’ compensation 
disputes are addressed in a judicial 
branch workers’ compensation court  
NE, RI, OK 
 
The issue of WCJ adjudicative finality is not, of course, 
unique to workers’ compensation.  The issue has been current, 
indeed, in the debate over “central panels” of ALJs.   Some states 
have created central panels that feature the ALJ as the final fact-
finder, a development that has been described as a dramatic shift 
away from the model provided by the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act.16  Virtually all of the literature that addresses finality 
in the administrative law context is found in discussions of central 
                                                          
14 HARRY F. BRADBURY, BRADBURY’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND 
STATE INSURANCE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 960 (3rd ed. 1917).   
15 More nuanced characterizations of most state systems are provided 
throughout the text of this article, and also in footnotes to the tables.  
16 James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State ALJ: Central Panels 
and their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1356-60  (2002) (referring to an “emerging trend of 
restricting or eliminating agency review of state administrative law judges’ (ALJ) 
decisions, thereby making them actually or effectively final and subject only to 
judicial review,” and positing that such change “represents a fundamental change in 
state administrative adjudication.”).     
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panels.17  This Author has not encountered the issue discussed in the 
discrete realm of workers’ compensation.  
This article, addressing this issue in the workers’ 
compensation field, reports in detail on the basic findings 
summarized above.  This article explains the nature of WCJ and 
commission adjudication, and seeks to determine why the original 
commission-as-fact-finder model, though it endures as the majority 
rule, has seemingly eroded.  This article also provides an introduction 
to the manner in which workers’ compensation adjudication is 
organized among the states.   
This article then seeks to ascertain the current state of the law 
– and the practice as well – among the states on the issue of WCJ 
adjudicative finality.  This article also treats the related issue of 
whether an appeal or request for review of the WCJ’s adjudication 
operates as an automatic stay on the award.  It seems impossible to 
ponder the practical import of fact-finding finality without taking into 
account this crucial procedural issue.  The tables at the conclusion of 
this article set forth an accounting of the laws of the various 
jurisdictions on these issues of WCJ finality and stays of 
adjudication.  They also identify the procedural schemes of each state 
and the precise standard of review that applies once a compensation 
case, however finalized, is ready for true judicial review.    
It may be noted that to speak of WCJ adjudicative finality on 
the facts is to at once speak of the standard of review that is 
employed by the Board, commission, or court to which the appeal 
has been taken.18  Indeed, in many state laws the final fact-finding 
                                                          
17  Wing, supra note 3, at 57 n.2 (collecting multiple citations to articles 
treating the history of and issues surrounding central hearing panels).  But see 
Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the 
Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2009) (author expressing 
disapproval of mandatory arbitration clauses, and positing that empirical evidence 
shows that district court judges are reversed 12% of the time – much more than 
mandated arbitrators).     
 
18 Some studies, when addressing standards of review, divide states into 
those where review is for “law and fact” and those that review for “law” only.  See, 
e.g., DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE, DISPUTE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION IN 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: A NATIONAL INVENTORY, 1997-1998 (Workers 
Compensation Research Institute ed., 1998).  This use of terms may also be found 
on occasion in statutes.   
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power of the WCJ is defined not by some bold declaration of the 
same, but by a proviso that defines the review power of the appellate 
entity.  An example of the former can be found in the Kentucky 
statute, which states, in part, “(1) An award . . . of the [ALJ] . . . shall 
be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact . . . .”19  An 
example of the latter, meanwhile, is that of Pennsylvania, where the 
statute provides, “The board shall hear the appeal on the record 
certified by the [WCJ] office. The board shall affirm the [WCJ] 
adjudication, unless it shall find that the adjudication is not in 
compliance with section 422(a) and the other provisions of this 
act.”20  The lawyer or other analyst, to derive the Pennsylvania 
WCJ’s power, must resort to statutory cross-reference and the 
precedents before he or she may discover that such finality is 
precisely the same as in Kentucky.21    
In this writer’s view, this analysis and ascertainment of the 
current law of WCJ finality is important because of two policy 
questions.  First, in an environment where we seek to ensure the 
efficiency of litigating disputed claims, is making the WCJ the 
ultimate fact-finder the superior approach?  A critical issue here is 
whether the parties are more or less likely to appeal, hence extending 
                                                          
In this article, the Author will not use this terminology. Generally, those 
that apply these terms mean that a commission or court that reviews for “law and 
fact” will reassess credibility and potentially substitute new fact-findings.  In 
contrast, a commission or court that reviews only for law will not do so.  Nothing is 
offensive about this language, but lawyers and judges simply do not speak in this 
fashion.  An appellate law clerk who tells his boss that, in a workers’ compensation 
appeal, the standard of review is “law only” would be taken as a poseur.  The legal 
formulation would likely be, instead, something like (1) “error of law,” and (2) a 
determination of “whether essential findings of fact are based on substantial 
evidence.”  It may well be that  a judge or commission that has issued a finding of 
fact based on legally insufficient evidence has committed an error of law. See 
generally Revello v. Acme Mkts, Inc., 1986 Del. LEXIS 1064, at *9 (Del.  Jan. 31, 
1986).  This does not, however, change the reality that appellate review in a “law 
only” state always takes into account review of facts.  No system tolerates an 
arbitrary and capricious WCJ.   
19 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.285 (West 2011).   
20 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 854.2 (West 2011). 
21 The landmark case in Pennsylvania that defines the WCJ as the final 
fact finder is Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 305 
A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).  Most Pennsylvania lawyers, even specialists, 
could not identify the statute which by inference defines the WCJ as final fact-
finder, but all know and hold close to their heart the case name, “Cyclops.”  
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the litigation, when a “second bite of the apple” may be obtained at 
the commission level.22 This has been an issue talked about for over a 
half-century.23  Second, in an environment where we seek to afford 
due process to the parties, is making the WCJ the ultimate fact-finder 
the superior approach?  A critical issue here is whether the parties 
perceive such a system to be affording them an equitable process 
before a competent, impartial, and accountable judge.24 
This article concludes with the assertion that the WCJ as 
ultimate fact-finder constitutes the superior method of administrative 
adjudication.  In submitting that this is so, this article evaluates the 
issue, as foreshadowed above, in the context of the familiar 
administrative adjudication values of efficiency, impartiality, and 
accountability.       
 
II.  THE UTILITY OF COMPARISONS 
 
The trend towards making the WCJ the final fact-finder in the 
system has not been widely noted or commented upon.  While the 
Larson treatise, as suggested above, identifies the trend,25 it does not 
try to identify its source (though it does note miscellaneously that an 
“increasing remoteness of the reviewing administrative body from 
the real fact-finding process” exists.)26  The Workers’ Compensation 
                                                          
22 See, e.g., PETER S. BARTH, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 
CONNECTICUT: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 24 (1987) (“Few appeals are 
successful . . . Many denials of appeals have been based on the CRD’s [viz., 
Compensation Review Division’s] consistent position that a commissioner’s 
conclusion cannot be reviewed when it rests on the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses.  This view, perhaps in conjunction with the low rate of 
success, largely explains the small number of appeals to the CRD.”).    
23 HERMAN M. SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION 158 (1954).    
24 See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 88-97 (1983) (identifying and discussing the 
importance of “process values”).  
25 See LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[8] (“The issue of extent of 
administrative review is closely related to the question of to whose findings the 
presumption of finality attaches, and there is discernible here also some beginnings 
of a trend to limit the scope of administrative review.”).    
26 LARSON, supra note 1, § 130.03[6].  For an Arkansas opinion in which a 
concurring judge recognized the trend and suggested modification of the Arkansas 
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Research Institute (WCRI), meanwhile, in 1999 published an 
authoritative catalog inventorying the adjudicatory approaches of the 
various states.27  This notable text raises the important policy 
questions as to which arrangement might be best, but it does not 
remark on the genesis of the trend or hazard any analysis.   
It is submitted that the trend, and the issues implicated, merit 
a critical analysis.  As WCRI points out, policymakers can benefit 
from understanding how the adjudication systems of other states 
operate as they endeavor to update and improve their own 
jurisdictions’ laws and processes.  When it comes to coverage and 
benefits, comparative analyses can be found in a number of excellent 
resources.28  However, for more nuanced, “back-end” issues29 such as 
adjudication, resources are scarce.   
Leading researchers notably posited in 1998 that “[v]ery little 
is known about the optimal design of dispute procedures.”30  The 
                                                          
system, see Webb v. Workers’ Compensation Commission, 733 S.W.2d 726, 728 
(Ark. 1987) (Newbern, J., concurring).   
27 See BALLANTYNE, supra note 18.  See also UNITED STATES CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS, Chart XV – 
Appeal Provisions (2011).  
28 For many years, the U.S. Department of Labor undertook a survey of all 
fifty state workers’ compensation systems, comparing laws and benefit levels.  This 
effort ended in 2006 because of budget cuts, but two entities have now taken up the 
task: the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions 
(IAIABC) and the Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI).  The result 
is the book WCRI, Workers’ Compensation Laws as of January 2010 (Ramona P. 
Tanabe, ed., 2010).  Much of the text is devoted to comparing the issue of benefits 
and their delivery.  The editor, Ms. Ramona Tanabe of WCRI, includes an accurate 
caveat in her introduction: “It is easy to misunderstand subtle differences between 
jurisdictional laws and regulations.  The differences in law are magnified by 
agency interpretive bulletins and traditional practices.  Additionally, case law is 
continually redefining interpretations and application and the laws are riddled with 
exceptions to the general rules . . . .” Id. at 5.     
29 This term the Author borrows from Richard Victor, Director of WCRI.  
See RICHARD A. VICTOR ET AL., COST DRIVERS IN SIX STATES, 102 (1992) (stating 
that the “back end of the claim . . . is a major friction point in the system, one that 
is quite complex and involves the interaction of a large number of factors.  
Historically, it has been difficult for policymakers and study commissions to 
untangle the nature of the beast.”). 
30 Terry Thomason, Douglass E. Hyatt, & Karen Roberts, Disputes and 
Dispute Resolution, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 291 
(1998).  WCRI researchers, writing in 1999, also despaired at the lack of studies on 
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Author is unsure that this is really true, as many analyses of dispute 
resolution systems exist.  This writer hopes to contribute some 
knowledge and opinion on the issue in the workers’ compensation 
context.  
Legislatures and administrators do, in fact, analyze other state 
practices as they undertake reform.  The Author, for example, 
addressed the issue of the fact-finding power of the WCJ in 
Pennsylvania in 1996 at the request of the Department of Labor & 
Industry.31  At that time, an early version of proposed reforms 
featured a provision that would have given enhanced review power to 
the Appeal Board (intra-agency review) over the credibility 
determinations of the WCJ (since 1972 the final fact-finder).32  The 
proposed reform would do so by requiring more highly-refined 
“reasoned decisions,” and obligating the Board on appeal to afford 
”whole record” review, as undertaken by federal and other courts.33   
The Department asked the Author for a report on how other 
states approached the fact-finding function.  Which states, the 
Department asked, maintained a system like Pennsylvania, with WCJ 
as fact-finder; and which maintained a system where the commission 
could more broadly reassess credibility?  This Author concluded 
then, as he does now, that the Larson treatise position that WCJ as 
final fact-finder is an aberration is misleading and that the WCJ as 




                                                          
workers’ compensation adjudication systems.  See DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & 
CHRISTOPHER J. MAZINGO, MEASURING DISPUTE RESOLUTION OUTCOMES: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION 83 
(Workers Compensation Research Institute ed.,1999).    
31 See David B. Torrey, Matters Regarding Proposed Amendment (H.B. 
2216) to Section 422(a) of the Act (Reasoned Decisions),with Comparative 
Analysis Among Jurisdictions, in PAPERS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
ADJUDICATION TASKFORCE (First Revision, Mar. 12, 1996) (on file with  Author).   
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  In the end, as discussed below, the legislature required the WCJ to 
issue a more refined, reasoned decision, but actually truncated further the Appeal 
Board’s powers.  See Section IX(C)(2).      
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III.  ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS 
 
The focus of this article is on the fact-finding power of the 
WCJ as opposed to the administration of systems per se.  The 
outlines of the systems within which WCJs undertake their work is, 
however, important to appreciate the more detailed analysis that 
follows.  
By far the most predominate organizational model in the 
present day is the WCJ serving as an employee of the department of 
state government responsible for overall administration of the 
workers’ compensation program.  For example, this Author is an 
employee of the State Department of Labor & Industry, in its 
Workers’ Compensation Adjudication Office.  Table 1 details the 
precise title of all WCJs and their various administrative affiliations.       
This is not, however, the universal model.  Of note is that four 
states — Colorado, Minnesota, Wyoming, and Michigan35 — 
organize WCJs under the auspices of a “central hearing panel.”36  In 
Colorado, Minnesota, and Michigan, the ALJ, Compensation Judge, 
and Magistrate, respectively, is a specialist in the field, while in 
Wyoming, the hearing officer is a skilled generalist.37   In all 
jurisdictions, notably, he or she is the final fact-finder. Florida, 
meanwhile, maintains a central panel, the Division of Administrative 
Hearings (DOAH),38 to which the Judges of Compensation Claims 
(JCCs) belong.  This is so, however, only for purposes of financing 
and internal administration and JCCs are not “subject to the control, 
supervision, or direction by any party or any department or 
                                                          
35 The Michigan development occurred in 2011.  See Mich. Exec. Order 
No. 2011-4, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/2011-
4_346311_7.pdf  (Feb. 23, 2011). 
36 Id. 
37 Memorandum from Hon. Deborah Baumer to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 
9, 2012) (on file with the Author) (stating, inter alia, “We hear all types of 
administrative cases in which we are the final decision makers, including but not 
limited to, driver’s license suspensions and revocations for DUI’s, workers’ 
compensation, Department of Family Services child/adult abuse and neglect for 
purposes of the central registry, and all state personnel hearings . . . .”).      
38 See State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, DIVISION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, http://www.floridagovernmentonline.com/topic/5 (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
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commission of state government.”39  To the contrary, a separate 
Office of Judges of Compensation Claims (OJCC) exists.40      
Other states have considered including WCJs in their central 
panels, but concerns over the complexity of the field, and its 
significant political aspect have often precluded such action.41  
When, in the 1990’s, a push was made for a central panel in 
Pennsylvania, a number of lobbies, including Public Utility 
Commission judges, the WCJs, and the state bar association workers’ 
compensation section, raised these concerns.  (Certainly the inherent 
tendency of organizations to resist change was also at work in this 
episode.)  Ultimately, this advocacy was unsuccessful.42   
In three states — Rhode Island, Nebraska, and Oklahoma — 
WCJs currently sit in a judicial branch workers’ compensation court.  
In these states the WCJ is the final fact-finder as well.  The 1990 
creation of the Rhode Island court, notably, occurred in the wake of 
the litigation crisis spawned by 1970’s liberalization of workers’ 
compensation laws discussed below.43  The heritage of compensation 
                                                          
39 Hon. Diane Beck, JCC, Nat’l Ass’n of Workers’ Comp. Judiciary Coll., 
Remarks at the Comparative Law Panel (Aug. 22, 2011) (on file with the Author).  
40 Id. As is common among states, assessments on the workers’ 
compensation industry via the workers’ compensation Administrative Trust Fund 
funds this agency.   
41 See, e.g., Wing, supra note 3, at 69 n.63 (2003) (noting that “[a]gencies 
[like workers’ compensation] . . .  whose subject matter was regarded as . . .  too 
political . . . were exempted” from Oregon Hearing Officer Panel).  
42 With regard to attempts to establish a central panel in Pennsylvania, see 
generally Michael Asimow, Speed Bumps on the Road to Administrative Law 
Reform in California and Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 229  (1999); Gerald 
E. Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An Emerging 
Framework to Increase “Judicialization” in Pennsylvania, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
297 (1996). 
43 Rhode Island established the Workers’ Compensation Court in 1990, 
after apparent inefficiencies and delays  plagued the predecessor Commission.  As 
a result of the Rhode Island reform, according to one commentator, “consistency 
has been brought to decisions, and appeals have been reduced.”  Matthew Carey, 
Workers’ Compensation in Rhode Island: Reform Through Business/Labor 
Cooperation , in WORKPLACE INJURIES AND DISEASE: PREVENTION AND 
COMPENSATION 277 (K. Roberts, J. Burton, M. Bodah, eds., 2005).  See generally 
Rhode Island Judiciary, Jurisdiction and Overview, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
COURT,  
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/workerscompensationcourt/PDF/JurisdictionandO
verview.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
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courts in Nebraska (1935)44 and Oklahoma (1959),45 on the other 
hand, is quite ancient.     
Two states, meanwhile, adhere to their initial approach of 
facilitating dispute resolution in the county civil courts.  These states 
are Alabama46 and Tennessee.47  Adjudication in each state is 
effected by a bench trial, that is, with the judge as fact-finder, as 
opposed to a jury trial.48   
                                                          
44 For an account of the court’s history, see Nebraska Government, 
History, Mission & Organization, NEBRASKA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT, 
http://www.wcc.ne.gov/about/history_mission_organization.aspx (last visited 
March 19, 2012).  From 1913-1917, the courts administered the program.  From 
1917 until creation of the workers’ compensation court, the Department of Labor 
administered the law.    
45 For an account of the court’s history, see History of the Workers’ 
Compensation Court, OKLAHOMA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  COURT, 
http://www.owcc.state.ok.us/history.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).  From 1915 
until creation of the court, the State Industrial Commission administered the law.    
46 With regard to the genesis of this arrangement, one historian states as 
follows:  
 
As elsewhere in the Deep South, Alabama reformers and even 
labor leaders avoided labor legislation that might discourage 
regional economic growth, leaving worker protection to 
paternalistic industrialists.  Hence, Alabama enacted a weak 
workers’ compensation law in 1919 in which the courts, rather 
than a commission, adjudicated claims, and in which the state 
regulated insurance only to prevent rate discrimination.  
 
DONALD W. ROGERS, MAKING CAPITALISM SAFE: WORK SAFETY & HEALTH 
REGULATIONS IN AMERICA, 1880-1940 88 (2009).   
47 A National Commission consultant explained the origin of court 
administration in Tennessee as follows: “The original statute, passed in 1919, 
provided for court administration partially because of the erroneous belief that the 
program would be primarily self-administering, and in part because of the over-
reaction of the bar association who feared that the advent of workmen’s 
compensation would eliminate litigation.” Bruce R. Boals, Administration of 
Workmen’s Compensation in Tennessee, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS III 67 
(1973).  A thorough review of the Tennessee dispute resolution process is found in 
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN TENNESSEE: 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY, 43-53 (Workers Compensation Research Institute 
ed., 2003).  
48 ALA. CODE § 25-5-81(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-203 (1999).     
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In Alabama, the trial judge is the ultimate arbiter of 
credibility, and the appellate court undertakes substantial evidence 
review.49  In Tennessee, however, the appellate court’s “standard of 
review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court 
accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless 
the preponderance of evidence is otherwise.”50  Tennessee appeals 
courts generally would not presume to change a trial judge’s 
credibility judgment about a live witness, but review de novo, 
without hesitation, expert testimony given by deposition.51   
This approach, though at this point a living artifact, is not as 
remarkable as it may seem.  The workers’ compensation system in 
England, which served as the initial U.S. model, entertained disputes 
in civil court.  Many jurisdictions emulated this model.  In fact, 
according to mid-century analysts, “[a]s many as 14 States attempted 
court administration before 1920, but the results were uniformly bad, 
and the majority soon switched to the commission form.” 52  Critics 
over the decades have disparaged this approach,53 and it was 
                                                          
49 See Chadwick Timber Company v. Charles Philon, 10 So. 3d 1022 (Ala. 
2008).  Under the Alabama practice, the trial judge may or may not be well-versed 
in the compensation law.  Expertise will depend on the venue: “Judges have 
different responsibilities depending on the county.  In many counties, judges handle 
a little bit of everything.  The larger counties divide the judges up between civil and 
criminal.  Some counties even assign all or most of the workers’ compensation 
cases to a single judge.”  Memorandum from Mike Fish, Esq., to the Author (Nov. 
10, 2011) (on file with Author).   
50 Griffin v. Walker Die Casting, Inc., No. M2009-01773-WC-R3-WC, 
2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1020 (Tenn., Special Workers’ Comp. App. Panel Sept. 15, 
2010).   
51 Memorandum from Cully Ward, Esq., to Mark D. Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 6, 
2012) (on file with Author).  See also infra Section IX. 
52 SOMERS, supra note 23, at 149 (1954).    
53 See id. at 148-50. See also WALTER F. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF 
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION, 62-99 (1936) (declaring that court administration of 
workers’ compensation programs had been a failure).  The Somers & Somers text 
features a subchapter entitled, “The Anachronism of Court Administration.”  
SOMERS, supra note 23, at 148.  As of 1954, Alabama, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Tennessee and Wyoming facilitated adjudication of contested cases in the civil 
court system.  SOMERS, supra note 23, at 148-49.  The National Commission still 
counted five as of 1972.  NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, 
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION LAWS 23 (1972), available at 
http://www.workerscompresources.com/National_Commission_Report/national_co
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disfavored by the National Commission.  The Commission, at 
Recommendation 6.1, admonished that “each State utilize a 
workmen’s compensation agency to fulfill the administrative 
obligations of a modern workmen’s compensation program.”54  It is 
critical to note that, presently, the Alabama and Tennessee systems 
are characterized by extensive pre-trial administrative structures that 
undertake oversight and seek to achieve the resolution of cases 
without the need for a trial.55  No evidence seems to exist that 
Alabama is interested in moving jurisdiction of disputed cases to an 
agency,56 but some in Tennessee advocate for such a move. 57 
The adjudications of WCJs are, in most systems, subject to 
intra-agency review – a major theme of this article – typically by a 
Board or Commission of several members.  Meanwhile, all 
jurisdictions allow for appellate review of WCJ decisions by the 
judicial branch.  These arrangements can also be gleaned from Table 
1.   
A number of unusual arrangements, however, exist.  In 
smaller states like Montana, there may be only one WCJ, and any 
appeal is prosecuted directly to the state supreme court.58  In several 
states with multiple WCJs, such as Florida, no intra-agency review 
exists, and an appeal is taken directly to the courts.59  In Iowa, no 
multiple-member board or commission exists. Instead the intra-
                                                          
mmission_report.htm (“claims in five States are assigned immediately to the 
general courts. Adjudicators who handle workmen's compensation cases 
exclusively have the primary duty to resolve disputes in 45 States”).  
54 NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at 
101.  
55 For a description of the functions of the Alabama Department of 
Industrial Relations Workers’ Compensation Division, see Workers’ 
Compensation, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://dir.alabama.gov/wc/.  For a description of the functions of the Tennessee 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Workers’ Compensation 
Division, see Worker’s Compensation, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE 
DEVELOPMENT (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.state.tn.us/labor-wfd/wcomp.html. 
56 Memorandum from Mike Fish, Esq. to the Author (Nov. 10, 2011) (on 
file with Author).   
57 Michael Adams, Tennessee to Study Workers’ Compensation System, 
INSURANCE JOURNAL (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/01/13/230979.htm. 
58 See infra Section V.   
59 See infra Section V. 
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agency review is handled by the Commissioner,60 who may, in 
practice, delegate to a Deputy Commissioner the task of 
recommending a decision.61      
There are five states wherein a jury trial is still possible after 
the completion of administrative adjudication, including; Maryland, 
Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.62 In no state is the trial 
completely de novo.63  In the present day, it is an exception  for a jury 
to be empanelled and a verdict rendered in a workers’ compensation 
case.64  The existence of this potential right in any state can, 
however, have material repercussions for both administration and 
lawyerly strategizing.    
It is worth mentioning another aspect of the fact-finding 
process.  There is an effort underway to make the resolution of 
contested cases turn more on objective findings, as opposed to 
subjective factors.  In several systems, the WCJ may have the option 
or obligation of according significant weight to a special medical 
examiner or other expert when making an adjudication.65  The 
ultimate form of such a provision appears in the Wyoming Act.  
There, if a dispute develops over the degree of physical impairment 
suffered by a claimant, the issue is adjudicated by a “medical hearing 
panel acting as hearing examiner . . . .”66  Ultimately, this is an issue 
                                                          
60 IOWA CODE § 86.24 (addressing appeals within the agency).  
61 See, e.g., Beef Products, Inc. v. Rizvic, 806 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2011).  
62 See infra Section VI. 
63 See infra Section VI. 
64 Washington is the exception to the exception and regularly empanels a 
jury to render a verdict in a workers’ compensation case.  
65 See generally LESLIE I. BODEN, DANIEL E. KERN & JOHN A. GARDNER, 
REDUCING LITIGATION: USING DISABILITY GUIDELINES AND STATE EVALUATORS 
IN OREGON (1991); Sean T. Carnathan, Due Process and the Independent Medical 
Examiner in the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act, 45 ME. L. REV. 123 (1993).  
See also RICHARD A. VICTOR, CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990S 20 (1990).  The author 
in this book posits, among other things, “Another design issue facing policymakers 
is whether or not to make the findings of independent experts binding on the 
adjudicator . . .” Id.  He further posits, correctly, that were a legislature to 
experiment with such an innovation, the experts employed should be of the highest 
caliber. Id.   
66 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-405(m) (2012).  See Lyles v. State ex rel 
Div. of Workers’ Comp., 957 P.2d 843 (Wyo. 1998).  
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beyond the scope of this article, but it can be critical in the 
understanding of workers’ compensation adjudication.   
 
IV.  NATURE AND HISTORY OF ADJUDICATION AND OF THE ORTHODOX 
RULE 
 
As submitted above, the orthodox adjudication rule, with 
commission as final fact-finder and original hearing officer as a 
conspicuously subordinate officer, is still dominant.  For example, 
under the Illinois system, the “Commission exercises original 
jurisdiction” upon request for review by a party “and is not bound by 
an arbitrator’s findings.”67  Likewise, under the Mississippi Act, “the 
Commission is the fact-finder and the judge of the credibility of 
witnesses.”68  The Mississippi ALJ’s determination is reviewed de 
novo.69    
Despite this state of affairs, it is rare for any commission to 
take further evidence,70 and, in most instances, the reassessment of 
the facts is undertaken by review of the record made before the WCJ.  
It is also extremely rare for a trial or appellate court to reassess the 
facts on appeal from the final adjudication of the administrative 
agency.  Though formulas vary, most states currently establish that 
review of the facts by the appellate judiciary is limited to a 
determination of whether substantial evidence supports the fact-
finder’s adjudication, whoever that may be.71  Also displaced in most 
states is the intermediate appeal – between the agency and the 
                                                          
67 R&D Thiel v. Illinois Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 923 N.E.2d 870, 877 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
68 Short v. Wilson Meat House, 36 So. 3d 1247, 1251 (Miss. 2010). 
69 Id.  
70 Illinois, for example, abolished the practice in 1989.  See infra Part VI.   
The ability of the Pennsylvania Board to do so (never exercised) was abolished in 
the 1996 amendments. See  DAVID B. TORREY & ANDREW E. GREENBERG, 6 
WEST’S PA. PRAC., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 14:176 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 
2011). The Indiana statute nominally allows the process.  631 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 
1-1-15 (entitled “Facts upon review; additional evidence; oral arguments,” and 
providing, inter alia, “The facts upon review by the full board will be determined 
upon the evidence introduced in the original hearing, without hearing new or 
additional evidence, at the discretion of the industrial board . . . .”).  
71 See Table 1. 
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appellate court – to the county court.  Many of these intermediate 
appeals were de novo, just like the review by the commission.   
The law and practice encountered among these orthodox rule 
jurisdictions and that of the states that maintain the WCJ as fact-
finder is treated below.72  As a predicate to those analyses, an 
acknowledgement of the nature and history of workers’ 
compensation adjudication is valuable.  
 
A.  No Right (Most States) to a Jury Trial 
 
Critical to analyzing WCJ fact-finding power is the 
importance of the tradition of trial by jury. The U.S. Supreme Court 
declared in the second decade of the last century that parties do not 
have a right, under the Constitution, to a trial by jury in a contested 
workers’ compensation case because trial by jury is not a right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.73  The Seventh 
Amendment, meanwhile, only provides for jury trials in cases 
brought in federal court.74       
                                                          
72 See infra Sections V, VI.    
73 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 255 (1917) (“Objection is made that the 
act dispenses with trial by jury. But it is settled that this is not embraced in the 
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); New York Central R.R. v. White, 
37 S. Ct. 247 (1917) (ruling on case where employer was trying to have the New 
York Act declared unconstitutional for depriving the employer of property in 
violation of employer’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process).  
74 See, e.g., Bio-Tech Pharmacal, Inc. v. Blouin, 2010 Ark. App. 714, 762 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2010).   
 
The only constitutional argument Bio-Tech made to the 
Commission, and upon which the Commission ruled, was that 
[the Act] . . . violates its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 
This argument . . . is easily decided.  “[T]he 7th Amendment 
applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States, and 
does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury 
in state courts, or the standards which must be applied 
concerning the same.”  
 
Id. (citation omitted). The Seventh Amendment provides as follows: “In 
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”  U.S Const. amend. VII. 
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The question remained, however, with regard to whether state 
constitutions guaranteed – and may continue to guarantee – such a 
right.  Some legislatures, like that of Pennsylvania, sought to avoid 
the problem altogether by codifying the fiction that the law was 
elective, so that the parties were perceived as having waived the right 
to any jury trial.75  Other states, like California, addressed the 
problem via constitutional amendment by providing “[t]he legislature 
may provide for the settlement of any disputes arising under the 
legislation . . . by arbitration, or by an industrial accident board, by 
the courts, or by either any or all of these agencies, anything in this 
constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.”76  The Montana 
Supreme Court, meanwhile, dismissed the argument by 
conceptualizing “adjustment of claims” as “an administrative 
function and not a judicial proceeding, and it is only in certain cases 
falling under the latter designation that trial by jury is guaranteed by 
the Constitution.  ‘Due process of law’ does not necessarily require a 
jury trial.”77  
Notably, the current day reasoning of Pennsylvania courts is 
that, while the state constitution preserves “[t]rial by jury as 
heretofore,” such guarantee “does not . . . prevent the legislature from 
creating and providing modes or tribunals other than the jury trial for 
the determination or adjustment of rights and liabilities which were 
not in existence prior to the adoption of the state constitution . . . .”78  
Still, an early version of the Maryland Act was declared 
unconstitutional, seemingly because it failed to provide for a jury 
trial.79  As an apparent result, the legislature was sure to allow for 
                                                          
75 Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 99 A. 215 (Pa. 1916).  
76 Western Indemnity Co. v. A.J. Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 400 (Cal. 
1915)(internal quotation marks omitted).  
77 Cunningham v. Nw. Improvement Co., 119 P. 554 (Mont. 1911).   
78 Grant v. GAF, 608 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“The legislature 
may withhold trial by jury from new judicial proceedings created by statute and 
clothed with no common law jurisdiction.”).     
79 In 1902, Maryland was the first state to pass a workers’ compensation 
law, although it was later (1904) declared unconstitutional.  According to one 
source, “Baltimore City Judge Henry Stockbridge based this judgment on the hurt 
employee’s inability to follow a jury trial.” Brianne Zarkan, The development of 
workers compensation laws and how you are defended from injury on the job, 
ABOUTCAREERS.NET  (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.aboutcareers.net/index.php/archives/2005.  See also JOHN FABIAN 
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jury trials in its subsequent enactment.80  Consequently, under current 
Maryland law and practice, the potential for a jury trial still exists, 
though the findings of the Commissioner are entitled to a 
“presumption of correctness.”81  Likewise, a right to a jury trial under 
the Texas Act (now “modified”), has always existed, because of 
constitutional concerns.82  The same concerns led the Ohio83 and 
                                                          
WITT, CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 137 (2004) (citing contemporary accounts).           
80 An expansive discussion of trial by jury under the Maryland Act is 
found in Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 144 A. 696 (Md. 1929).  The court’s 
ultimate conclusion on the issue is rather ironic.  In the court’s view, inclusion of 
trial by jury was not required to support the law’s constitutionality:  
 
It having been determined . . . that the abrogation by the act of 
common law causes of action . . .  [and substitution of workers’ 
compensation rights and remedies] was a competent exercise of 
legislative authority, there would be apparent inconsistency in 
holding, nevertheless, that a right of jury trial according to the 
course of the common law must in such cases be recognized and 
unqualifiedly enforced. The valid use of the police power for the 
remedial objects of the act placed it beyond the purview of the 
due process clause of the Federal Constitution and the equivalent 
provision of the organic law of Maryland. 
 
Id. at 697.      
81 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(b), (c) (“Conduct of appeal 
proceedings”). 
82 Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 
527 (Tex. 1991): 
 
The Act provides for a trial by jury on the principal 
compensation issues: compensability of the injury; eligibility for 
income and death benefits; and, within limits, the amount of 
those benefits…. The question presented, therefore, is whether 
the Legislature has so restricted the jury’s role in deciding these 
issues that it has transgressed the inviolate right to jury trial . . . . 
The Act does specify certain limiting procedures not found in a 
pure trial de novo. First, the jury is informed of the Commission's 
decision.  Because the jury is not required to accord that decision 
any particular weight, however, this procedure does not impinge 
on the jury's discretion in deciding the relevant factual issues. We 
hold that this procedure does not violate a claimant's right to trial 
by jury. 
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Vermont84 legislatures, among others, to allow for a jury trial after 
the adjudications of the workers’ compensation commission.  It is in 
these states, along with Washington, that eventual right to a jury trial 
endures today.  Importantly, in all instances, such a right attaches 
only after consideration of the dispute by the administrative agency.85     
 
B.  The Decision: Judicial, Not “Institutional” 
 
An objection that may be lodged against the WCJ as final 
fact-finder is that it defeats the administrative law idea that the 
agency adjudication should be “institutional.”  At first glance, this 
objection may seem to have weight, because granting a single WCJ 
fact-finding authority means depriving the multiple-member 
commission of presumed experts of the fact-finding power.   Scholars 
of administrative law, in their treatise, remark:  
                                                          
Id. 
83 See State v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602 (Ohio 1912).  In response to 
argument that the Ohio Act was unconstitutional because it deprived parties of right 
to trial by jury, the court reminded the parties that “if the board denies the 
claimant's right to participate in the fund on any ground going to the basis of his 
claim, he may by filing an appeal and petition in the ordinary form be entitled to 
trial by jury, the case proceeding as any other suit.” State, 97 N.E. at 608.  But see 
Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1004, 1011 (Ohio 2006) (“We 
have never held that a worker seeking to participate in the fund is entitled to a trial 
by jury because of . . . any . . . constitutional provision.  Rather, we consistently 
have held that the rights associated with the act are solely those conferred by the 
General Assembly.”).  
84 An expansive discussion of trial by jury under the Vermont Act 
(regarding procedure) is found in Pitts v. Howe Scale Co., 1 A.2d 695 (Vt. 1938).  
It seems likely that provision for jury trial in the Vermont Act was influenced by 
the state constitution’s still-extant proviso “that when any issue of fact, proper for 
the cognizance of a jury, is joined in a court of law, the parties have a right to trial 
by jury, which ought to be held sacred.”  Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283, 5 (Vt. 
1860).  It may be that jury trial for a work-related injury is still obligatory under the 
Vermont Constitution.  See generally Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., Inc., 624 
A.2d 1122 (Vt. 1992) (explaining Plimpton and state constitution and holding that 
claimant had right to trial by jury in her state Fair Employment Practices Act case).  
85 Critics have long argued that the persistence of revisitation of the case 
via jury trial is redundant and wasteful.  See, e.g., DODD, supra note 53, at 358 
(1936) (“Most of what we now have of trial by jury . . . is a relic of the earlier days 
when the constitutional issue as to jury trial was regarded as one of serious 
consequence . . . .”).  




The decisionmaking process in an administrative 
agency resembles the function of the judiciary in that 
facts and law are examined to reach the appropriate 
resolution of issues.  Unlike the courts, however, 
which limit the cast of characters in the process to a 
judge and his law clerk(s), an agency decision reflects 
the thought processes of numerous persons.  The 
decision becomes one of the institution, rather than a 
particular individual.86   
 
This “institutional decision-making” is a process whereby “no 
one person, but a collection of skilled persons, would be involved in 
the ultimate determination of the case.”87   
This is all unassailable, of course, but it does not describe the 
workers’ compensation process.  When workers’ compensation 
systems were created in the second decade of the twentieth century, 
the fact-finding in contested cases was undertaken in a fashion which 
suggests the institutional decision-making described above.  In this 
regard, most legislatures enacting workers’ compensation laws were 
influenced by the example of early entities like the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).  So influenced, they eliminated court 
jurisdiction over contested cases and vested them in a similar multi-
person board or commission.88  One of the earliest writers stated, 
“[i]nasmuch as the functions of the compensation authority are 
judicial as well as administrative, the board or commission type of 
                                                          
86 JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL, & BASIL J. MEZINES, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 38.01 (Lexis Nexis 2011). 
87 Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings: 
Establishing Independent Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While 
Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. 
L. JUDICIARY 119, 145 (2005).  
88 See generally Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ’s in 
Historical Perspective, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 25 (1999).  As 
discussed above, however, many jurisdictions (said to be fourteen) followed the 
example of England, and vested jurisdiction over contested cases in civil court. See 
supra Part III. Indeed, Alabama and Tennessee still entertain the litigation of such 
cases in court.  Id.         
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organization, already familiar in American practice, would seem to 
be most appropriate.”89     
Given the nascency of the workers’ compensation program, 
and its supposedly scientific principles, this is not surprising.   
Administration by commission had, after all, traditionally “been 
championed by those who believe that administrative regulation 
requires a high degree of expert[ise], a master[ing] of technical 
detail[s], and continuity and stability of policy.”90  “Doubtless,” an 
early critic noted, “it is necessary, or at least advisable, that any 
compensation law should be supervised by some public body.”91  A 
historian of the pioneer Wisconsin Commission further explains that 
the intellectuals of the Progressive Era who were behind the creation 
of compensation programs “sanctioned administrative labor law on 
the grounds of representativeness.”  They endorsed, for example, 
such things as “safety code advisory committees that gave ‘due 
weight’ to [both] employer and worker viewpoints.”92  
Thus, the multiple-person commissions, entities often 
comprised of politically-appointed representatives of labor and 
                                                          
89 E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 72 (1924).  
90 M.H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 4 (1955).  
91 BRADBURY, supra note 14, at 960.  
92 ROGERS, supra note 46, at 48. Rogers, notably, identifies a subtle 
distinction between the early (and enduring) workers’ compensation boards and 
those created two decades later, in the 1930’s, by the New Deal.  According to 
Rogers, the New Dealers contended “that administrators needed relief from three-
branch American government to apply independent technical judgment to modern 
problems.” Id. This thinking had nothing to do with the origins of workers’ 
compensation.  This distinction is important, as it contrasts workers’ compensation 
adjudication from other aspects of the “administrative law state.”  Contested 
workers’ compensation cases in most states find their forum in an administrative 
law setting, but the system, as noted in the accompanying text, finds it genesis in a 
reform occurring well before the New Deal and the “rise” of administrative law 
agencies.  Remembering the distinction is helpful, as on occasion, critics of the 
growth of agency power uncritically include workers’ compensation adjudication.  
See, e.g., Daniel R. Schuckers & Kyle Applegate, The Rise of Pennsylvania’s 
Administrative Agencies and Legislative and Judicial Attempts to Constrain Them, 
81 PA. BAR ASS’N QUARTERLY 124 (July 2010).  While room for criticism of 
workers’ compensation adjudication may exist, the system is not part of the agency 
growth that some consider a menace to separation of powers principles.    
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employer groups,93 and/or others presumed to have some special 
expertise or insight into issues surrounding the program, were the 
original workers’ compensation fact-finders.   
This did not mean, however, that this multiple member group 
was producing the type of “institutional decision” characterized 
above.  Compensation commissions well understood – or learned – 
from the very beginning that when adjudicating disputes between two 
parties (i.e., employer/insurance carrier and employee) over 
compensability, they were undertaking what had theretofore been 
handled as a judicial function in civil court.94  While commissions 
had many other responsibilities in terms of executing and enforcing 
policy (many still do), when adjudicating contested cases, they were 
not dealing with issues of regulation, but were instead sitting as 
impartial adjudicators, just as trial judges had in the displaced 
industrial accident tort cases.95  Workers’ compensation cases have 
always been recognized as adversarial.96    
This was certainly made clear in Pennsylvania, where the 
Supreme Court, immediately upon enactment of the law, reversed a 
referee decision and held that in disputed cases objected-to hearsay 
was legally incompetent evidence, just as it was in civil court, and 
could not support an agency adjudication on workers’ compensation 
                                                          
93 See, e.g., Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. 
App.1995) (court explaining original formation, and evolution of, Missouri 
commission).  A discussion of the early commissions and boards may be found in 
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration of Workmen’s 
Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REV.119, 131 (1951-1952).   
94 See David B. Torrey, The Rules of Evidence Under the Pennsylvania 
Workmen’s Compensation Act: Sources and Theoretical Considerations, 29 DUQ. 
L. REV. 447, 451-53 (1991). 
95  See DODD, supra note 53, at 101 (“We may classify as quasi-judicial 
the action of administrative bodies in passing upon contested claims, . . .”); id. at 
320 (“Such a Board has the dignity and the form of many of our courts, the only 
distinction being that of name.”).  See also DOUGLAS ARGYLE CAMPBELL, 
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION: INSURANCE, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE (1935).  
This early California treatise author drew a distinction between “judicial fact-
findings,” such as those generated by the Industrial Accident Commission (IAC), 
and “administrative findings” such as those produced by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  Campbell also noted that California courts had immediately held that 
the findings of fact of the IAC were final and had the same import as those of a jury 
in a civil case. Id.   
96 DODD, supra note 53, at 53. 
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entitlement.97  Cross-examination, another early court decision 
admonished, constituted “a fundamental right, without which the 
prime essentials of a fair trial, according to Anglo-American 
standards of justice, are not preserved.  The [B]oard [and referees], 
not less than the courts, must obey the indispensable basic mandates 
of our jurisprudence.”98  The experience in Connecticut was the 
same.  “Our courts have,” declared one of the state’s original 
commissioners, “by their own actions, made it clear that, however 
informal the methods, the real essentials of justice inherent in any 
proper effort to determine property rights, must be found.”  The 
“Commissioner is not a judge,” he admonished, but “proceedings … 
have the same practical results as ordinary judicial actions.”  He is 
“to act in the enforcement of contract rights and not to be an almoner 
of bounty . . . .”99  This universal understanding led to Larson’s 
assertion quoted above: “[T]he compensation commission[,] while 
deciding controverted claims[,] is as far towards the judicial end of 
the spectrum as it is possible to go without being an outright 
court.”100   
The upshot of all this is that, while the final fact-finding was 
undertaken collectively, as if the “institutional model” of 
adjudication was being undertaken, in effect the commission adhered 
to what has been termed the “judicial” model of administrative 
adjudication.  In contrast to the institutional model, this model 
dictates that “the administrative process should resemble judicial 
process as closely as possible. The administrative judge should 
personally listen to the evidence and argument, have no 
preconceptions about the case, receive no information about the case 
except through on-the-record submissions, and be completely 
independent of investigators and prosecutors.”101   
                                                          
97 McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 104 A. 617 (Pa. 1918).   
98 Cowan v. Bunting Glider Co., 49 A.2d 270, 271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946).           
99 Remarks of Commissioner George H. Beers, in BRADBURY, supra note 
14, at 965-67.  
100 LARSON, supra note 1, § 79:90.  
101 See Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central 
Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 500 (2001) (quoting Michael Asimow et al., State and 
Federal Administrative Law § 2.0 (2d ed. 1998)).  For another discussion of the 
basic difference between agency rulemaking and agency adjudication, see Toni M. 
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This is the model that has prevailed from the outset and exists 
today.  Still, on occasion, the distinction can escape a court.  In a 
Longshore case, for example, the ALJ (the final fact-finder), had 
credited the claimant’s expert and found that claimant’s stroke was 
caused by work conditions.  On appeal, the Benefits Review Board 
(BRB), undertaking substantial evidence “whole record” review, 
criticized the claimant’s expert opinion, reassessed credibility, and 
reversed.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
however, reversed, concluding that substantial evidence supported 
the ALJ’s decision, and reinstated his award.  The dissent, however, 
complained as follows:  
 
Under [our precedents], reviewing courts have looked 
independently at the record before the ALJ to 
determine if the ALJ’s findings were supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.  This 
scope of review effectively removes the BRB from the 
hierarchy established to administer the 
workman’s[sic] compensation programs. 
 
Yet the BRB, a body with significant accumulated 
experience, competence and memory with the run of 
workman’s [sic] compensation cases, found [the 
ALJ’s] theory of causation of Burns’ stroke not 
plausible.  For us to be obliged to dismiss this 
judgment – essentially the product of superior 
institutional competence – out of hand appears 
anomalous.  I am, however, uncertain whether any 
other course, any different scope or review, is even 
theoretically available to a court of appeals under this 
statute; review of the BRB's finding for substantial 
evidence is apparently foreclosed by the statutorily-
dictated relationship between BRB and ALJ. . . .  If no 
other scope of review of the BRB than the present one 
                                                          
Fine, Appellate Practice on Review of Agency Action: A Guide for Practitioners, 28 
U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990).  
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is feasible, though, the statutory structure makes little 
sense to me.102 
  
These complaints miss the point, however, that neither the 
ALJ nor the BRB were supposed to be employing institutional skills.  
Both were, instead, charged with being unbiased and impartial.   
Having said all this, an arguable irony exists.  In practice, 
aspects of the institutional model existed, and endure, in most 
workers’ compensation jurisdictions, regardless of whether the WCJ 
or commission is ultimate fact-finder.  The judge (or commission), 
for example, may well have considerable powers of investigation to 
advance an inquiry into issues beyond those presented by the parties, 
and may enlist the power and resources of the agency to assist him.103  
He may, further, have the option, or even obligation, of seeking the 
opinion of a staff or contract physician to provide an impartial 
medical opinion as to causation, disability, and impairment.104  In the 
end, however, the commission or judge, despite these investigatory 
powers, has always been an independent decision-maker, not an 
advocate for any side, and he or she was not and is not 
conceptualized as implementing agency policy via institutional 
decision. 
 
C.  The Orthodox Rule: Commission and Subordinate Officer 
 
The orthodox model, which still predominates,105 originated 
in the first place because of the need for commissions to delegate the 
                                                          
102 Burns v. Dir., OWCP Programs, 41 F.3d 1555 (D.C. Cir.1994) 
(Silberman, J., concurring).  
103 See, e.g., 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 831 (West 2011) (WCJ may “appoint 
one or more impartial physicians or surgeons to examine the injuries of the plaintiff 
and report thereon.”). 
104 See generally Alex Swedlow, Social Policies of Disability Evaluation, 
in WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM? WHERE ARE WE 
GOING? (Richard A. Victor & Linda Carrubba, eds., 2010) (noting that “[i]n many 
states, industrial accident boards create rating bureaus to interpret the disability 
schedule and to make recommendations to judges and administrators as to the 
extent of disability based on medical evidence.”).       
105 While the predominate approach is for the Commission to retain final 
adjudication powers, most states have abandoned the process of appeal de novo 
from the decision of the Commission to the trial or other courts.  For an early 
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evidence-collection and proposed fact-finding to hearing officers.  In 
a few states, notably, including Connecticut, Maine, and under the 
Longshore Act, no delegation existed, as volume was apparently such 
that the commissioner himself could hear and see the witnesses and 
then make his decision.106   
The preeminent analyst of the day, Walter F. Dodd, studied 
compensation systems in the early 1930’s, and observed: “[I]n the 
organization for the administration of workmen’s compensation, 
there must be provision for the hearing of contested issues by officers 
designated for this purpose or by individual members of the board . . . 
.”107  Indeed, in a jurisdiction with “a large number of contested 
[cases] and a small compensation board or in which the 
administration is [trusted] to a single officer, the use of referees, 
examiners or arbitrators for such hearings thus becomes 
necessary.”108 
One will recall that the original theory was that the 
Commission was supposed to be a professional body composed of 
experts.109 Under this original thinking, the Commission, and not its 
                                                          
recounting of this process, and a critique of the same, see Dodd, supra note 53, at 
338-407. Dodd criticized this process because of delay in finality and defeat of the 
idea that a commission could more expertly adjudicate the cases with regard to 
which they were supposed to be expert.  Id.    
Further, in the present day commissions operating under the original 
model do not usually hear evidence. See, e.g., Webb v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 
733 S.W.2d 726, 726 (Ark. 1987) (describing Arkansas system, court remarks, 
“[t]here may have been a time when the commission actually heard witnesses give 
live testimony when its members wished to redo the work of the ALJ.  Given the 
numbers of claims today, however, that would be impractical if not impossible.”).  
106 All have, notably, evolved over the decades so that intra-agency review 
exists.  In all, the Commissioner, Hearing Officer, and Deputy Commissioner 
(respectively) are currently the final fact-finders.  See infra Section V.     
107 DODD, supra note 53, at 785.   
108 Id. 
109 Whether this goal was always met seems to be in question.  Harvard-
trained Massachusetts lawyer, Samuel Horovitz, for example, complained in his 
1946 treatise: 
 
In the courts, judges are usually limited to lawyers and persons 
skilled in the law.  Commissioners or referees or board members 
(whatever their local title) are chosen from all walks of life.  
Though lawyers predominate, a board may consist, as one did, of 
an “undertaker, a farmer and a printer.” 
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subordinate, was considered to be in the best position to find the 
facts.  Dodd, likely articulating the unanimous view, spoke to this 
issue in the seminal 1936 study, Administration of Workmen’s 
Compensation:   
 
And an efficient administration requires an 
administrative review of both fact and law by a body 
or officer whose judgment will not be controlled or 
primarily influenced by the decision of the referee, 
examiner, or arbitrator in the original administrative 
hearing. . . . [T]here should be an opportunity for an 
administrative review by an impartial body which has 
not theretofore passed upon the issues, and which may 
hear evidence in addition to that presented at the 
original hearing.  Such review is desirable, not only 
for the protection of the parties, but also for the 
prompt disposition of the cases and in order to relieve 
the courts of a duty which may be more satisfactorily 
performed by a body devoting its primary attention to 
workmen’s compensation.110  
 
As foreshadowed above, Dodd actually favored systems 
where the Commission could take more evidence in the event of a 
party’s appeal or request for review:  
 
For the supervision of administrative work a single 
officer has been regarded as better than a board, but a 
board or commission has normally been regarded as 
more satisfactory than a single officer for purposes of 
review.  The reviewing body under workmen’s 
compensation bears a close analogy to a court of 
review, and consideration of the merits by several 
persons has its advantages.  But, to obtain this 
                                                          
  
SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION LAWS 384 (1944).    
110  DODD, supra note 53, at 785.  When Dodd was writing this work in 
1936, a sizeable number of states allowed de novo review in the trial courts.   
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advantage, the members of a board must hear, 
consider, and determine the issues.111   
 
It was not only organizational theory that led such a skilled 
observer to favor intra-agency de novo review.  Importantly, by 
“protection of the parties,”112 Dodd was also referring to the 
perceived need for correction of the initial decision of a subordinate 
who could not necessarily be trusted in all cases to make a reliable, or 
even competent, decision.   
Doubtless the quality of such early hearing officers varied 
markedly among the states in the early decades.113  Dodd’s 
examination of the adjudication scene in the early 1930s, however, 
left him appalled at the quality of referees in many important states.  
Dodd seemed satisfied with the Wisconsin examiners,114 but he found 
the New York referees poorly trained and the Pennsylvania referees 
short-term patronage hires.115  His harshest words, however, were 
saved for Illinois arbitrators:  
 
With few exceptions the arbitrators in Illinois have 
been selected and have held their positions because of 
political connections and by no means because of their 
fitness for the work.  As a result, most of them have 
no background in the compensation field, are not 
interested in it, and have no initial comprehension of 
its importance and difficulty. 116  
 
                                                          
111 Id. at 795.  The early treatise writer, Downey, also took for granted that 
the commission would be the final fact-finder.  “The board,” he declared, “should 
have plenary power to review the decisions of a referee or a single commissioner 
both as to the law and facts and in the form either of a hearing de novo or of a 
review of the findings upon the record.”  DOWNEY, supra note 89, at 73.   
112 DODD, supra note 53, at 785. 
113 The author of an early California treatise, Campbell, identified himself 
on the title page of his book as a California Workmen’s Compensation Referee and 
a teacher of the field at the University of California.  See generally CAMPBELL, 
supra note 95.  
114  DODD, supra note 53, at 258 (noting that the commission would ratify 
the examiner’s decision in 99% of the cases).    
115 See id. at 269-77. 
116  Id. at 285. 
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Indeed, “[s]ome of the arbitrators have been almost 
illiterate.”117  An individual, he continued, “without 
experience or capacity who by political influence is 
able to obtain an appointment as a referee or arbitrator 
in Illinois, Pennsylvania or New York will provide a 
handicap rather than an aid . . . .”118  The idea that 
such marginal, subordinate individuals would be the 
fact-finders in a compensation system would have 
been absurd to Dodd.119  
 
D.  Critique of Trial De Novo and Other Multi-tiered Fact-finding 
 
To read the historical critical analyses of workers’ 
compensation is to expose oneself to an alarming narrative of a noble 
idea run amuck at the very outset.  There was no Belle Époque for 
the system. 
 Many, for example, complained that several states initially 
refused to create supportive administrative agencies, leaving it to 
courts – ill-equipped for the task – to preside over the new law.120  
Others have asserted that common law judges derailed workers’ 
compensation within the first few decades by imposing excessive 
legalities on its administrative structures.121  Starting in the 1940s, 
and extending until the early 1970s, a frequent complaint heard was 
                                                          
117  Id.      
118 Id. 
119 Id.  A New York workers’ compensation referee was depicted as a 
hack in the autobiographical novel, Christ in Concrete.  See PIETRO DI DONATO, 
CHRIST IN CONCRETE (1939).  In that case, the worker, an Italian immigrant, 
suffered a work-related death from a fall into liquid concrete.  His widow’s claim 
was opposed by the insurance company because the employer had allegedly failed 
to reveal all of its work locations.  At a tumultuous hearing, presumably convened 
in 1923, the aloof “Referee Parker” chums around with the defense lawyer and 
ignores the pro se dependents.  The novel was later turned into a movie, Give Us 
This Day.   
120  DODD, supra note 53, at 98-99.     
121 SOMERS, supra note 23, at 157 (“[M]ost commissions, under severe 
pressure from many sources, are being pushed, or are retreating, into an ever-
increasing legalistic atmosphere.”).     
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that coverage and benefits were woefully inadequate.122  In the 
present day, the persistent stance of business is that benefits are now 
so generous, and procedures so lax, that costs are out of control and 
many employees malinger or otherwise take advantage of the 
system.123   
These are all macro-level critiques.  A micro-level critique, 
on the other hand, has been that, for those cases that are contested, 
the adjudicatory scheme set up to handle such disputes is too 
unwieldy and time-consuming.  The complaint is intuitively valid – 
after all, the entire purpose of displacing negligence liability and 
contests in court was to provide prompt recovery via the operative 
principle of no-fault.  Granted, all realized at the outset that contested 
cases would exist (they did, after all, in England), but to construct a 
dispute resolution system that did not expedite cases was antithetical 
to the whole purpose of the law.    
Yet this is what many states did.  As summarized by Dodd, as 
of the 1930s (and extending well after), the typical compensation 
program was set up so that the facts of a contested case could be 
visited up to three times:  
 
(1) A hearing by a referee, examiner, arbitrator, or by 
a member of the administering body;   
(2) A review, with the possibility of introducing new 
testimony, before a board of several persons, or before 
an officer superior to the one who held the original 
hearing;  
(3) An appeal to a trial court or to an intermediate 
court of review, with the issues in most cases heard by 
the court on the basis of the record made in the 
administrative review noted under (2) above[.]124   
 
In many instances, the third-level consideration was de novo 
review.  This multi-tiered review, particularly de novo review in the 
trial courts, was assailed for decades.  As discussed above, Dodd 
distrusted the referee and favored the commission as fact-finder, but 
                                                          
122 See, e.g., Arthur Larson, “Model-T” Compensation Acts in the Atomic 
Age, 18 NAT’L ASS’N CLAIMANTS COUNS. OF AM. L.J. 39 (1956).  
123 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 9, at 5-6.   
124  DODD, supra note 53, at 114.    
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he also denounced trial de novo (reassessment of the facts) in the 
courts:           
  
       Judicial review by trial de novo is open to all the 
objections that apply to court administration, and if 
trial de novo is with a jury, an even greater lack of 
uniformity of administration is introduced.  Not only 
this, but a cumbersome and expensive procedure is 
established if evidence is to be introduced on an 
administrative hearing, and then is to be introduced 
again on judicial review, if such review is sought.  
Another objection to trial de novo is that it affords an 
opportunity to withhold testimony in the 
administrative hearing and present it in the judicial 
proceeding, if either party thinks this to his interest.  
In the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis, the 
administrative proceeding thus becomes “an inquiry 
preliminary to a contest in the courts,” rather than a 
less cumbersome and less expensive means of 
determining the controversy.125  
 
The critics, Somers & Somers, writing in 1954, joined Dodd 
in decrying this multi-tiered system of adjudication.  They counted 
twenty-two states, as of that year, still allowing the court, upon a 
party’s appeal, to “pass on questions of fact.”126  “There are all 
degrees of fact review,” they added, “among this group.  In most, the 
review is on the record made by the Commission, but a few permit 
reopening the entire case from scratch.”127   
The authors reproduced a portion of a 1951 IAIABC-
endorsed report on this issue: “Trial de novo in the trial courts, often 
with trial by jury, is the worst possible mode of judicial review, since 
it transfers to the courts the Commission’s full power of decision and 
                                                          
 
125  Id. at 369-70.    
126 SOMERS, supra note 23, at 157.  
127  Id.  See also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the 
Administration of Workmen’s Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REV. 119, 132 (1952) 
(“It is . . . more than doubtful whether such duplication serves any useful 
purpose.”).   
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introduces slower and more expensive judicial procedure in the 
compensation case . . . . ”128  That year, the IAIABC took the position 
that judicial review “in all cases”129 should be on the record 
developed by the commission, “and upon questions of law alone – 
including the question of whether there is evidence to support the 
finding complained of – but without power in the court to 
redetermine the weight of the evidence.”130  
The type of havoc that multi-tiered fact-finding could cause in 
the trenches of litigation is well illustrated by the complaints of a 
Florida lawyer in the late 1940s.131  Under the law and practice at that 
time, the findings of the Florida Deputy Commissioner were said to 
be upheld routinely by the Industrial Commission.132  But, rather 
oddly, the district court had the power to reassess credibility, with the 
state supreme court undertaking “clearly erroneous” appellate 
review.133   The lawyer expressed his frustration in frank terms:  
 
[T]he risk and expense of an appeal make it 
impossible for the claimant to obtain relief, and . . . 
many cases . . . are dropped when the Circuit Court 
has ruled adversely. . . .   
 
           For one thing, an appeal takes time and money.  
The attorney represents a client who, as a general rule, 
can pay him only in the event of final victory.  He 
runs the risk of spending a year in litigation, making 
two trips to Tallahassee to argue the case, and 
expending his own monies in railroad fares, hotel 
bills, stenographic costs, and meals away from home, 
all on a mere contingency.134   
                                                          
128 SOMERS, supra note 23, at 159.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. (quoting COMM. ON ADMIN. & PROC., REP. OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
ADMIN. AND PROC. OF 1951 IAIABC CONVENTION, reproduced in U.S. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STANDARDS, BULLETIN NO. 15696-97). 
131 Lester Harris, Appeals in Workmen’s Compensation Cases, 2 MIAMI L. 
Q. 215 (1948).  
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134  Id. at 223.     
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“Nor[,]” he added, “do the burdens of an appeal rest equally 
on both parties.”135  Defense counsel, he posited, would prosper by 
this multi-tiered process: “[T]he only way [for him] to hold a good 
retainer is to show a record of constant litigation successfully 
handled, even at the expense of the poor devil of a workman.”136   
One of the writer’s solutions was to make the Deputy 
Commissioner the final fact-finder.137  In this recommendation, he 
was perhaps prophetic, for, as discussed below, this is precisely how 
the state supreme court ruled three years later, in 1951.  
 
V.  THE TREND AWAY FROM THE ORTHODOX MODEL 
 
A.   The National Commission 
 
The modern history of workers’ compensation commences 
with the formation of the National Commission on State Workmen’s 
Compensation Laws.  The Commission was established by Congress 
as part of the landmark passage of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1969.138  The commission was charged with evaluating 
state workers’ compensation laws and with making recommendations 
for improvements of the same.139  The Commission, in 1972, 
promulgated nineteen “essential recommendations” for an adequate 
state workers’ compensation law.140  The federal government, 
meanwhile, communicated to states the idea that failure to improve 
                                                          
135  Id.  
136 Harris, supra note 131, at 223.  
137  Id. at 224.  
138 The definitive up-to-date discussions of the National Commission are 
found in John F. Burton, Jr., The National Commission on State Workmen’s 
Compensation Laws: Some Reflections by the Former Chairman, 40 INT’L ASS’N 
OF INDUS. ACCIDENT BOARDS & COMMISSIONS J. 15 (Fall 2003); John F. Burton, 
Jr., The National Commission 33 Years Later: What Have We Learned? (Part I), 
42 INT’L ASS’N OF INDUS. ACCIDENT BOARDS & COMMISSIONS J. 21 (Fall 2005); 
John F. Burton, Jr., The National Commission 33 Years Later: What Have We 
Learned? (Part II), 43 INT’L ASS’N OF INDUS. ACCIDENT BOARDS & COMMISSIONS 
J. 21(Spring 2006).    
139 See id.  
140 NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at 
26. 
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their systems accordingly could result in federal action.141  The 
adjudicatory scene described above, with board or commission in 
most states serving as final fact-finder, still prevailed when the 
Commission issued its report.142   
The Commission called for expeditious litigation and 
adjudication, and, like the critics noted above, disapproved of de 
novo review of compensation awards in the trial court.  The 
Commission, however, found it acceptable that the commission was 
to be the final fact-finder (it did, however, encourage commissions to 
presume its hearing officers’ decisions were correct on the facts).  
Recommendation 6.14 provides, “We recommend that where there is 
an appellate level within the workmen’s compensation agency, the 
decisions of the workmen’s compensation agency be reviewed by the 
courts only on questions of law.”143  The Report thereupon states: 
“The decision of the hearing examiner could be appealed to the 
appeals board, which could overrule the hearing examiner on 
questions of fact and of law.  The decision of the hearing examiner, 
however, should be presumed correct and the appeal should not stay 
the examiner’s award.”144   
A review of the Commission’s multi-volume supportive 
studies (a treasure-trove of information) demonstrates that reforming 
the adjudicative process of compensation acts was not a priority for 
the Commission.  Indeed, not one of the supportive studies discretely 
addresses adjudication.  One of the Commission’s consultants did 
recommend expediting controverted cases, having noted that “[i]t has 
been estimated that a period of 15 months to two  or three years is 
occasionally required for a case to run the gamut of hearings, 
reviews, and court appeals.”145  In the end, however, the consultant 
ultimately concurred with a like-minded reform advocacy, that of the 
                                                          
141 Id. The National Commission did not, however, advocate 
federalization.   
142 Id. 
143  Id. at 108.  
144 Id.  
145 See Milton Brooke, Administering Workmen’s Compensation Cases in 
California, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, & Wisconsin, in 3 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION LAWS 77, 91 (1973). 
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Council of State Governments (CSG).146  The CSG in its 
recommendations took for granted reassessment of the facts by the 
commission.147    
Indeed, Section 34 of the Council of State Government’s 
Model Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law (“Appeals 
to the Board”), provides: 
 
[T]he [Appeals] Board shall have the power to review 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and exercise of 
discretion by the . . . hearing officer in hearing, 
determining or otherwise handling of any 
compensation case and may affirm, reverse or modify 
any compensation case upon review or remand such 
case to the Director for further proceedings and 
action.148 
 
The Commentary to this section clarifies: 
 
From the order of the hearing officer . . . an appeal lies 
to the . . . AppealBoard, which has the power to 
review both finding of facts and conclusions of law, 
but not to take new evidence.  If further development 
of the facts is found necessary, the case may be 
remanded for appropriate action.149  
  
The Interdepartmental Workers’ Compensation Taskforce 
that continued the work of the Commission likewise did not have 
reform of adjudicative process as a priority.  Its 1977 Report to the 
President and Congress makes no reference to the subject.  The only 
item that approaches the subject is the recommendation that “[if] a 
hearing is requested or necessary, it should be held within [forty-five] 
                                                          
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 The Council of State Governments, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND 
REHABILITATION LAW WITH SECTION BY SECTION COMMENTARY 145-46 (1973).  
Thanks to John F. Burton, Jr., Esq., for providing the Author with a copy of this 
commentary.  
149 Id.    
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days from the time of the accident, unless the State agency grants an 
extension.”150  
This lack of priority given to adjudication reform by both the 
National Commission and the CSG is not surprising.  The leaders of 
the National Commission desired a system where only a few 
contested cases would ever require litigation.  They hoped, 
specifically, that improved agency responses to workers’ injury 
reports, incentives on employers to pay claims, and informal dispute 
resolution procedures would quell disputes before the parties ever got 
near the judge’s hearing room.   
Indeed, these bold reformers declared that a workers’ 
compensation system that featured significant litigation, and hence 
adjudication, was dysfunctional.  The Commission’s report states, 
“Workmen’s Compensation can be undermined by excessive 
litigation . . . . [A properly functioning] agency must adjudicate 
claims which cannot be resolved voluntarily.  Adjudication, however, 
should be a secondary task.  If the agency is performing well in 
fulfilling . . . [its pro-active] obligations [like oversight and claims 
counseling], there will be little need for adjudication.”151  With this 
type of orientation, it is not surprising that adjudication system 
design – beyond favoring the abolition of the long-maligned trial de 
novo – was not a priority.152  
While the National Commission did find acceptable the commission 
as final fact finder, it advocated that the administrative aspects of a 
                                                          
150  UNITED STATES INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
TASK FORCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: IS THERE A BETTER WAY? A REPORT ON 
THE NEED FOR REFORM OF STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 52 (Commerce 
Clearing House 1977).  The Task Force, notably, mailed a survey to all 50 state 
workers’ compensation agencies, asking for descriptions of various administrative 
aspects of state programs.  The actual questionnaire that was utilized, addressing 
“Contested Cases,” is reproduced in a volume of Taskforce studies that reported on 
the results of the survey.  Oddly, no table was created to show the results of the 
contested cases inquiry. The explanation: “The tabulations on the ‘contested cases’ 
portion of the survey were omitted because the responses were meager and did not 
merit publication.” JOHN LEWIS, A SURVEY OF STATE AGENCIES 301 
(Interdepartmental Taskforce Studies, 1975). 
151 NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at 
100.  
152 Richard Victor has noted that the “1972 national commission . . . dealt 
with a wide range of issues, but few recommendations addressed the back end of 
claims.” Victor, supra note 29, at 102. 
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commission’s work should be separate from its adjudicatory 
functions and that employees of the commission should be 
professionalized – that is, become entitled to civil service protections.  
This emphasis influenced Pennsylvania and the Longshore Act to 
enact organizational reform.  In Pennsylvania, notably, the WCJ 
became the final fact-finder as part of these reforms, and the judge 
under the Longshore Act maintained this traditional role (though his 
title was changed from Deputy Commissioner to “hearing 
examiner.”)153  
 
B.  Reaction to the National Commission 
 
The force that has, in critical aspect, fueled the trend towards 
making the WCJ the final fact-finder can also be traced to the 
National Commission – but in a different way.  The more recent 
(1980s-1990s) impetus has been a response to the increase in 
litigation in workers’ compensation systems.  That increase unfolded 
in the wake of National Commission-inspired liberalizations in terms 
of coverage and benefits and their attendant system costs.  Litigation 
crises in many states prompted counter-reforms that have featured 
both retractions in coverage and benefits154 and attempts at reducing 
or streamlining litigation and dispute resolution.155   
The most remarkable developments in the realm of dispute 
resolution reform have been the surge in mediation programs156 and 
the trend of states allowing compromise settlements with full 
release.157  However, legislatures have also tried to adjust 
                                                          
153 See infra Section V(D).   
154 See generally WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME 
FROM? WHERE ARE WE GOING?, supra note 104.      
155 See generally Thomason, supra note 30, at 291-92. 
156 See generally Howard W. Cummins, From Conflict to Conflict 
Resolution: Establishing ALJ Driven Mediation Programs in Workers’ 
Compensation Cases, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 391 (2010); David 
B. Torrey, Mediation of Workers’ Compensation Cases Under the Pennsylvania 
Act, IAIABC Annual Convention, Philadelphia, PA (September 2005) (monograph 
on file with the Author); Lex Larson, Mediation of Industrial Commission Cases, 
17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 395 (1995).  
157 David B. Torrey, Compromise Settlements Under State Workers’ 
Compensation Acts: Law, Policy, Practice and Ten Years of the Pennsylvania 
Experience, 16 WIDENER L.J. 199 (2007).    
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adjudication systems so that those cases that cannot be mediated 
and/or settled can proceed to a more prompt and final adjudication.  
One device to effect such change is to make the adjudication of the 
WCJ final as to the fact-findings.   
The elimination of multiple levels of factual review has been 
desired by employers and the insurance industry – the proponents of 
the counter-reform – who find such multiple reviews to be costly.  In 
1991, writers for the Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.), a carrier 
lobby, authored a short, representative book in which they set forth 
an extensive agenda for change in response to the costs and litigation 
crises noted above.158  Among other things, these commentators 
declared: 
 
The arrangements for reviewing initial determinations 
in cases involving disputed claims vary significantly 
among the states, but the nature and scope of appellate 
review can directly affect system costs . . . . [C]osts 
are likely to be greater and the role of attorneys 
enhanced when appellate review, whether 
administrative or judicial, is not limited to questions 
of law but rather can include reconsideration of the 
questions of fact determined at the initial hearing.159 
 
Another reform group, the Blue Ribbon Panel of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, was explicit in its call for the WCJ 
to be the final fact-finder:  
 
In disputed cases the parties are entitled to a full and 
fair hearing of the factual issues . . . . Some 
jurisdictions have allowed a retrial of factual issues at 
an administrative or judicial appellate level.  Most of 
the Panel members believe that the system should be 
designed to limit the resolution of factual issues to the 
                                                          
158 KRAMER, supra note 9, at 40.   
159 Id.  The authors added, “An extreme case of inefficient dispute 
resolution was the trial ‘de novo’ procedure employed in Texas prior to the 
enactment of recent reform legislation, in which information developed during the 
administrative process could not even be admitted at the jury trial on a workers’ 
compensation claim.”  Id. 
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hearing officer, with review only of legal issues 
(including the question of whether the hearing 
officer’s findings of fact were supported by the 
evidence) by the administrative review body and the 
courts.  A variation of this approach is to permit the 
administrative review body to consider the factual 
decisions made below, but reverse them only when 
they are clearly extreme when compared to the 
findings made by other hearing officers in cases 
involving similar factual situations.160 
 
Researcher Terry Thomason, along with his colleagues in 
their 1998 essay, identified the same concern over cumbersome 
adjudication procedures.  Employers and carriers, they pointed out, 
have appreciated that contested cases constitute a large portion of 
workers’ compensation administration costs, and they have lobbied 
policymakers and legislatures to eliminate system features that 
increase such costs.  “Streamlining appeal procedures” is one aspect 
of this lobby.161 
 
C.  Jurisdictions Ahead of the Trend 
 
This Author identifies multiple states that have broken with 
the orthodox rule in response to post-National Commission crisis and 
counter-reform.  This article, however, seeks to identify all 
                                                          
160 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 13 (1994).  The Report further remarks, “At least one 
member of the Panel believes that the review body should have the absolute right to 
make its own findings of fact, to prevent wide variations in the results of cases 
involving similar facts.”  Still, “[o]ther Panel members are concerned that this 
approach encourages the losing party in every case to seek administrative review in 
order to get ‘another bite at the apple.’”  Id.  
161 Thomason, supra note 30, at 292 (“Recent reform proposals have 
sought to lower transaction costs by eliminating adversarial processes – such as 
substitution of independent medical examiners for “dueling doctors[”] – or by 
eliminating or streamlining appeal procedures, including alternative dispute 
resolution procedures like final offer selection arbitration.  However, theory and 
research reviewed in this chapter suggest that a reduction in the quantum of due 
process could result in a greater probability of judicial error.”).  For an explanation 
of the “final offer selection process” in workers’ compensation cases, see LESLIE I. 
BODEN, REDUCING LITIGATION: EVIDENCE FROM WISCONSIN 32 (1988). 
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jurisdictions in which the WCJ is, or has been, the final fact-finder.  
Accordingly, it is important to note that some programs have always 
had the first-level hearing officer as the final fact-finder.  These states 
can be regarded as being ahead of the trend. 
 
Longshore Act. The Longshore Act has long been in this 
category.  In fact, the Deputy Commissioner was the fact-finder at 
the time the law was enacted in 1927.  One early authority ventured 
that “no doubt because of the great distances sometimes involved[,] 
no provision was made for any administrative review by the 
Commission prior to the review . . . by United States district courts 
on questions of law.”162 
Appeals went to federal district courts, which exercised 
substantial evidence review. This process prevailed from 1927 until 
the reorganization of the law and the creation of the Benefits Review 
Board in 1972.163  The changes of that year left the hearing officer 
the fact-finder, though the Deputy Commissioner title was changed to 
“hearing examiner” (and back, notably, to “ALJ” in 1978).  Of some 
note is that this novel status came to the attention of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which held that the law definitively established the 
Deputy Commissioner as the finder of facts (though facts 
“jurisdictional” in nature could be reviewed).164  Justice Hughes, 
authoring the opinion, noted in general that “the obvious purpose of 
the legislation [is] to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and 
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact 
                                                          
162  DODD, supra note 53, at 326-27 (quoting a 1934 report of the United 
States Employees’ Compensation Commission).    
163 See, e.g., Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 334 (1953) (“findings of the 
Deputy Commissioner are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by 
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole”).  See also Wheeling 
Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1930) (“it is clear that 
[the statute] does not contemplate a hearing de novo in the District Court or 
authorize that court to weigh the evidence taken before the Deputy Commissioner 
or review the facts as found by him. The compensation order may be set aside only 
if it is found to be ‘not in accordance with law,’ i.e. if it is based upon error of law, 
or is not supported by any substantial evidence, or is so manifestly arbitrary and 
unreasonable as to transcend the authority vested in the Deputy Commissioner. His 
findings of fact, however, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.”). 
164 See ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 130.07 (2007).    
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which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an 
administrative agency specially assigned to that task.”165  
 
District of Columbia.  Prior to 1980, privately-employed 
workers of the District of Columbia found their workers’ 
compensation remedy under the provisions of the Longshore Act. 
This process dated from 1928, when Congress enacted a workers’ 
compensation law for the District, “which extended the provisions of 
the federal statute to cover the private employment sector.”166  Part of 
that extension included, accordingly, establishment of the Deputy 
Commissioner as final fact-finder.167  Thus, the district court, in a 
1966 case declared: 
 
The evidence . . . was far from satisfactory, especially 
because the claimant’s credibility was seriously 
impeached.  The scope of judicial review, however, in 
cases such as this is restricted and limited. The Court 
may not review the evidence and reach an independent 
conclusion as though the review is a trial de novo.  So, 
too, the Court may not review the weight of evidence 
and set aside the findings of fact of the Deputy 
Commissioner, if it deems them to be contrary to the 
weight of evidence.168   
 
In 1980, the District, having gained limited self-government 
powers, enacted its own law.169  Perhaps in respect of the Longshore 
                                                          
165 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1942).     
166 The genesis of the law is discussed in District of Columbia v. Greater 
Washington Cent. Labor. Council, 442 A.2d 110 (D.C. 1982).   
167 See D.C. Transit System v. Massey, 260 F. Supp. 310, 311-12 (D.D.C. 
1966). 
168 Id. (deputy commissioner had determined that bus driver’s neurosis 
arose out of his employment, because coming in the wake of trauma, despite 
employer’s psychiatrists’ testimony that depression was  “involutional” and 
“related to a ‘change of life.’”), rev’d, on other grounds, 388 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 
1967).  See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 18 (D.C. 
Cir. 1940) (deputy commissioner had determined that grocery worker’s injury, 
fractured jaw from co-employee assault, had arisen in the course of employment, 
and such determination was “supported by substantial evidence.”). 
169 See Dell v. Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 499 A.2d 102, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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Act’s heritage of having the hearing officer as fact-finder, the newly-
enacted regime provided for the same.  A regulation provided that on 
administrative appeal, the hearing examiner’s decision was to be 
upheld “if it [was] supported by substantial evidence in the record,” 
and a court in 1985 ratified this standard of review.170  This rule is 
now in the statute.171      
 
Maine.  Maine is another jurisdiction where the individual 
commissioner traditionally heard the contested case.  Since 1981, 
intra-agency review has existed,172 but prior to that time, the 
commissioner’s findings were final and not subject to reassessment 
by any intra-agency panel.  Any appeal went directly to the state 
supreme court.  A 1974 decision, for example, provided that the 
court’s responsibility was to determine whether “competent evidence 
supports the commission’s decision and whether its decree is based 
either upon a misapprehension of fact or a misapplication of law to 
the facts.”173  In that case, a remand was ordered because the 
commissioner failed to provide findings that would facilitate 
review.174 
In 1981, the statute was amended to create the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission Appellate Division, which undertook the 
same review as had the Supreme Court; the division’s standard of 
review was “neither broader nor narrower than appellate review by 
the Law Court.”175  In 1992, meanwhile, amid a cost and litigation 
                                                          
170 Id.   
171 D.C. Code § 32-1521.01 (titled, “Establishment of Compensation 
Order Review Board” (2004)).  See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. 
D.C.Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 926 A.2d 140 (D.C. Ct. Appeals 2007) (recounting 
review standards).    
172 See Kuvaja v. Bethel Savs. Bank, 495 A.2d 804 (Me. 1985) (discussing 
amendment to law).    
173 Dufault v. Midland-Ross of Canada, Ltd., 380 A.2d 200, 203 (Me. 
1977).     
174 Id. 
175 Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Moyse, 466 A.2d 1257, 1260 (Me. 1983).  
In another case, the court noted that:  
 
The purpose of the amendment was threefold: (1) to relieve the 
appellate burden on the Law Court; (2) to provide an 
intermediate appellate body with expertise in workers’ 
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crisis, the system was again altered.  According to a commentator, 
the reform displaced the Commission with “a Workers’ 
Compensation Board consisting of four labor and four business 
representatives.”  The intent was to “replace what was ‘a quasi-
judicial adversarial approach’ to workers’ compensation with ‘a 
cooperative approach between employers and employees to reduce 
utilization of the workers' compensation system and its costs.’”176   
Under this reform, which endures to the present date, the 
hearing officer’s findings of fact are final,177 and the Supreme Court 
takes appeals only in its discretion.  The Maine law has a unique 
proviso, however, in that “[a] hearing officer may request that the full 
board review a decision of the hearing officer if the decision involves 
an issue that is of significance to the operation of the workers’ 
compensation system.”178  However, this same proviso admonishes, 
“There may be no such review of findings of fact made by a hearing 
officer.”179 
 
Connecticut.  Connecticut is another state ahead of the trend.  
As with Maine, intra-agency review is relatively new to the 
administrative procedure.  Prior to 1979, the findings of the 
individual commissioner were final.  Any appeal was taken directly 
                                                          
compensation; and (3) to have ”consistent policy positions 
announced within the administrative agency itself before the 
issues are presented in litigated appeals to the Law Court.” 
 
Mathieu v. Bath Iron Works, 667 A.2d 862, 865 (Me. 1995). 
 
176 Norma Harris & Kathleen Kisner, Maine Reforms Workers’ 
Compensation – State Report, BUSINESSLIBRARY (Nov. 1992), 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0903/is_n13_v10/ai_13359848/ (noting that 
“[i]n recent years, the workers' compensation system in Maine has deteriorated to 
the extent that insurer after insurer has pulled out of the market and larger 
businesses have chosen to self-insure.”).  The legislative intent behind this reform 
is also discussed in Hanover Ins. Co. v. WCB, 695 A.2d 556 (Me. 1997); Mathieu, 
667 A.2d at 865 (Me. 1995) (“The record of floor debates suggests that the 
purposes for the changes in appellate procedure were to reduce litigation and to 
promote efficiency and cost-savings in the system.”). 
177 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 318 (2012). 
178 Id. at § 320. 
179 Id.  
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to the trial court, with review thereafter in the state supreme court.180  
This arrangement was addressed very early in the Connecticut 
experience, in a case where an employer’s argument that the trial 
court should have exercised de novo review was rejected.181  The 
court’s reasoning shows that it was very much ahead of the trend, and 
for all the right reasons:  
 
The certainty of the receipt of compensation for injury 
follows the act.  Its procedure contemplates a speedy 
investigation and hearing by a commissioner, without 
the formalities of a court and without, as a general 
rule, the employment of an attorney.  It attempts to 
improve the condition of the workman under modern 
methods of industry by giving him partial recompense 
for an injury, with a result more certain and speedy 
and less expensive than under the former method in 
tort litigation.   
 
If the Act permits each cause to be appealed and tried 
de novo in the superior court, its objects will be 
defeated, and more delay, less certainty, and more 
expense will ensue to the claimant than with the single 
trial of the old method.   
 
We may not lightly presume that the Legislature 
intended to set up a new system, the result of long 
agitation, much study and the fullest publicity, and 
then deliberately, in the very act creating its new 
system, pull down the work of its hands.182 
 
In 1979, legislation was passed, which for the first time, 
allowed for intra-agency review.  Appeals from compensation 
commissioners were to be taken to the “Compensation Review 
                                                          
180 Grady v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 427 A.2d 842 (Conn. 1980) (in case where 
the trial court set aside commissioner’s findings and made his own instead, 
supreme court reversed).   
181 Powers v. The Hotel Bond Co., 93 A. 245 (Conn. 1915). 
182 Id. at 248.   
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Division.”183  These fundamental changes were intended, in part, to 
create a more authoritative commission head, who in turn would 
better “facilitate the timely and efficient processing of cases.”184  In 
1991, meanwhile, the CRD “was replaced, largely semantically, with 
the modern workers’ compensation review board.”185  The 
commissioner, however, remained “the trier of fact . . . . [T]he 
commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses . . . .”186   
Reconsideration of the adjudicatory structure came about in 
the midst of what some characterized as a management crisis in the 
handling of contested cases.  A January 1991 legislative report, 
Workers’ Compensation in Connecticut, determined:  
 
that the system’s current administrative structure is 
not responsive to the concerns of either employers . . . 
or employees . . . .  Management is weak and 
accountability is lacking. . . . Administrative resources 
. . . are inadequate, particularly given the dramatic 
growth in workload . . . and [the fact that] backlogs 
and delays in case processing are widespread.187  
   
The report also identified burgeoning employer costs as a factor in 
the overall reform.188  
                                                          
183 Fair v. People’s Savs. Bank, 542 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Conn. 1988) (court, 
holding that CRD impermissibly engaged in fact-finding, remarks, “It is clear that 
under . . . § 31-3019(a) and § 31-301-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State 
Agencies the review division's hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a 
de novo hearing of the facts.  Although the . . . division may take additional 
material evidence, this is proper only if it is shown to its satisfaction that good 
reasons exist as to why the evidence was not presented to the commissioner.  
Otherwise, it is obliged to hear the appeal on the record and not ‘retry the facts.’”).  
184 Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 657 A.2d 601, 608 (Conn. 1995).  
185 Stec v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 2009 Conn. App. LEXIS 220, *90 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2009), rev‘d on other grounds, 10 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2010). 
186 Healey v. Hawkeye Const., 4 A.3d 858, 861 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) 
(quotation omitted).   
187 Dixon v. United Illuminating Co., 657 A.2d 601, 608 (Conn. 1995).   
188 Id. at 608 n.7 (“The Report also focused on, and made 
recommendations regarding, ‘a more equitable structure, and better control over 
rising benefit costs.’”). 
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Delaware.  Prior to 1997, the Delaware Industrial Accident 
Board (IAB) (a multi-individual panel) heard the testimony of the 
parties in contested cases.  The appellate courts have long deferred to 
the IAB’s fact-finding powers.189  In modern days, appeal has been 
to the superior court, which reviews the decision on a substantial 
evidence basis.190  As to the findings of fact, a tradition has long 
existed of deference to the first-level hearing officers who actually 
saw and heard the witnesses. 
Since 1997, the Board has had the power to hire hearing 
officers who, with the consent of the parties, may sit in place of the 
Board.  When this process unfolds, the appeal to the superior court is 
governed by the same substantial evidence standard.  The 1997 
amendment was intended “to assist the Department and Board in 
expediting . . . cases.”191  
 
Alaska.  The Alaska experience is perhaps in its own 
category.  Contested cases in Alaska are heard by the Workers’ 
Compensation Board of the Department of Labor & Workforce 
Development.192  Since 2005, decisions of the Board have been 
appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
                                                          
189 Children’s Bureau of Del. v. Nissen, 29 A.2d 603, 609 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1942): 
 
This Court acts with a prudent caution in reversing a finding of 
fact made by the Industrial Accident Board.  It will not disturb 
the Board’s findings if there was evidence from which its 
conclusions could have been fairly and reasonably drawn 
(citation omitted).  The reason for the rule . . . is that the trial 
court sees and hears the witnesses, and is better able to determine 
the credit and weight to be given to their testimony.  The reason 
falls when the testimony is not presented orally.  
 
Id. 
190  General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 689 (Del.1960) 
(“The position of the Superior Court and of this Court on appeal is to determine 
only whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the 
Board.  If there was, these findings must be affirmed.”).    
191S.B. 147, 139th Gen. Assemb., Pub. Act. 84 (Del. 1997).   
192 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.30.128 (West 2012).  Two members of a 
hearing panel of the Board constitute a quorum for taking action on a disputed 
benefits claim. 
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Commission.  The Board is the final fact-finder.193  Prior to 2005, a 
somewhat different scheme existed.  At that time (as it has been at 
all times since statehood), the Board acted as fact-finder, but no 
intra-agency review existed.  Instead, an appeal was taken to the 
superior court.194   
According to the state supreme court: 
 
Among the goals of the legislature in changing the . . .  
Act were decreasing costs and speeding the processing 
of claims.  The Appeals Commission was created to 
help achieve these goals: it was intended to provide 
“consistent, legally precedential decisions in an 
expeditious manner.”  The legislature hoped that the 
Appeals Commission would provide necessary 
expertise and thereby improve the appeals process.195 
 
D.  The Pre-Crisis Trend Makers 
 
Long before the cost and litigation crisis of the 1980s, a 
number of states developed adjudication regimes under which the 
WCJ became, in practice, the final fact-finder.  In Florida, the 
appellate court combined statutory interpretation with the common-
law concern over assessing credibility, and held that appellate review 
was restricted to substantial evidence. In Arizona and Rhode Island, 
meanwhile, the courts seemed to have flatly disregarded the statute – 
which voiced the orthodox rule – and insisted that there could be no 
reassessment of demeanor credibility on appeal.  (In Arizona, the 
decision which so held was reversed as contrary to statute, but the 
holding was later ratified by the legislature.) In New Jersey, the 
statute was changed to eliminate trial de novo in the county courts.  
                                                          
193 Pietro v. Unocal Corp., 233 P.3d 604, 610 (Alaska 2010) (indicating 
that the Board’s findings are to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence).  
194 See Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966). 
195 Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 39  (Alaska 
2007).  See also Knudsen to Chair Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, 
SIT NEWS (Nov. 25, 2005), 
http://www.sitnews.us/1105news/112505/112505_workers_comp.html (quoting the 
governor as complaining, “Too often in the past, workers’ compensation cases 
encountered unreasonable delays and scatter-shot rulings that were inconsistent . . . 
.”).     
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Finally, in Oklahoma, amendments to the law in 1977 changed the 
system so that the judge’s findings could only be altered when 
against the “clear weight of the evidence.”196          
 
Florida.  Florida was the first jurisdiction to declare that the 
WCJ (deputy commissioner), and not the Industrial Commission, was 
the final fact-finder. The state supreme court, interpreting a 1941 
change to the law, held in 1951 that the Commission could only 
review the deputy commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence, 
and it was not permitted to reassess credibility.197 
The court, in so declaring, pointed out that the law initially 
provided that the hearing “may” be conducted by the deputy 
commissioner, instead of one of the members of the full commission, 
and that upon application the full commission could once again hear 
the witnesses.198  The case could then be heard de novo in the trial 
court.199  The 1941 amendment, the court observed, eliminated the 
word “may” and substituted the word “shall,” and at once limited the 
full commission to review of “the matter upon the record as prepared 
and certified by the deputy commissioner.”200  The court declared: 
 
under the law the deputy commissioner is the only 
person charged with the burden and responsibility of 
hearing the witnesses and making findings of facts 
[and he is hence appropriately deemed final fact-
                                                          
196 See Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. 1984) 
(superseded on other grounds). 
197 U.S. Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951).  The 
court acknowledged that it had issued decisions overlooking the apparent change in 
the decade since the amendment.  Id. at 743.  At least one critic had complained 
about the regime during this period, remarking that review of the facts by 
commission and trial court was “surprising, because the Circuit Court does not 
enter upon a trial de novo, and must depend upon the record made before the 
deputy commissioner.”  Harris, supra note 131, at 215-16.  The critic found the 
adjudicatory structure unwieldy and a burden to injured workers.  A critical 
analysis of the United States Cas. Co. case is found in Malcom B. Parsons, The 
Substantial Evidence Rule in Florida Administrative Law, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 481 
(1953).   
198 See U.S. Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d at 743. 
199 See id. 
200 Id. 
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finder].  It is patent that the full Commission functions 
much in the same manner as does an appellate court, 
although it is quasi judicial rather than strictly so.201   
 
The trial court, meanwhile, was limited to determining 
whether the full commission “observed the ‘substantial evidence’ 
rule” in the course of its own review of the deputy commissioner’s 
findings.202 
The amendment, notably, did not in so many words declare 
that the deputy commissioner was the final arbiter of credibility and 
the finder of the facts.  Rather, the court inferred that this must be the 
case “in lieu of the provision that the full commission might hear the 
witnesses and in effect conduct a hearing de novo . . . .”203  The court 
added that “[t]he fact-finding arbiter is usually in a better position 
than the reviewing body to judge the ability, experience and 
reputation of the various so-called expert witnesses who appear 
personally before him [and] to determine the weight which should be 
given their testimony.”204  This issue was of some moment in the 
case at hand, as the critical credibility determination did not turn on 
lay testimony, but on the choice of which medical expert to 
believe.205  With regard to this issue, the court declared, “doctors are 
human.  They may be appraised as witnesses and their testimony 
evaluated, in much the same manner as other witnesses and their 
testimony are judged and estimated.”206  
The Florida rule endured.  Indeed, by 1965 the court was 
prompted to say that it was virtually “hackneyed” to declare that the 
“deputy commissioners have the prerogative of determining 
questions of fact,” to be sustained on appeal as long as the evidence 
relied upon “is competent and substantial and comports with reason 
and logic.”207  In the present day, the “Judge of Compensation 
Claims” remains the final fact-finder, and upon appellate review in 
                                                          
201 Id. at 744.  
202 Id. at 745. 
203 U.S. Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d at 743. 
204 Id. at 745. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Crowell v. Messana Contractors, 180 So. 2d 329, 329 (Fla. 1965). 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-1 
 
74 
the First District Court of Appeals the “competent, substantial 
evidence” standard of review prevails.208 
 
Arizona.  An Arizona court, in 1967, declared that the referee 
of the system, and not the Industrial Commission, should be the 
arbiter of credibility.209  The court in that case reasoned that it is the 
 
referee who hears the testimony, observes the 
demeanor of the petitioner, and is best able to judge 
the reliability and credibility of the witnesses who 
have testified at the hearing. Absent testimony before 
them, the Industrial Commission in reviewing the 
hearings before the referee, is in the same position as 
an appellate court in that both the Commission and the 
appellate court must evaluate the evidence from the 
record presented.210   
 
The court added this endorsement: “[T]he importance of the 
referee to a fair and just determination of the issues cannot [be] over-
emphasized.  It is the referee who hears the witnesses, rules on the 
admission of evidence, and forms the impressions from the demeanor 
of the witnesses which the cold record on review cannot indicate.”211  
This decision articulates the renowned common-law principle 
of fact-finding, and it is often cited as definitely placing Arizona into 
the minority camp.  In point of fact, however, the state supreme court 
promptly reversed, declaring that “[t]he [c]ommission of course was 
not bound by the finding of its referee.”212  The commission could 
delegate the gathering of evidence to an agent, but could not delegate 
the actual decision-making.213  
                                                          
208 FLA. STAT. § 440.271.  See James W. Windham Builders, Inc. v. Van 
Overloop, 951 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
209 See Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966), 
rev’d, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1967).   
210 Id. at 606.   
211 Id. at 607.   
212 Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 423 P.2d 348, 350 (Ariz. 1967).  
213 Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1967).  That the Powell 
appeals court ruling has been declared in treatise and court opinions as definitive is 
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However, in the midst of broad-based 1973 reforms, the 
legislature abolished review by the full commission. While the 
amendment allowed administrative review of the ALJ’s decision,214 
that review, similar to the “reconsideration” provided for in the Black 
Lung program, is by the same ALJ who heard the contested claim.215  
Following potential administrative review, however, the award is 
final pending appellate review.  A 1989 subsequent decision 
explained that the legislature changed the law in 1973 in order to 
comport with the holding of the appeals court.216  
Since the change to the scheme, Arizona courts have 
continued to produce language that supports the common-law view 
of fact-finding.  In one court of appeals decision, the court held: 
 
 If the administrative decision-maker and this court are 
both reaching a decision upon the “cold record” the 
integrity of the legal process not only falters, it fails.  
In cases of conflicting evidence, meaningful appellate 
review requires that the conflict be resolved by 
something more personal than a sterile resort to pages 
of hearing transcripts.217  
 
 Another court admonished, “Not only is credibility a larger 
question than truthfulness, but also the quality of substantial justice 
demands a higher standard . . . . When the administrative or 
managerial procedure ceases and the process of judicial fact finding 
occurs, then he who decides must hear.”218    
 
Rhode Island.  The modern history of Rhode Island workers’ 
compensation starts in 1990, with the dramatic creation of the Rhode 
Island Workers’ Compensation Court.  Under current law, the trial 
judge is the final fact-finder.  Under one critical reading of the law, 
                                                          
strange. Certainly the Court of Appeals knew that it had been reversed.  See 
Tolmachoff v. Indus. Comm’n, 442 P.2d 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968). 
214 The current statute may be found at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-943 
(2012).  
215 Koval v. Indus. Comm’n, 532 P.2d  549 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).    
216 Ohlmaier v. Indus. Comm’n, 776 P.2d 791 (Ariz. 1989). 
217 Adams v. Indus. Comm’n, 710 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).  
218 Ohlmaier, 776 P.2d at 793 (Ariz. 1989). 
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perhaps counterintuitive at first, the full panel exercises de novo 
review, except for the all-critical (for our discussion) issue of witness 
credibility.  The state supreme court held “that the statute provides 
the Appellate Division with de novo review of such factual findings 
except for credibility determinations made by the trial judge.”219 
Prior to creation of the court, the Rhode Island adjudication 
structure was one of the familiar trial commissioner, with appeal to 
the full commission.  Under the critical statute, the full commission 
determined whether the preponderance of the evidence sustained the 
burdened party’s case. This statute, which had its genesis in 1954 
reforms, was held to mean that the full commission could weigh the 
evidence and serve as the final fact-finder.220  Nevertheless, in a 1967 
case, the court declined to enforce the statute when it came to the 
issue of credibility findings.221  “In our judgment,” the court 
declared, “it is not the business of the commission either to weigh the 
evidence or to determine where its fair preponderance lies until it 
first decides whether the trial commissioner, if he rejected testimony 
as unworthy of belief, was clearly wrong . . . .”222   
In this action, the court was animated by the familiar 
common-law concern that deference should be paid to the findings of 
the hearing officer who observed the demeanor of the witnesses:  
 
Under generally accepted appellate procedures a 
determination of credibility by the fact finder who saw 
and heard the witness should be entitled to great 
weight on review. . . . The appearance of the witness, 
how he demeans himself and his manner of answering 
questions, can only be observed  by the trial 
commissioner. They are observations which 
necessarily enter into his determination of what he 
believes and what he disbelieves. “The weight of 
the evidence” . . . “is to be determined by the 
touchstone of credibility . . . .”  That touchstone, 
                                                          
219 Lambert v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 723 A.2d 777, 783 (R.I. 1999) 
(second emphasis added).  Judicial review of the Appellate Division, meanwhile, is 
based upon the “any competent evidence” standard.  See id. at 780. 
220 Cairo v. Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc., 116 A.2d 188 (R.I. 1955).  
221 Laganiere v. Bonte Spinning Co., 236 A.2d 256 (R.I. 1967).   
222 Id. at 259.  
    
Spring 2012 Master or Chancellor?  77 
however, is not available to the full commission which 
never sees the witness or hears him testify and which, 
on review, looks only at a silent record.223 
 
New Jersey. New Jersey undertook reform of its adjudicative 
process in 1972, when the legislature abolished de novo review in the 
county courts prior to appellate review.224  The state had long been 
noted for its “cumbersome trial de novo system,” which Larson 
famously highlighted in his treatise section, “The New Jersey Trial 
De Novo Story.”225  According to Larson, under the state’s 
longstanding law, “successive findings of fact could be made at four 
levels, culminating in the Supreme Court . . . and under which the 
reviewing court had not only the right but the duty to weigh the 
evidence.”226  However, the statutory change was foreshadowed by a 
renowned state supreme court holding in 1965.227  The court held that 
only the county court, upon appellate review, was charged with 
reassessing the weight of the evidence, and that neither the Appellate 
Division of the Superior Court nor the state supreme court were 
under such obligation.228  After the statutory change, the Appellate 
Division immediately noted,  
 
[T]he scope of our appellate review limits us to a 
determination of whether the findings of the judge of 
compensation could reasonably have been reached on 
sufficient credible evidence present in the whole 
record, after giving due weight to his expertise in the 
                                                          
223 Id. at 258-59 (quoting Rossi v. Ronci, 7 A.2d 773, 778 (R.I. 1939)). 
224 See COMPILATION OF NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
APPELLATE DECISIONS WITH COMMENT FOR THE JUDGE OF COMPENSATION, 1 n.2, 
available at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/wc/pdf/wc_research.pdf 
(stating that “[p]rior to March 2, 1972, the County Court was required ‘to bring a 
new mind to the case and conscientiously reach its own independent 
determination.’”) (remarks of Hon. Peter J. Calderon). 
225 LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[7][e]. 
226  Id. (internal citation omitted).   
227 Close v. Kordulak, 210 A.2d 753 (N.J. 1965). 
228  Id.  This opinion is said to remain the “seminal case” on the issue.  
Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Newby, Esq to Author (Dec. 5, 2011) (on file with 
the Author).   
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field and his opportunity of hearing and seeing the 
witnesses.229   
 
The court also stated,  
 
in reaching this conclusion, we [note] the fact that 
hearings before the Division are adversary in nature; 
are presided over and tried by a judge who must now 
be an attorney-at-law of New Jersey . . . . Under such 
circumstances, the judge of compensation’s 
determination, when reviewed on appeal, is equivalent 
to a trial by a judge without a jury.230   
                                                          
229 De Angelo v. Alsan Masons Inc., 299 A.2d 90, 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1973).   
230 Id.  This case is still cited as a leading precedent for establishing the 
power of the Judge of Compensation.  See JON L. GELMAN, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE 
SERIES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 31.1 (2011).  See also Famularo Elec., 
LLC v. Lyndhurst Res. Comm., No. A-4218-08T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1977 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010): 
 
We must defer to a trial court's credibility determinations, which 
are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial 
and credible evidence on the record (footnote omitted).  This 
deference is provided because the trial court “has the opportunity 
to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who 
appear on the stand; it has a feel of the case that can never be 
realized by a review of the cold record.”  (Footnote omitted)  Our 
role is not to reweigh the evidence; we determine only whether 
the factual findings are supported. 
 
Id. at *18-19.  In another case, the court held that: 
 
An appellate court may not “engage in an independent 
assessment of the evidence as if it were the court of first 
instance.” (quotation omitted)  Findings of fact made by a trial 
judge “are considered binding on appeal when supported by 
adequate, substantial and credible evidence.” (quotation omitted)  
Accordingly, if in reviewing an agency decision, an appellate 
court finds sufficient credible evidence in the record to support 
the agency’s conclusions, that court must uphold those findings, 
even if the court believes that it would have reached a different 
result. 
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It appears as though one crucial motive for this change was to 
expedite the process by removing one step of appeals.231   
 
Montana.   Prior to 1975, the Industrial Accident Board heard 
contested workers’ compensation cases in Montana.  An appeal from 
an order of the same was taken to the district court (i.e., trial court), 
where “the trial . . . was considered de novo,” with a “presumption of 
correctness.”232  Under this arrangement, “[t]he district court on 
appeal from the board is not justified in reversing a finding of the 
board unless the evidence clearly preponderates against such 
finding.”233 
In 1975, however, the office of Workers’ Compensation 
Judge (a single individual) was created.234  An appeal under the 
current practice goes directly to the state supreme court.235  The court 
is to affirm the WCJ’s ruling if supported by substantial evidence.236  
According to the state’s website, “[t]he Legislature created the 
Workers’ Compensation Court  . . . to provide an efficient and 
                                                          
 
Sager v. O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862 A.2d 1119, 1124 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004). 
231 Memorandum from Lora V. Northern, Esq. to the Author (Dec. 5, 
2011) (on file with the Author), 
232 Erhart v. Great W. Sugar Co., 546 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Mont. 1976).  
233 Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 417 P.2d 95, 98 (Mont. 1966); 
Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347  (Mont. 1933).  This latter case 
shows that in the early days of the Montana practice, additional evidence could be 
presented to the district court, “for good cause shown.”  Id. at  350. 
234 The fact that a single individual has such significant power is 
remarkable.  This was apparently the thinking of the state’s Chamber of 
Commerce, which in 2010 issued a report evaluating the judge.  MONTANA 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE 2010 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MONTANA 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT (2010), available at 
http://www.montanachamber.com/files/2010%20Workers'%20Compensation%20C
ourt%20Review.pdf. After summarizing his rulings, the Chamber accorded him a 
2008-2009 “Total Business Score” of 78%, noting further that his “Lifetime 
Business Score” was 66%.  Id. at 10.            
235 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2904 (2011). 
236 Michalak v. Liberty N.W. Ins. Corp., 175 P.3d 893 (Mont. 2008). 
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effective forum for the resolution of [workers’ compensation] 
disputes . . . .”237 
 
Oklahoma.  Workers’ compensation cases in Oklahoma are 
litigated before the Workers’ Compensation Court, an entity created 
in 1978. Under Oklahoma law, a case is first heard before a trial 
judge of the court, followed by review within the court by a three-
judge or en banc review panel.  The panel “is not free to reverse at 
will a trial judge’s findings,”238 but first must make a threshold 
determination that the judge’s decision “was against the clear weight 
of the evidence . . . .”239  Upon true judicial review, the test, in the 
wake of a 2010 amendment, is the same.240 Under the pre-existing 
scheme, meanwhile, review undertaken by the displaced “State 
Industrial court en banc” was similar (though not identical) to trial de 
novo.241  
Under the Oklahoma statute, panel-substituted fact findings 
can exist, but only when the panel makes the threshold determination 
of error by the trial judge.242  Reported cases may be found where 
this occurs,243 and one precedent indeed states that the three-judge 
                                                          
237 See Workers Compensation Court, MONTANA OFFICIAL STATE 
WEBSITE,  http://courts.mt.gov/workers_comp/default.mcpx (last visited Jan. 3, 
2012).  
238 Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548, 551 (Okla. 1984) 
(superseded on other grounds). 
239 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.6 (West 2010) (current version at 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 340 (West 2011).  
240 Mobile Mini, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 517, 522 (Ct. Civ. 
App. Okla. 2011) (citing OKLA. STAT. § 3.6(c)).  For the pre-2010 rule, see 
Smalygo v. Green, 184 P.3d 554, 559 (Okla. 2008). 
241 Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 684 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. 1984) 
(referring to the 1977 amendments, court remarks, “fact findings of the trial judge 
are now impervious to any alteration unless the panel finds them to be clearly 
against the weight of the evidence.”). 
242 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 340 (West 2011). 
243 See, e.g., Foster’s Florist v. Jackson, 997 P.2d 843 (Okla. 2000).  The 
court also stated: 
 
The claimant and the employer both presented competent 
evidence to support their respective views of causation. However, 
an appellate court will not disturb a fact-substituting panel order 
that has the statutorily-mandated determination that the trial 
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review panel is the “final arbiter of questions of fact.”244  Still, as the 
usual definition of “against the clear weight of the evidence”245 
gravely limits the fact-finding power of any review tribunal, 
Oklahoma can be seen as one of the pre-crisis trend makers in 
assigning marked fact-finding power to the WCJ.  In fact, the genesis 
of the 1978 reform was a conviction that:  
 
[A] better system could be devised if one could 
separate completely the role of administration from 
the role of adjudication.  It was argued that this would 
increase accountability, reduce unnecessary litigation, 
and provide a more effective mechanism for handling 
such key new features . . . as physical and vocational 
rehabilitation and job placement.246 
 
E.  Jurisdictions Influenced by the National Commission 
 
Longshore Act.  As noted above, the hearing officer under the 
Longshore Act has long been the final fact-finder.247  However, in 
1972, his or her decision became subject to intra-agency review as 
part of a National Commission-inspired administrative 
restructuring.248  The Benefits Review Board (BRB) undertakes 
                                                          
judge’s finding was “against the clear weight of the evidence,” 
where, as in this cause, the record contains ample competent 
evidence to support the panel's findings.  
 
Id. at 848. 
244 Dunkin v. Instaff Personnel, 164 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Okla. 2007).  In this 
case, both the trial judge and the three-member panel dismissed a claimant’s 
original claim, but on judicial review the court held that both opinions were so un-
explained that judicial review could not be accomplished.  See id. at 1059 
245 See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 848 n.1 (2010) (“a decision so 
inadequately supported by the record as to be arbitrary and therefore objectively 
unreasonable.”).   
246 Chris Sturm, The Workers’ Compensation Act of 1977, 3 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).   
247 See supra Section V(C). 
248 Francis J. Gorman, The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act – After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 2 (1974).  
See also John Vittone, Practice Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, in 
THE LONGSHORE TEXTBOOK 120 (2010) (stating that the BRB had remarked in a 
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substantial evidence review of the ALJ’s decision based upon the 
record considered as a whole.249  Thus, as one practitioner phrases it, 
“Questions of witness credibility are particularly within the ALJ’s 
province and reviewable only for the most extreme credulity or 
skepticism without an apparently reasonable basis.”250   
 
Pennsylvania.  The Pennsylvania legislature, in 1972, enacted 
sweeping amendments to the law.251  These amendments eliminated 
the ability of the Appeal Board to reassess credibility.252  The Board 
changed the referee from a patronage hire of limited employment 
duration to a professional possessing civil service protections.253  A 
                                                          
decision that the “legislation reflected legislative concerns that the administrative 
and adjudicative functions had been too closely tied together prior to the 1972 
amendments.”).     
249 33 U.S.C. § 921 (2012). 
250 Joshua T. Gillelan II, Appellate Procedure Under the Longshore Act, in 
THE LONGSHORE TEXTBOOK 142 (2010).  See, e.g., Norfolk Shipbuilding v. Faulk, 
228 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2000): 
 
The ALJ may not merely credulously accept the assertions of the 
parties or their representatives, but must examine the logic of 
their conclusions and evaluate the evidence upon which their 
conclusions are based. . . . Despite this deference [to the ALJ], 
the evidence must still be sufficient – more than a scintilla but 
less than a preponderance. 
 
Id. at 381, 386; Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Belcher Erectors, 770 F.2d 
1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (in case where BRB reassessed credibility, court 
declares, the “intent of Congress [was] that litigation of the facts of these matters 
substantially terminate at the ALJ level.”  See also Bath Iron Works Corp. v. 
Fields, 599 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2010) (shows court treating as an issue of law 
whether employer rebutted the presumption of causation allowed by Longshore 
Act, and revealing the operation of presumption – if ALJ finds the presumption 
rebutted, parties are where they normally would be in a civil case, as the 
“presumption ‘falls out of the case.’”); Greenwich Terminals, LLC v. Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 309 Fed. Appx. 658 (3rd Cir. 2009) (after ALJ refused 
to reduce claimant’s benefits, employer appealed alleging that he applied the “true 
doubt rule,” which had been rejected by Supreme Court in 1994; court also 
explained that, within limits, ALJ may accept the expert medical opinion that he 
chooses).    
251 TORREY, supra note 70, § 1:46. 
252 Id. 
253 Id.         
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Pennsylvania court immediately held that the referee was now the 
final fact-finder.254  
The Pennsylvania amendment was part of a major effort to 
follow the National Commission recommendations that the 
adjudicative and oversight functions of workers’ compensation 
agencies be made separate, and that agency employees be given civil 
service protections.  The legislature, accordingly, sought to remove 
overt political influences from adjudication and replace those 
influences with a more professional ethic.255    
Expedition of cases was also a motive.  In this regard, the 
amendments removed the county trial courts from the appellate 
process, a procedure that had been in place since the enactment of the 
law in 1915.  According to a contemporary treatise writer, “It was the 
1972 Legislature’s view that this intermediate appeal . . . served no 
useful purpose, but only served to involve such appeal proceedings in 
an additional major delay . . . .”256   
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ascribed the change to 
the legislature’s conviction that the judge who sees and hears the 
witnesses should be the final fact-finder.257  This assertion, however, 
                                                          
254 Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 305 
A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (landmark case defining WCJ as final fact finder; 
court interpreted 1972 amendments that removed review powers from Board, and 
which renamed the latter “Appeal Board”).  The hearing officer’s title was finally 
changed from referee to WCJ in 1993.  See TORREY, supra  note 70, § 1:99. 
255 Comments of Stanley Siegel, Esq. to the Author (Feb. 4, 2011); 
Comments of Raymond Keisling, Esq. to the Author (Feb. 7, 2011).  
256 ALEXANDER F. BARBIERI & THOMAS R. BOND, 3 PENNSYLVANIA 
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE § 6.25 (Bisel 1996).  
One of the National Commission consultants, in an early effort to study reform 
factors in Pennsylvania, interviewed a major insurer and was told, “Compensation 
benefits are now paid too slowly in contested cases, and litigation is too protracted 
when a contest occurs.”  Arthur W. Motley, A Study of the Forces that Produce 
Change in the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of Four States: Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 544 (1973).   
257 Peak v. Unemployment Comp’n Bd. Of Rev., 501 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 
1985) (“It may be wiser, more efficient or more expedient to entrust administrative 
determinations of fact based on credibility to the person who hears the evidence. . . 
.[J]ust such a judgment was made by our legislature when it amended Section 423 
of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act to change those referees from 
mere agents of the Board to independent factfinders whose credibility 
determinations became binding on the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.  
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does not find any contemporary documentation.  The iconic court 
precedent that first clarified the meaning of the 1972 amendment is 
completely silent on intent.258   
In the present day, the WCJ is firmly ensconced as the final 
fact-finder and arbiter of credibility.  Reforms of 1993 and 1996 
brought the “reasoned decision” requirement, which obliged the 
Pennsylvania WCJ to detail the reasons for his or her decisions and 
some level of explanation for his fact-findings.  Nevertheless, both 
the Appeal Board and the appellate courts, upon true judicial review, 
undertake a markedly deferential substantial evidence or “arbitrary 
and capricious” review.259  These entities never substitute credibility 
determinations.  Indeed, in the nineteen years this Author has been a 
WCJ, his determinations with regard to the facts have not been 
overthrown on a single occasion.260     
 
                                                          
Before that amendment, the. . . . Board had had the same power of de novo review 
over its referees as the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review retains 
under. . . . the Unemployment Compensation Act. . . . ” (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted)).  
258 See Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 
305 A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).     
259 With regard to use of these terms, see Republic Steel Corp. v. Workers’ 
Comp. Appeal Bd., 421 A.2d 1060, 1062-1063 (Pa. 1980) (court using “substantial 
evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” in same discussion).  For the law and 
analysis of WCJ fact-finding under the Pennsylvania Act, see TORREY, supra note 
70, §§ 13:96-13:139.         
260 A resultant Pennsylvania phenomenon may be identified: the perennial 
effort of disappointed parties to find ways to avoid such fact-finding finality and 
find relief on appeal.  In one case of this variety, a claimant on appeal to the 
Commonwealth Court alleged that the WCJ had committed a “capricious 
disregard” of evidence.  He suggested that when only one party to the contested 
litigation presents evidence, the WCJ’s decision to discredit the same should be 
subject to special scrutiny, particularly under the “reasoned decision” requirement 
of the Act noted above.  Utilizing creative prose, the claimant submitted that this 
proposed review was admittedly unique, to wit, “a form of review normally resisted 
by appellate courts.”  Claimant asserted, “Thus, notwithstanding the instinct of an 
appellate tribunal to defer to the fact-finder, this is simply not what is mandated. . . 
.”   To this assertion the court responded, “We disagree with Claimant’s premise 
that appellate court judges defer to the fact finder by employing ‘instinct;’ in truth, 
it requires discipline.”  Remaley v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Turner Dairy 
Farms, Inc.), 861 A.2d 405 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).  
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F.  Jurisdictions Influenced by Counterreform 
 
Eight states, in direct response to concerns over litigation and 
costs crises, have altered their adjudication systems to make the WCJ 
the fact-finder.  A number of orthodox rule states, meanwhile, have 
undertaken other steps at streamlining the adjudication process.  In 
Oregon, for example, de novo review of the Board’s decision by the 
Court of Appeals was abolished in 1987.261  In Illinois, the Industrial 
Commission remains the final fact-finder, but the parties as of 1989 
may no longer, on review, submit new evidence.262  In Georgia, 
meanwhile, the Board endures as the final fact-finder, but review is 
no longer de novo.  Instead, the ALJ’s findings are to be accepted 
when “supported by a preponderance of competent and credible 
evidence . . . .”263   
 
Minnesota (1983).  The compensation judge in the Minnesota 
system has been the final fact-finder since 1983.264  Prior thereto, an 
appeal taken to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals was 
reviewed on a de novo basis.  That court now reviews for substantial 
evidence.265  According to the first case to confirm the meaning and 
                                                          
261 See Erck v. Brown Oldsmobile, 815 P.2d 1251, 1254 (S. Ct. Oregon 
1991).  Jury trial de novo was not abolished in Oregon until 1965.  For a case 
critical of that development, see Hannan v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 471 P.2d 831, 
833 (Or. Ct. App. 1970) (“Under the pre-1965 system, an award was made by the 
State Industrial Accident Commission to the claimant. . . . If he was not satisfied he 
had a right to a jury trial . . . . At that trial he produced witnesses; the commission 
produced witnesses, the court instructed the jury on the applicable law, the jury 
returned its verdict which was reduced to judgment, and the scope of review on 
appeal was no broader than that in any other action at law.”).  
262 See infra Section VII. 
263 See infra Section VII.  
264 See MINN. STAT. § 176.421 (2009). 
265 Stately v. Red Lake Builders et al., 2010 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 99 
(2010) (“On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine 
whether ‘the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by 
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted’ . . .   Substantial 
evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, ‘they are 
supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’ . . . 
‘Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed . . . ’ Similarly, findings of fact 
should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, 
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import of the revised law, the intent was efficiency.  The change, in 
this regard, “should result in fewer appeals to the Workers’ 
Compensation Court of Appeals, with resultant savings in time and 
cost to the workers’ compensation system.”266  WCRI researchers, 
meanwhile, reported that the 1983 “reform sought to lower costs 
without reducing benefits and to reduce litigation and friction costs.”  
Among the changes were “new paths for dispute resolution.”267  
 
Michigan (1985).  Up until 1985 in Michigan, a state which 
has roiled with reform, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 
(WCAB) undertook de novo review on appeal from a referee 
decision.  In the wake of post-National Commission growth in costs 
and claims, a litigation crisis unfolded.268  A major reform of that 
year “completely revamped the appeal procedure,”269 abolished the 
                                                          
‘unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to 
the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.’”) 
(citations omitted).  For a well-considered decision that parses the difference 
between finding of fact and conclusion of law in the old injury/new injury context, 
see Busch v. Advanced Maintenance, 659 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Minn. 2003). 
266 Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1984).  
The court continued, in this vein, “We think it may be of some significance that the 
legislature added the appellate review amendments, not to its then pending bill for 
general revision of the workers’ compensation law, but to House File No. 1290, an 
appropriations bill dealing with budget considerations.”  Id.  WCRI researchers 
found it ironic, in their 1990 study, that even after the abolition of de novo review, 
almost 40 percent of compensation judge decisions were appealed.  The researchers 
heard many explanations for the high appeal rate, but perhaps the most ironic was 
from one attorney, who stated that he “attributes the high appeal rate in part to the 
unpredictability of WCCA decision, particularly with respect to the change in the 
standard of review from de novo to substantial evidence.  This new standard does 
not allow WCCA judges to second-guess OAH judges, which may lead to a 
perception of inconsistency.”  DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & CAROL TELLES, 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN MINNESOTA: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 79 
(Workers Compensation Research Institute ed., 1991).  
267 BALLANTYNE, supra note 266, at 79.  
268 EDWARD M. WELCH & DARYL C. ROYAL, WORKER’S COMPENSATION 
IN MICHIGAN: LAW & PRACTICE § 18:10, at 18-11 (5th ed. 2010).  See also H. 
ALLAN HUNT & STACEY M. ECCLESTON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN MICHIGAN: 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 43 (1990) (referring to policymakers’ frustrations 
that as of 1985 a “five-year backlog of cases” existed at the Appeal Board, an 
aggravating effect of de novo review which meant that “the loser at the hearing 
level could get another chance on appeal.”).      
269 HUNT, supra note 268, at 43. 
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position of referee, and created a Board of Magistrates.  The WCAB 
was likewise abolished and replaced by the Workers’ Compensation 
Appellate Commission (WCAC).  The Magistrate is now, for all 
practical intents and purposes, the final fact-finder.270    
According to the state supreme court: “The Legislature sought 
thereby to reduce the delay in adjudicating workers’ compensation 
claims, which had been attributed to a large backlog in the WCAB 
resulting from the appeal of seventy-five to eighty-five percent of 
referee awards.”271 
In 1986, the supreme court, considering an extraordinary case 
in which the displaced referees sought an injunction against their 
removal, summarized the legislative intent.  In so summarizing, the 
court referred to a renowned report, authored by Professor Theodore 
St. Antoine (a special counselor of the governor), which had 
recommended reform:  
 
De novo review, described in the report as an “open 
invitation to disappointed litigants and their lawyers to 
seek to retry the case from scratch,”. . .  was seen as 
the principal cause.  Having in mind that there is now 
a large body of precedent, that over the years referees 
were affirmed on questions of law about sixty-six 
percent of the time and on issues of fact about eighty-
two percent of the time, and the backlog at the 
appellate level, de novo review, Professor St. Antoine 
said, is no longer “a luxury that can be afforded, or a 
procedure that is needed” and should be eliminated. . . 
. A referee should become a “true-decision maker,” 
and the decision at that level “a much more dispositive 
step in the administrative process.”272 
 
St. Antoine also “recommended that the referees be required 
to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  Their findings of fact should be conclusive if supported by 
                                                          
270 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.206; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.861(a). 
271 Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Mich. Dept. of Labor, 384 N.W.2d 728, 
730 (Mich.. 1986), on remand, Matulewicz v. Governor, 435 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1989).   
272 Id. at 733. 
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competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . 
.”273  The appeal process, he added, “should be ‘streamlined,’ by 
creating a new five- or possibly seven-member board, which should 
be able to handle the anticipated reduced number of appeals, given 
the substantially reduced record-reading and fact-finding 
responsibilities, and the use of legal assistants . . . .”274 
Under the 1985 amendment, the new Workers’ Compensation 
Appellate Commission (WCAC)275 does indeed review the 
magistrate’s decision for substantial evidence.276  This change led 
Larson to say that Michigan had adopted the minority rule that the 
WCJ was the final fact-finder.  Some confusion, however, thereupon 
unfolded, as a 1992 case of the supreme court interpreted the statute 
to allow for limited WCAC fact-finding.277  In 1997, however, the 
court ruled that no such power existed.278    
Finally, in a landmark 2000 case,279 the court disavowed the 
latter ruling and clarified that the WCAC can under limited 
                                                          
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 734-35.  For another account of the 1985 reforms, see Holden v. 
Ford Motor Co., 484 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1992).  The St. Antoine report, the 
opinion notes, was actually foreshadowed by the 1980 “Lesinski Report,” which 
“proposed that decisions of a magistrate be made conclusive ‘unless fraudulently 
obtain[ed] or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.’”  Id. at 228.  No reform 
was enacted at that time.  St. Antoine, meanwhile, believed that giving the WCAC 
whole record substantial evidence review would “allow the Appeal Board a bit 
more latitude” than the Lesinski standard noted above.  “St. Antoine said this 
would enable the reviewing panel to ‘remedy any serious misstep by [a hearing 
officer] in assessing the evidence and making factual findings.’”  Id. at 229.   
275 The WCAC is now (2012) the Michigan Compensation Appellate 
Commission. 
276 For a recent case, see Djelaj v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 2011 Mich 
App. LEXIS 1771 (Mich Ct. App. 2011). (“The WCAC reviews the magistrate’s 
decision under the ‘substantial evidence’ standard in accordance with MCL 
418.861a(3) ….”).  
277 Holden v. Ford Motor Co., 484 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1992).  The Holden 
case, which is very well written, is an excellent example of “whole record review” 
as undertaken in a workers’ compensation  case.  The magistrate, notably, had 
denied a cardiac claim, but the WCAC changed his findings and issued an award of 
benefits.  
278 Goff v. Bil-Mar Foods, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. 1997).  
279 Mudel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 614 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. 
2000).  
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circumstances undertake fact-finding.  The court did so by a 
meticulous parsing of the law.  The pivotal statute provides, in this 
regard, for substantial evidence review.  However, it also provides 
for review of the “whole record,” to wit, “the entire record of the 
hearing including all of the evidence in favor and all the evidence 
against a certain determination.”  Finally, the section admonishes:  
 
(13) A review of the evidence pursuant to this section 
shall include both a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full, 
thorough, and fair review. 
 
(14) The findings of fact made by the commission 
acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall 
be conclusive . . . .280 
 
According to the court, these sections provide for WCAC 
“fact-finding powers, and permits it in some circumstances to 
substitute its own findings of fact for those of the magistrate, if the 
WCAC accords different weight to the quality or quantity of 
evidence presented.”  The court rejected the idea, however, that this 
was de novo review of any kind:  
 
[A]pplication of the clear and plain language of [these 
sections] . . . does not connote a de novo review by the 
WCAC of the magistrate’s decisions . . . . Clearly, it 
would be improper for the WCAC to engage in its 
own statutorily permitted independent fact finding if 
“substantial evidence” on the whole record existed 
supporting the decision of the magistrate.281   
 
Of note is that the WCAC applauded the ruling for the clarity 
it was presumed to bring to its own review tasks.  In addition, 
however, the Commission thought that having fact finding power 
                                                          
280 See id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.861(a) (13-14)).  
281 Id. at 612.  Judicial review thereafter is actually in the discretion of the 
court, and when it does take a case, it is under an “any evidence” standard.  
Importantly, when the court undertakes review, it reviews the WCAC decision, not 
that of the magistrate.        
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would promote expedition of cases.  The new precedent, the 
Commission stated, by allowing it to correct “faulty or incomplete 
magistrate decisions[,] will streamline the decision-making in 
worker’s compensation by eliminating wasteful remands and 
expediting the resolution of disputes in the system.”282  
 
In the present day, one Michigan expert reports that despite 
possessing the power:  
 
[T]he WCAC rarely disturbs the Magistrate’s finding 
of fact on a factual issue.  They can re-analyze the 
facts as it applies to a legal issue.  For example, if the 
issue was credibility, it would never be overturned but 
if the WCAC felt that the Magistrate incorrectly 
applied the facts to the law, they may make an 
adjustment.283   
 
The treatise writer Welch is in accord, stating the 
“commission has typically declined to push the limits of its power….  
[I]n practice, the commission seems to impose on itself a rather high 
standard, perhaps higher than required by Mudel, and tends to reverse 
factual decisions only in exceptional cases.”284     
                                                          
282 Press Release, “‘CIS’ Appellate Commission Applauds Supreme Court 
Clarification of its Review Standards” (July 26, 2000), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-10573_11472-50550--,00.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
283 Memorandum from Denise Clemmons, Esquire, Farmington Hills, MI, 
to Author (Nov. 21, 2011) (on file with Author).  Ms. Clemmons represented 
defendant Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. in the Mudel appeal.      
284 WELCH & DARYL, supra note 268, at 18-12, 18-13.  Still, the researcher 
can find cases where the Commission has substituted its own fact-findings for those 
of the magistrate.  See, e.g., Romero v. Burt Moeke Hardwoods, Inc., 760 N.W.2d 
586, 592-93 (Ct. App. Mich. 2008) (WCAC did not engage in illicit de novo 
review, but instead legitimately found as fact reason that claimant left Michigan to 
return to Mexico, as his visa had run out: “Here, the WCAC found sufficient 
evidence on the record to make a finding and determined that plaintiff left the 
United States because his visa expired.  Because there is record evidence to support 
the WCAC’s finding, we will not overturn it on appeal.”) (note: the magistrate had 
not made a hard finding on why claimant departed); Daniel v. Dep’t of Corrs., 658 
N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 2003) (magistrate determined that claimant had developed 
depression because of employer’s disciplining of him, but WCAC, reversing 
    
Spring 2012 Master or Chancellor?  91 
 
Massachusetts (1985, 1991).  The Administrative Judge (AJ) 
under the Massachusetts Act has been the final fact-finder in earnest 
since the state’s 1991 amendments.285  The system had undergone a 
remarkable progressive reform in 1985, said to have been informed 
by a tardy response to National Commission recommendations.286  
Those changes first deprived the intra-agency review board of de 
novo powers, but still left it authority to reweigh evidence.  However, 
it was only six years later, the pendulum having swung back towards 
retractive reform, that the AJ was finally equipped with his or her 
current power.  
Before 1985 the hearing officer in the system was an 
individual commissioner.  Appeal was taken to a reviewing board of 
“‘not less than three members’ or commissioners . . . .  The 
commissioners . . . presided over their own hearings and also, as 
members of a reviewing board, reviewed the single member 
decisions of their colleagues.”287  This board “could entirely 
supersede the single member’s decision,” empowered as it was to 
hear testimony, take evidence, and “revise the decision in whole or in 
part . . . .”288  By one account, this arrangement had encountered 
                                                          
award, found that claimant had brought discipline upon himself by harassing co-
worker; court affirms over dissent).      
285 M.G.L. c.152, § 11C.  With regard to the 1991 amendments, see 
Laurence Bengston’s Case, 609 N.E.2d 1229 (Ct. App. Mass. 1993).  See generally 
David Carpenter’s Case, 923 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Mass. 2010) (“credibility 
determinations are within the sole province of an administrative judge and are to be 
considered final by both the reviewing board and an appellate court.”).   
286 Memorandum from Alan Peirce, Esquire, Salem, MA to Author (Dec. 
16, 2011) (on file with Author).  
287 LEONARD NASON, 29, 29A MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION § 14:27 (3d ed. West 2003). 
288 Barbara Pospisil’s Case, 525 N.E.2d 646 (Mass. 1988) (noting also that 
change to single commissioner as fact-finder was procedural, and hence 
permissibly retroactive; employer had no vested right in having the Board on 
appeal be able to reassess claimant’s credibility).  According to one expert, even 
though the reviewing board had this power, it did not exercise the same very often.  
The Review Board would usually operate as a “rubber stamp . . . [I] cannot ever 
remember having a case revisited or having facts revised.” Memorandum from 
Alan Peirce, supra note 286.  Another expert has observed that the prior process 
resulted in such rubber-stamping due to the personal/political dynamic involved, 
stating that the “Sitting Review Board members would in turn have their own 
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efficiency problems.  Consequently, by the 1980s, the public could 
read of acute delays in the litigation process: “An injured employee 
faced months, if not years, of delays waiting for a decision regarding 
benefits.”  This unsatisfactory arrangement was superimposed on a 
system that paid only modest benefits that “often left injured workers 
impoverished over time.”289  It was out of this environment that the 
1985 reform evolved.   
Under the initial reform, the title “commissioner” was 
abolished.290  The first-level hearing officer became the 
Administrative Judge (AJ) and the intra-agency review board was 
composed of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), an arrangement 
which continues to the present.291  This effort was no doubt intended 
to address the “effective delivery” goal of the system, but the statute 
still allowed the reviewing board to “weigh evidence” and substitute 
its decision if the AJ’s decision was “unwarranted by the facts.”292  In 
a 1988 case, the court held that the law said what it meant, thus 
allowing for the review board to make new fact-findings.293  The 
exception was that the personal assessment of a live witness could 
not be overthrown.294  
According to the treatise writer Nason, “[r]eaction to the . . . 
decision was swift,” with bills submitted prohibiting the reassessment 
of credibility.295  According to Nason, this advocacy grew out of a 
fear “that in the absence of legislative correction, the fact finding 
ability of the reviewing board would undoubtedly result in an 
                                                          
hearing decisions be the subject of appeals to be heard by their fellow 
Commissioners.”  The present arrangement is more satisfactory.  Memorandum 
from Joseph Agnelli, Jr., Esquire, Boston, MA to Author (Dec. 17, 2011) (on file 
with Author).     
289 ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES OF MASSACHUSETTS FOUNDATION, 
MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS COMPENSATION: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW & MOVING 
FORWARD FROM THE 1991 REFORM 16 (2004), available at 
http://www.aimnet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Web_Site&CONTENTID=744
2&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.  
290 Id. at 12. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Robert Lettich’s Case, 530 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1988). 
294 Id. at 163. 
295 LEONARD Y. NASON, 29 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION § 16:27 (3d ed. 2003).  
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increase in appeals from decisions of administrative judges.”296  In 
the end, the statute was changed so as to remove any doubt regarding 
where the power to assess credibility lay and now it is “clear that the 
reviewing board has absolutely no fact finding authority.”297  Nason 
also asserts that a legislative motive in making the AJ the final fact-
finder was “that it was felt that the hearing judge was in the best 
position to find ‘credible’ facts based upon a live witness’ testimony, 
i.e., assess a witness’ credibility.  In the absence of hearing live 
testimony it was felt that it was inappropriate for the reviewing board 
to revisit the facts found, especially when based on credibility.”298    
This 1991 change was, in fact, part of a broader reform, 
which itself was a reaction to the 1985 amendments referenced 
above.299  The latter had given rise to the “unintended consequence of 
rapidly accelerating benefits to the point where they served as a 
disincentive for many employees to return to work.” 300 This crisis in 
costs and premiums was exacerbated by a bad economy and 
insurance industry woes, leading to a “decidedly pro-
business/insurer” reform,301 the outlines of which endure to the 
present day.    
According to the veteran attorney, Alan Pierce, the 1991 
reform tended to improve the adjudication of cases, and has 
significantly reduced the number of appeals:  
 
Since the old practice [pre-1985] was almost always 
an affirmation of the fact finder [anyway] the new 
[Review Board] really has taken [itself] seriously as 
an appellate body.  Both the 1985 and 1991 changes 
made a previously “simple and summary” process 
(and statute) now chock full of procedural and 
substantive nuances (i.e. different levels of causation 
                                                          
296 Id.  
297 Id. 
298 Memorandum from Leonard Y. Nason, Esquire, Bedford, MA, to 
Author (Dec. 17, 2011) (on file with Author).   
299 See ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES OF MASSACHUSETTS FOUNDATION, 
MASSACHUSETTS WORKERS COMPENSATION: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW & MOVING 
FORWARD FROM THE 1991 REFORM, supra note 237. 
300 Id. at 20.  
301 Memorandum from Alan Peirce, supra note 286.   
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when there is a pre-existing condition, tighter 
definitions of earning capacity and so on), [and] the 
appeals that actually are briefed (and in rare cases 
orally argued) usually have some substance to them.  
If you read the Review Board decisions now there are 
a great deal of reversals, or more commonly remands, 
to correct the original AJ’s analysis. 
 
Two other factors . . . dictate the volume of cases 
appealed and ultimately heard.  Under the old system, 
despite the Review Board rubber stamping almost 
everything, cases were nevertheless almost always 
appealed . . . . [This was so because it] kept the case 
alive for [a] possible lump sum.  Since getting 
anywhere at the old IAB took a long time, cases 
usually settled when there was something coming up 
on the docket.  Also there was another appeal level 
(eliminated in 1985) to the Superior Court (now cases 
go from the Review Board to the Appeals Court).   
 
[T]he other factor influencing the lower volume of 
appeal decisions today is that prior to the filing of 
briefs, the Review Board upon receipt of an appeal 
will schedule an informal conference with counsel and 
just one of the three Review Board judges to ask what 
the “real” issues are and try to get the appealing party 
to withdraw if it appears the filing of the appeal was 
just a long shot or to appease the losing client. Also[,] 
a certain number of those cases would settle[,] or if 
there was an obvious error below the appellee might 
in the interest of time agree to a remand to correct the 
minor error below.  About one-third of appeals today 
to the Review Board “go away” after this informal 
conference.302 
 
Nason agrees: “I think overall that [the 1991 changes have] 
reduced reviewing board appeals, and hearing judges have been very 
                                                          
302 Id. 
    
Spring 2012 Master or Chancellor?  95 
careful to make it clear that his/her findings of fact were based upon 
their own credibility determinations, having in mind the witness’ 
demeanor, memory, testimony, corroborating evidence, and the 
like.”303  
 
Kentucky (1988).  The ALJ has been the final fact-finder in the 
Kentucky system since 1988.304  The motive for the change was to 
create a more efficient process of adjudication.305  “[T]he primary 
goal of the [1987] Special Session” of the legislature, one veteran 
states, was:  
 
[determining] how to shorten the time from filing of 
claim to final decision.  It was not unusual for a claim 
to take two years to litigate. . . .  Because all claims 
were decided by the three-member Workers’ 
Compensation Board, there was a substantial backlog 
of cases to be decided . . . .  The result of the Special 
Session was that the Board was replaced by twelve 
ALJs, and a fast-track litigation scheme was 
adopted.306   
 
Under this scheme, the Board became an appellate entity,307 
reviewing the ALJ decision on a substantial evidence basis.308   
                                                          
303 Memorandum  from Leonard Y. Nason, Esquire, Bedford, MA, to 
Author (Dec. 17, 2011) (on file with Author).   
304 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.285 (West 2010).    
305 Comments from Hon. Mike Alvey, Chair, Kentucky WCB, to Author 
(Aug. 28, 2011) (indicating that under the displaced practice, cases would go into 
an adjudication “pipeline,” with the end-point years away; amendment was 
intended to “expedite” the process). 
306 Memorandum of Stephanie Ross, Esquire, Florence, KY, to Author 
(Sep. 1, 2011) (quoting James Fogle, Esq.) (on file with Author).   
307 Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1992).  
According to the court: 
 
The 1988 statutory restructuring . . . intended appeal to the WCB 
to be the functional equivalent of appellate review in the Court of 
Appeals.  These statutes worked fundamental changes.  The ALJs 
were created and empowered to function the same as a trial court 
trying a case without a jury.  The WCB was divested of the fact-
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In a renowned case, the state supreme court stressed that the 
amendment sought to “streamline the workers’ compensation 
process,” and it encouraged parties to avoid appeals that simply 
asked (in vain) that the appellate court reweigh the evidence and 
reassess credibility.309  Supreme Court review should not, the court 
admonished, be the end sought in every litigated workers’ 
compensation case.  The court remarked memorably that “[t]he WCB 
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals are not way stations, or rest 
stops, along the road to the Kentucky Supreme Court.”310 
 
Colorado (1987).  The ALJ of the Colorado system gained 
full fact-finding power in the course of the 1987 amendments.311  An 
                                                          
finding function and restructured to carry out the same functions 
as an intermediate court reviewing the decisions of a court of 
original jurisdiction, to perform the error correcting function 
normally assigned to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, lacking 
only the power of constitutional review.   
 
Id. at 687 (citation omitted).    
308 See, e.g., Couch v. Blevins Logging, 2011 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 69 (Ky. 
2011) (“The courts have construed KRS 342.285 to require a party who appeals a 
finding that favors the party with the burden of proof to show that no substantial 
evidence supported the finding, i.e., that the finding was unreasonable under the 
evidence.”) (footnote and citations omitted);  Jefferson Cnty Public Schools v. 
Stephens, 208 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2006) (ALJ’s findings that claimant did not suffer 
idiopathic fall, and that she did not otherwise suffer a work-related injury, were not 
arbitrary and capricious, court remarking that “[a]lthough KRS 342.285 designates 
the ALJ as the finder of fact, a finding that is arbitrary, capricious, or clearly 
erroneous is subject to reversal on appeal.  [We have previously explained] that a 
finding may only be affirmed if it is reasonable and supported by substantial 
evidence.” (citing Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)).  
 
309 Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1992) 
(emphasis omitted).  
310 Id. The court continued: “The parties in cases such as the present one 
must accept that, notwithstanding their right to demand further appellate review, 
the body performing further review is there to address new problems, not to 
redecide the same evidentiary questions.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
311 See C.R.S. § 8-43-301(8).  The 1987 reform also had retractive aspects, 
in particular the abolition of the injured worker’s right to vocational rehabilitation – 
a benefit type that had become highly costly and, reportedly, abused.  See also 
Memorandum from Tom Kanan, Esq., Denver, CO to Author (Dec. 20, 2011) (on 
file with Author).     
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appeal is to be prosecuted to the Industrial Claims Appeals Office 
(ICAP or “panel”), which undertakes substantial evidence review.312  
The legislature at the time was dissatisfied with the performance of 
the Industrial Commission, which at the time entertained disputes.  
This was particularly so at a time of “widespread perception that the 
costs of the system to employers were getting too high.”313  
The Court of Appeals, in 1995, confirmed that efficiency in 
the adjudication process was the legislature’s motive for eliminating 
intra-agency reassessment of the facts.  In that case, the claimant 
argued that limiting the appeals panel to “substantial evidence” 
review compromised his due process rights.  The court rejected this 
argument, replying that the “purpose of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act . . . is to provide ‘an expeditious method of compensating 
disabled workers with liability determined ‘with some degree of 
certainty’ . . . . Since limited administrative review, such as provided 
here, avoids duplication of effort at the agency level, it is rationally 
related to the statutory goal . . . .”314 
One veteran who experienced the change states that investing 
the ALJ with fact-finding power, and making the Appeals Panel in 
effect an appellate court, has been a positive development.  The panel 
“has in effect become the rule and statutory interpreter of most 
influence in the current system, but no longer deciding the outcome 
of cases on grounds of proximate cause or ‘arising out of or in the 
course of’ employment, except supposedly as based on legal 
standards.”  The Panel has also:  
 
                                                          
312 May DF v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo. App. 
1988) (court discerning a “conscious legislative intent to abolish the previous 
distinction between ultimate and evidentiary findings and to make any findings of 
fact by the ALJ binding on the Panel, if they are supported by substantial evidence, 
leaving only conclusions of law to be fully reviewed.”).  See also Panera Bread, 
LLC v. Indus. Claims Appeals Office, 141 P.3d 970, 972 (Colo. App. 2006) (in 
horseplay case, court remarks, “Because the issues are factual in nature, they must 
be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard . . . The evidence must be 
considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we, like the 
Panel, must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility 
determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record . . . .”). 
313 Memorandum from Tom Kanan, Esquire, Denver, CO to Author (Dec. 
20, 2011) (on file with Author).   
314 Wecker v. TBL Excavating, 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1995). 
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[G]reatly reduced the pressure on the Colorado Court 
of Appeals by, over time, interpreting and applying 
the Act and administrative rules in a legally 
sophisticated and consistent manner. . . . [This has 
been] much unlike the old Industrial Commission, 
which was composed of political appointees, with no 
requirement for legal expertise among them, 
influenced by common sense and “fairness” good and 
simple.315 
 
Texas (1989).  The elimination of the Texas “jury trial de 
novo” is perhaps the most illustrious phenomenon of the counter-
reform.  The jury trial and the preexisting administrative process 
were displaced in a dramatic 1989 amendment.  Now, after a 
mandatory benefit review conference, a disputed case can proceed to 
a contested case hearing.   In this forum, the hearing officer is, for all 
practical intents and purposes, the final fact-finder.  The law, in this 
regard, states, “The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance 
and materiality of the evidence offered and of the weight and 
credibility to be given to the evidence.”316   
The Appeals Panel, which was created by the reform, is no 
“rubber stamp,” but instead reviews the sufficiency of the facts under 
a “clearly wrong and manifestly unjust” standard. 317  Some Appeals 
Panel decisions refer to appeals taken on this basis as “great weight” 
challenges.318  As discussed below, a modified jury trial de novo, of 
limited character, endures.    Contemporary observers posited that 
                                                          
315 Memorandum from Tom Kanan, supra note 313. 
316  TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.165; Interview with Hon. Jennifer 
Hopens, Hearing Officer, Tex. Dept. of Ins. (Aug. 29, 2011).   
317 Texas Workers’ Comp.  Ins. Fund v. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 
124 S.W.813, 823 (Tex. App. 2003).    
318 Appeals Panel, Appeal No. 110382, p.2 (filed May 5, 2011) (holding 
that the evidence did not support a 15% impairment rating, but only a 5%, and 
hence that hearing officer was “clearly wrong”; and stating, “In reviewing a ‘great 
weight’ challenge, we must examine the entire record to determine if: (1) there is 
only ‘slight’ evidence to support the finding; (2) the finding is so against the great 
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly 
unjust; or (3) the great weight and preponderance of the evidence supports its 
nonexistence.”), available at 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/appeals/2011cases/110382r.pdf.    
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these 1989 changes “creat[ed] a strong administrative agency to 
oversee and improve the efficiency of the compensation system,” 
with a “multitiered system of dispute resolution designed to resolve 
more disagreements at the agency level.”319  According to one system 
participant, the Appeals Panel in practice rarely disturbs the hearing 
officer’s fact-findings.  The “modified” jury trials de novo that are 
potentially available, meanwhile, in practice unfold only rarely.320       
 
Of course, when such a trial actually unfolds, the jury is in the 
position to find facts.  The reform statutory scheme that makes this 
possible has been summarized as follows:  
 
The Commission’s final decision may be appealed to 
the courts under what might best be described as 
modified de novo review. For all issues regarding 
compensability of the injury (for example, whether it 
occurred in the course and scope of employment) and 
eligibility for and the amount of income and death 
benefits, there is a right to trial by jury . . . . The party 
appealing bears the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . . The jury, although 
informed of the Commission decision, is not required 
to accord it any particular weight . . . . Further, the 
opinion of the designated doctor regarding impairment 
is accorded no special weight.  
                                                          
319 William O. Ashcraft & Anita M. Allesandra, A Review of the New 
Texas Workers’ Compensation  System, 21 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 609, 610 (1990) 
(reviewing background of amendments).  
320 Interview with Hon. Jennifer Hopens, Hearing Officer, Tex. Dept. of 
Ins. (Aug. 29, 2011).  For a case where such trial did unfold, see State Office of 
Risk Management v. Trujillo, 267 S.W.3d 349, 352-54 (Tex. App. 2008) (trial 
court committed error in refusing to allow jury to hear testimony of employer’s 
medical expert, who was to opine that claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not 
work-related; court agreed with employer’s argument that it was not obliged to 
have announced this expert in proceedings before the Appeals Panel, as it was 
“entitled to de novo review and [its] . . .  appeal should not be considered a 
continuation of the administrative hearing.”)   The court also noted that the “final 
decision of the TDI-DWC appeals panel may be appealed to the district court level 
under a ‘modified de novo review.’”).     




In determining the extent of impairment, however, the 
jury must adopt the specific rating of one of the 
physicians in the case . . . . Evidence of the extent of 
impairment is limited to that presented to the 
Commission unless the court makes a threshold 
finding that the claimant’s condition has substantially 
changed, in which case new impairment evidence may 
be introduced . . . . If the parties dispute whether the 
claimant’s condition has substantially changed, the 
court must hear from the designated doctor, whose 
opinion is controlling on this issue “unless the 
preponderance of the other medical evidence is to the 
contrary.”  . . . . The court’s finding of substantial 
change of condition is not revealed to the jury. . . . 
[I]ssues other than compensability of the injury and 
eligibility for and the amount of income and death 
benefits are reviewed by the court under the 
substantial evidence rule.321 
 
 This restructuring unfolded in the wake of cost and litigation 
crises.322  With regard to litigation, the availability of trial de novo 
was said to be abused, presumably by regular claimant demands for 
jury trials in weak cases that had met with defeat during 
administrative review.  The “Texas trial de novo . . . abuses,” a critic 
aligned with business interests asserts, “frankly had [an] organized 
crime dimension[] . . . .”323  Whether or not this churlish statement is 
                                                          
321 Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 515 (Tex. 
1995).  
 
322 According to Larson, “the waste generated by the trial de novo process 
prompted the amendments.” LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[7][d].   
323 Robert B. Steggert, Cost Trends and Cost Drivers: An Employer’s 
Perspective, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM? WHERE 
ARE WE GOING? 72 (WCRI 2010).      
A different view about the leveraging effect of the jury trial can be found 
in Sam B. Barton, A Study of Administrative Improvements in Workmen’s 
Compensation in Texas, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, 571, 579 n.10 (1973).  Writing in 
the early 1970s, Barton complained that employers would deny benefits to 
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true, the Texas system developed a crisis that provoked a harsh, anti-
lawyer/anti-litigation backlash.324    
The background of the 1989 amendments may be ascertained 
by review of a committee report prepared for the legislature in the 
midst of the crisis.  It states, in pertinent part, “[d]ue to the delay and 
costs of the system’s first factfinding (the court trial), disputes are 
resolved by compromises rather than application of the law to facts 
established through formal procedures . . . .”325  Among the 
suggestions for adjudicatory reform were the following:       
 
[1] Provide for evidentiary hearings in the agency with 
appeals to an appeals board within the agency.  
Appellate review within the agency should be on law 
and facts and on the record of the administrative 
hearing.  (No change in the [then-existing] pre-hearing 
system). 
 
[2] . . . Provide for review of agency decisions on 
liability and compensation issues by the courts on the 
record of the agency under the substantial evidence 
standard.326  
 
The latter suggestion, which the committee recommended, 
allowed only for substantial evidence review in (presumably) the 
county trial courts, after consideration of disputed cases by 
administrative officers.  The committee, in voicing this 
                                                          
deserving workers and try to leverage them to compromise-settle their cases for 
less than they were worth.  A worker who could survive the delay attendant to the 
denial could turn the tables and use the threat of the trial de novo to leverage a 
higher settlement.  “Contrary to academic orthodoxy,” Barton observed, “trial de 
novo served the interests of the injured worker under the Texas system.  At times, 
the threat of a jury trial was the only effective restraint on the tendency of some 
insurance companies to pay workers less than the law intended.” Id. 
324 See generally Phil Hardberger, Texas Workers’ Compensation: A Ten-
Year Survey – Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
1, 42 (2000).  See also Ashcraft & Allesandra, supra note 319 (reviewing 
background of amendments).  
325 JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE: 
A REPORT TO THE 71ST TEXAS LEGISLATURE 5 (Dec. 9, 1988).   
326 Id. at 15. 
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recommendation, actually offered four different variations.  Jury trial 
de novo was not, notably, mentioned in any of these variations.  One 
variation, which allowed for revisitation of the facts, came close to 
what was ultimately adopted.  As foreshadowed above, however, the 
enduring availability of a modified jury trial de novo was later added.  
The variation provided as follows:  
 
Provide for review of liability and compensation 
decisions [by the trial court] on both law and fact; 
make the agency records admissible; the burden of the 
appealing party is to show the agency erred, based on 
the information before it at the time of the decision.327   
 
This eventual retention of the jury trial, even in modified 
form, was controversial at the time.328  The choice to retain review by 
a jury, however, had its genesis in constitutionality concerns.329 
The reforms were accompanied by severe restrictions on the 
fees that attorneys could charge injured workers.  This aspect of the 
1989 amendments has reportedly created a shortage of lawyers for 
such claimants.  This lack of legal representation, critics complain, 
can become a real problem when the administrative fact-finding 
process is complete and the modified jury trial is pending.  “Even if 
an injured worker overcomes denials through three administrative 
levels within the division, the insurance carrier can appeal for judicial 
review in state court . . . . The claimant can win every issue in the 
[administrative process] ‘only to lose on a default judgment in district 
court solely due to lack of representation . . . .’”330  This critique 
raises the issue of whether the adjudication reform pendulum swung 
too violently in favor of employers.331   
                                                          
327 Id. (Emphasis added).   
328 Ashcraft & Allessandra, supra note 319, at 627 (1990). 
329 See supra Section IV(A).  
330 Terry Carter, Insult to Injury: Texas Workers’ Comp System Denies, 




331 An irony, meanwhile, is that the specter of court review now more 
commonly leverages the claimant and not the employer.  Arguably, the situation 
    
Spring 2012 Master or Chancellor?  103 
 
    Nebraska (1992).  The single trial judge of the seven-
member Workers’ Compensation Court is the final fact-finder under 
the Nebraska Act.  This has been the law since 1992, when the prior 
practice of allowing a rehearing de novo by a three-judge review 
panel was abolished.332  Under the current practice, the findings of 
the trial judge are final, and the three-judge panel of the court 
undertakes review of the decision under the “clearly wrong” 
standard,333 that is, as if the adjudication was a “jury verdict.”334    
This change in the system unfolded in the wake of a litigation 
crisis, with backlogs of cases that had plagued the court for some 
time.  The elimination of de novo review “was intended to streamline 
the system to bring a resolution to disputed cases in a more timely 
fashion . . . [and] provide for a better organization of the legal 
process . . . . ”335 
 
                                                          
could be remedied by making the Hearing Officer the final fact-finder in every 
respect. 
332 See, e.g., Phipps v. Milton G. Waldbaum & Co., 477 N.W.2d 919 
(Neb.1991) (three-member panel on rehearing reversed trial judge; court describing 
then-existing review standard).  
333 Haworth v. Compass Group, No. A-08-865, 2009 Neb. App. LEXIS 
51, *5 (Neb. Ct. App., Mar. 17, 2009) (“On appellate review, the factual findings 
made by the trial judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court have the effect of a 
jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong . . . . ”).  With regard to 
the meaning of “clearly wrong,” “findings of the Workers' Compensation Court 
unsupported by credible evidence are clearly wrong and will be set aside on 
appeal.” Granados v. IBP, Inc., No. A-96-927, 1997 Neb. App. LEXIS 86, *19 
(Neb. Ct. App. May 27, 1997).  For case where the court agreed with the review 
panel that the trial judge had been clearly wrong in one aspect of his award, see 
Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 407 (Neb. 2005).     
334  NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-185 (addressing appeals from WCC Review 
Panel, and stating, “the judgment made by the compensation court after review 
shall have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case.  A judgment  . . 
. of the . . . court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds” 
that court acted ultra vires, that fraud had occurred, or that “there is not sufficient 
competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the . . . judgment . . .”).  
Importantly, the revised scheme, which was perceived to feature an inconsistency, 
received a definitive interpretation by the state supreme court, to this effect, in 
Pearson v. Lincoln Telephone Co., 513 N.W.2d 361 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994).   
335 Floor Debate, 92d Leg., 2d Sess. 11, 324 (March 25, 1992) (on file 
with Author).  
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West Virginia (1995).  In 1995 the legislature in West 
Virginia enacted legislation that reformed the compensation law.  
According to the state supreme court, “The purported goal of these 
sweeping reforms envisioned ameliorating the workers’ 
compensation fund’s fiscal crisis and restoring its financial 
integrity.”336  The definitive contemporary analysis of the 
amendment certainly confirms this assessment.337 
Among the changes was making the ALJ of the Office of 
Judges the final fact-finder.  In making this change, the legislature 
sought to streamline the litigation process.338  In this regard, the 
revised law provides that the Board of Review, as it is currently 
called, may reverse, vacate or modify the ALJ’s decision if his or her 
findings are “[c]learly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and 
substantial evidence on the whole record” or “[a]rbitrary and 
capricious ….”339  Importantly, another statute altogether governs the 
state supreme court’s review power over the decision of the Board of 
Review.340           
 
G.  States Experiencing Institutional Change 
 
Since the trend towards making the WCJ the final fact-finder 
began, three states have undertaken fundamental institutional change.  
These states, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming, all moved the 
adjudication of contested workers’ compensation cases from civil 
court to an administrative forum.  In all three states, the WCJ was 
                                                          
336 Repass v. Workers’ Comp’n Div., 569 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 2002).  See 
also Blankenship v. Richardson, 474 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1996).  
337 Emily A. Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers’ Compensation 
Reform: A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers’ Compensation 
Legislation, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 23 (1995).  
338 Id. at 188 (“The Administration sought to streamline the adjudicative 
system by placing more authority with the Commissioner, at both the initial and 
final levels of review . . . .”).  Spieler questioned the fairness of this change, as 
initially manifested, as it gave the same individual who was responsible for 
payments out of the state fund authority over the adjudication system. 
339 W. VA. CODE § 23-5-12(B)(5)-(6) (2011).  For a case in which the 
Supreme Court held that the Board of Review exceeded its power, see Fenton Art 
Glass Co. v. West Virginia Office of Insurance Commissioner, 664 S.E.2d 761 (W. 
Va. 2008).     
340 W. VA. CODE  § 23-5-15 (2011). 
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invested with final fact-finding powers, and in all three, notably, no 
intra-agency review was created.  Instead, appeals from the WCJ in 
each state are prosecuted directly to judicial review.  
 
Louisiana (1983/1988).  The Office of Workers’ 
Compensation, now located in the Louisiana Workforce 
Commission, dates from 1983, but WCJs of the system date from 
1988.  Since 1989 the WCJ has been the final fact-finder, and review 
is undertaken by appeal directly to the court of appeals.341   Under the 
Act, “factual findings . . . are subject to the manifest error-clearly 
wrong standard of appellate review . . . .  In applying [this] standard, 
the appellate court must determine whether the fact finder’s 
conclusion was reasonable, not whether the trier of fact was right or 
wrong . . . .”342   
The Larson treatise remarks that in Louisiana “the standard is 
actively applied,” and it collects many cases that have been “reversed 
because the trial court’s findings on medical and factual causation or 
other issue were clearly erroneous.”343  In the present day, courts 
state that they accord deference to the judge.344  Still, cases may be 
                                                          
341 The 1988 amendment created an intra-agency review panel, but this 
panel was abolished by a law passed in 1989.  See John Devlin, Louisiana 
Constitutional Law, 51 LA L.  REV. 295, 314, n.91 (1990).  The governing statute is 
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1310.5.    
342 Bell v. Mid-City Printers, Inc., 54 So. 3d 1226 (La. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“factual findings in workers’ compensation cases are subject to the manifest error-
clearly wrong standard of appellate review…. In applying the manifest error-
clearly wrong standard, the appellate court must determine whether the fact finder’s 
conclusion was reasonable, not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong….”).  
See also Chaisson v. Philip Services Corp., 917 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 2005).    
343 LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[6][d].  See, e.g., Britton v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., 604 So.2d 130 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (applying clearly erroneous 
standard, court states, “the conclusion of the hearing officer, at best, rests primarily 
upon the statements of the chiropractor, Dr. Aaron, whose diagnosis is directly 
contradicted by other objective evidence, and totally inconsistent and implausible 
when compared with all of the medical testimony.  Hence, the record discloses no 
reasonable basis for the rejection of the preponderate medical evidence and for a 
decision that, instead, returns plaintiff to light duty work. Consequently, 
determining that the hearing officer's finding is clearly wrong in that respect, we 
reverse the award of weekly benefits ….”).       
344 Herrerea v. Cajun Co., 960 So. 2d 1161, 1166 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (in 
case where WCJ credited claimant based in on observations of non-English 
speaking claimant’s “demeanor and testimony and to evaluate his level of 
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found where the court applies the clearly wrong standard and 
reverses fact-findings in situations where a commission or court 
applying the substantial evidence rule would not.  In one case, the 
court stated, “‘where documents or objective evidence so contradict 
the witness’s story, or the story itself is so inconsistent or implausible 
on its face that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's 
story,’ even a finding purportedly based upon a credibility 
determination may be deemed manifestly erroneous or clearly 
wrong.”345    
Under the 1983 reform, administrative hearing agents of the 
Director had limited power; they were essentially mediators 
undertaking informal dispute resolution.   If one of the parties 
disagreed with the Director’s recommendations, he or she could seek 
consideration de novo in the district court.346   In 1988 the law was 
amended to create hearing officers with true adjudicatory power.347  
At first, notably, an appellate entity within the agency was provided 
for, but this was abolished in 1989.  The original title of the judge 
was hearing officer, but in 1997 the title was changed to WCJ.348   
A cause célèbre unfolded after the 1988 enactment, as the 
court of appeals declared the law unconstitutional.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed, on the narrow grounds that the legislature had 
impermissibly deprived the civil courts of jurisdiction.  The 
constitution, in this regard, provided that all civil matters were to be 
heard  in the district courts and, in the court’s view, workers’ 
                                                          
understanding first-hand,” award would be affirmed, court remarking, “When 
findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the 
manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's 
finding.”).  
345 See, e.g., Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, LLC, 56 So. 3d 215 (La. 2011) 
(hearing officer found as fact that claimant had not promptly reported his injury 
because he feared discharge; court reverses as clearly wrong) (quoting Rosell v. 
ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989)).  
346 Turner v. Md. Cas. Co., 518 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1988).   
347 Ross v. Highland Ins. Co., 590 So. 2d 1177 (La. 1991).   
348 Able v. La. Workers’ Comp. Corp., 702 So. 2d 1388, 1389 (La. 1997) 
(Johnson, J., dissenting).  In this case, the majority held that a WCJ could not hold 
unconstitutional a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The dissent noted 
that compensation hearing officers were indeed “judges,” that the state constitution 
specifically sanctioned a special tribunal for compensation disputes, and concluded 
as result that a WCJ should have such power.  
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compensation cases were indeed civil matters. 349  The next month, 
however, the state constitution was amended to permit adjudication 
of workers’ compensation cases outside the civil system.350  
Prior to this 1988 reform, the trial court was the final fact-
finder, and on appeal the appellate court applied the “manifest error” 
or “clearly wrong” standard of review.351  The early 1983 reform, 
which displaced this system, and the more fundamental 1988 reform, 
reflected the legislature “respond[ing] to longstanding criticism of the 
Louisiana system and [it] brought [the] system into line with that of 
the vast majority of other states.”352  The changes also unfolded, 
notably, in the midst of an insurance cost crisis – employers 
experienced a 477% increase in the cost of insurance during the 
period 1980 to 1990.353  
 
New Mexico (1986). The New Mexico constitution was 
amended in 1986 to allow the adjudication of workers’ compensation 
cases by an administrative agency.  A law providing for the same was 
passed that year.  The WCJ from the outset was final fact-finder.  In a 
1988 case, however, the state supreme court, in an articulate decision, 
held that on appeal the standard of review is “whole record” 
substantial evidence review.354   
                                                          
349 Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990).  
350 Long v. Ins. Co. of No. America, 595 So. 2d 636 (La. 1992).  
351 See, e.g., Harris v. La. Pac. Corp., 420 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct. App. 
1982).  
352 John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 LA. L. REV. 295, 314, 
n.90 (1990).   
353 See History of LWCC, “The Historical Timeline of LWCC,” available 
at http://www.lwcc.com/content.cfm?id=19 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (stating, inter 
alia, that in October 1990 the “Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation 
(LWCC), a private nonprofit mutual insurance company, is created by a 
constitutional amendment and legislation to save the state’s failed workers’ 
compensation system by tackling the factors that led to its demise and stabilizing 
costs.”).  
354 Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (court citing, 
among others, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 71 S. Ct. 456 (U.S. 1951)).  For a 
case where the court, having undertaken whole record review, reversed the decision 
of the WCJ, see Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 228 P.2d 525 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2009).  In this case, the claimant/appellee argued that adjudications over physician 
choice under the New Mexico Act should be within the WCJ’s discretion, to avoid 
appeals and delay.  The court observed that the review of WCJ decisions was 
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This reflected more rigorous review, notably, than that 
undertaken when a case was adjudicated before a trial court in the 
years before reform.  In those days, the standard of review was 
simply substantial evidence.355  The court in its 1998 case noted that 
the whole record review it was imposing has its basis in the post-New 
Deal concern that administrative agencies will abuse their power.  “In 
most cases,” the court stated, “the administrative agency performs 
more than one function.  It may be the complainant, the prosecutor, 
and the fact finder.  It is those dual roles that prompts the reviewing 
court to closely scrutinize agency decisions, rather than acting as a 
rubber stamp.”356   
The genesis of workers’ compensation adjudication in an 
administrative agency was fraught with trouble.  An initial attempt, in 
1957, by the legislature to transfer jurisdiction from the courts to the 
executive branch met with failure when the governor vetoed the 
legislation.  He did so out of the same sort of constitutional concerns 
that existed in Louisiana.  In a consequent lawsuit, the state supreme 
court sustained his decision, ruling that the creation of a commission 
to resolve disputes “was an unconstitutional intrusion into the domain 
of the judicial branch . . . .”357  A second attempt, coupled with a 
                                                          
substantial evidence on the whole record, and that a change such as that proposed 
by claimant must be undertaken by the legislature.   
355 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 697 P.2d 156 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1985) (“It is then through this small aperture called appellate review that we 
examine the evidence.”).  
356 Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363, 367 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). We may 
note editorially, however, that this concern is not, or should not, be applicable in 
the workers’ compensation context.  The present-day professional WCJ in New 
Mexico, Pennsylvania – and everywhere –  is supposed to be a neutral fact-finder 
entertaining a dispute between two private parties over money.  See supra Section 
IV(B).  Whole record review could be valuable in the name of accountability, but 
of the individual judge, not the agency and its institutional interests.  
357 NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT (PAUL L. HIAN, CHRIS GARCIA, AND 
GILBERT K. ST. CLAIR, EDS.), p.287 (1994) (discussing State ex rel. Hovey 
Concrete Products v. Mechem, 316 P.2d 1069 (S. Ct. New Mexico 1957), book 





ult&ct=result&resnum=3&sqi=2&ved (last visited Jan. 7, 2012),   
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change to the constitution, in 1986, was successful.  Ironically, just 
before the voters passed the proposed amendment, the court 
overruled Mechem and held that a workers’ compensation law would 
not have offended the constitution.358  As for the legislative motive, 
by one account, the populous had “suffer[ed] through nearly thirty 
years of court administration. . . . [M]any complaints arose over the 
courts’ handling of … claims.  Many workers believed the courts 
were too slow and too expensive.  Others believed their decisions 
were too costly to business . . . .”359 
 
Wyoming (1986).  The Hearing Examiner has been the final 
fact-finder under the Wyoming Act since 1986.  Prior to that time, 
contested compensation cases were entertained by judges in the 
district courts.  The legislature in 1986 moved “. . . the adjudicatory 
function . . . from our state district courts to the ‘office of 
independent hearing officers.’”360  Appeals are brought to the district 
courts which, like the state supreme court thereafter, undertake 
substantial evidence review.361  This significant change was 
accompanied by substantive changes to the law, said to have been 
necessary because of a fiscal crisis with the state fund.362 
The Wyoming statute maintains an unusual proviso whereby 
a dispute can be referred to a medical panel for fact-finding.  In this 
regard:  
 
If the percentage of physical impairment is disputed, 
the division shall obtain a second opinion and if the 
ratings conflict, shall determine the physical 
impairment award upon consideration of the initial 
and second opinion.  Any objection to a final 
                                                          
358 Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 726 P.2d 1381 (N.M. 1986).  
359  NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENT (PAUL L. HIAN, CHRIS GARCIA, AND 
GILBERT K. ST. CLAIR, EDS.) 287 (1994). 
360 State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Hollister, 794 P.2d 
886, 888 (Wyo. 1990). 
361  Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 
1989).  
362  George Santini, The Breaking of a Compromise: An Analysis of 
Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Legislation, 1986-1997, 33 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 489, 494 (1998).   
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determination pursuant to this subsection shall be 
referred to the medical commission for hearing by a 
medical hearing panel acting as hearing examiner . . . 
.363  
 
VI.  LAW AND PRACTICE: STATES MAINTAINING THE ORTHODOX RULE 
 
Twenty-five states, in the present day, hew, at least 
nominally, to the orthodox rule that the WCJ is a subordinate officer 
whose credibility determinations and finding of fact can be 
overthrown upon intra-agency review (i.e., the Commission, as in 
Arkansas), or trial court (as in Maryland).  Among these are four of 
the five states where a jury trial is permitted once the administrative 
adjudication has been completed.364  This article has addressed Texas 
in a prior section.365 
In some states, the orthodox rule has endured in seemingly 
pristine shape.  Thus, the review commissions in Arkansas, Kansas, 
Mississippi, and New Hampshire, among others, are characterized as 
undertaking de novo review.  Perhaps the system of the latter state is 
the most true to the original model of many decades ago.  A 
practitioner reports:  
 
[As] a practical matter, the hearings before the New 
Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board are purely 
de novo.  Neither the prior decision nor the transcript 
of the hearing are allowed into evidence.  (Transcripts 
are used to impeach.)  The evidence from the initial 
hearing must be presented again, and the board makes 
its own, independent rulings and decision.  They do 
not expressly reject prior findings or overturn the prior 
decision.  Frequently, the Board will reach factual 
determinations that are different from the 
department’s findings . . . .366 
                                                          
363  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-405(m) (West 2011).  As for the 
composition and duties of the medical panel, see id. § 27-14-616. 
364 These states are Maryland, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington.     
365 See supra Section V.  
366 Memorandum from Edward W. Stewart, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 10, 
2011) (on file with Author).  Mr. Stewart adds that, given this process of review, 
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In other states in this category, fact-finding power has been 
limited, usually in the interest of streamlining litigation.  As noted 
previously in this article, in Illinois the Industrial Commission is the 
fact-finder, but the parties as of 1989 may no longer, on review, 
submit new evidence for consideration.367  In Georgia, the Board is 
the fact-finder, but review is not de novo.  Instead, the ALJ’s findings 
are to be accepted when “. . . supported by a preponderance of 
competent and credible evidence . . . .”368   
In analyzing WCJ fact-finding power, an essential question is 
the frequency with which the commission actually exercises its 
powers, reassesses the facts, and materially changes the outcome.  
Importantly, simply because a state statute provides that the 
commission may reassess credibility, one cannot infer that routine 
overthrow of the initial WCJ findings is the actual custom and 
practice.  In fact, in many states the practice is rare. 
For example, California cases can be found where the 
Appeals Board substitutes its judgment for that of the WCJ.369  Still, 
lawyers report that such an act is a rare phenomenon,370 particularly 
as the state supreme court had admonished the Board years ago that 
credibility should be for the hearing officer: 
 
Although the board is entitled to reject the referee’s 
findings on credibility matters if substantial evidence 
supports contrary findings, the degree of substantiality 
required to sustain the board in such cases should be 
                                                          
“Since we previously tried the case, we can work with the evidence and our clients 
to correct prior deficiencies.” Id. 
367 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7040.40 (2012). 
368 GA . CODE ANN. § 34-9-103 (West 2011). 
369 See, e.g., Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 
(Palacio), 2005 Cal. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (WCJ, crediting 
employer witnesses, ruled that claimant had not shown that he was employee of 
putative employer; WCAB, however, reassessing evidence, legitimately granted 
reconsideration and reversed, finding that claimant was in fact employee of 
putative employer – court noting that “Appeals Board has the authority to reweigh 
the evidence following … independent examination of the record to reach a 
conclusion which differs from that of the WCJ.”).  
370 Memorandum from Ms. Leslie S. Shaw, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, 
Esquire (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with Author).    
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greater than that afforded by the evidence relied upon 
herein.  As stated [previously] by this court . . . with 
respect to review of referee’s findings in habeas 
corpus cases, “A referee’s findings of fact are, of 
course, not binding on this court, and we may reach a 
different conclusion on an independent examination of 
the evidence produced at the hearing he conducts even 
where the evidence is conflicting.  However, where 
the findings are supported by ‘ample, credible 
evidence’ . . . or ‘substantial evidence’ . . . they are 
entitled to great weight . . . because of the referee’s 
'opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses 
and weigh their statements in connection with their 
manner on the stand . . . .”371 
 
As discussed below, on the other hand, states can be 
identified where a commission does, on occasion, or even with some 
frequency, utilize its fact-finding powers.  
How often a commission reassesses credibility may also turn 
on how “political” the current collection of members is behaving.  
One will hear, on occasion, that “workers’ compensation is so 
political.”  This statement (or cliché) may have many dimensions, but 
in the realm of fact-finding, it usually suggests that the process is 
highly influenced by the proclivities of the commission members 
who have most recently been appointed by the Governor.  In recent 
years, for example, some members of the claimants’ bar insist that 
the Mississippi Commission, which is composed of political 
appointees, is biased in favor of the employers’ side.372  Another such 
assertion was made by an Arkansas claimants’ attorney, who filed a 
legal ethics complaint against two Arkansas Commission members, 
claiming that they and other commission officials were “. . . 
excessively pro-employer and are trying to drive him out of workers 
comp practice.”373  Participants in the Iowa system, meanwhile, told 
                                                          
371 Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 475 P.2d 451, 456 (Cal. 
1970).    
372  See infra Section VI(B).  
373 Doug Smith & Max Brantley, Lawyer Files Ethics Complaint Against 
Workers Comp Commission, ARKANSAS TIMES (Apr. 7, 2005), 
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WCRI researcher Ballantyne “. . . that the politically appointed 
appellate person (the division commissioner) can influence the value 
of cases depending on the leanings of the appointing governor.”374    
The Author’s analysis in the next two sections is based on 
interviews as opposed to a crunching of hard numbers.375  A more 
definitive analysis would, of course, involve a study of reversal and 
decision modification rates.  This is a statistic that can be located in a 
number of states, in resources such as annual reports as published on 
state agency websites.  A review of such data, however, can leave the 
discrete question of substitution of credibility determinations 
hanging.  This is so as reversal and modification rates, even when 
reported, do not usually set forth the reasons for such alteration.  
 
A.  Commissions/Courts That Rarely Reassess Credibility 
 
Indiana.  Workers’ compensation claims under the Indiana 
Act are litigated before a single member of the Workers’ 
Compensation Board, with appeal thereafter to the full board.  The 
review before the Board is de novo; 376 and it may even accept further 
                                                          
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/lawyer-files-ethics-complaint-against-workers-
comp-commission/Content?oid=868487  
374  DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN IOWA: 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 92 (Workers Compensation Research Institute ed., 
2004).     
375 The Author and his assistant sought to interview or correspond with at 
least two specialists in the field for each state.  The same answer was not always 
provided, but the findings set forth above suggest what seems to be the consensus 
view.  The Author welcomes corrections or differing views.   
376 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-3 (LexisNexis 2011).  See ACLS v. Bujaroski, 904 
N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Eades v. Lucas, 23 N.E.2d 273, 
276 (Ind. Ct. App.1939) (“If such an application is duly filed, any action of the 
hearing member disposing of a controversy on its merits ceases to be effective for 
any purpose and leaves the status of the parties unchanged . . . . [A]ll parties to the 
proceeding are bound to know that a new finding and award to be made by the full 
board is necessary; that said board neither affirms nor reverses an award made by 
one member, but ‘shall review the evidence, or, if deemed advisable, hear the 
parties at issue, their representatives and witnesses, and make an award and file the 
same with the finding of the facts on which it is based . . .’ Where an application 
for review of an award by one member is filed, the application . . . then stands for 
hearing before the full board, and is to be heard de novo.”)).  See also, e.g., Shultz 
Timber v. Morrison, 751 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (court remarking, “. 
. . the Board has an obligation to enter specific findings of basic facts to support its 
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evidence,377 but it rarely does so.378  The Board, further, would only 
very rarely reverse the credibility determinations of one of its single 
members.379    
 
Maryland.  Under the Maryland statute, the adjudication of 
the Maryland Commissioner is subject to appeal to the trial court, and 
a jury may even be empanelled to reassess witness credibility and the 
facts.380  “With 75 years of extensive case law behind it,” one court 
declared, “the plenary availability of trial de novo at the circuit court 
level is not to be doubted, even if its statutory pedigree is more 
implicit than explicit.”381  According to Chief Commissioner Karl 
Aumann, however, only 6% of commissioner decisions are appealed, 
and of these, 50% are settled prior to trial.382  Thus, the trial judge or 
                                                          
finding of ultimate fact and conclusion of law . . . . The Board's findings must be 
stated with sufficient specificity upon contested issues so as to allow intelligent 
review by a reviewing court.”).  
377 631 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1-1-15 (West 2011).  
378 Memorandum from Sharon F. Murphy, Esquire, to Author
 
(Dec. 6, 
2011) (on file with Author).      
379 Memorandum from Sharon F. Murphy, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 
2011) (on file with Author).  Memorandum from G. Terence Coriden, Esquire, to 
Author (Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with Author).    
380  MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-745(b),(c) (West 2011).  The 
formal term in Maryland is not “appeal,” but, instead, “petition for judicial review.”  
Comments of Mr. Richard Lafata, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with 
Author).      
381 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bark, 555 A.2d 542, 545 (Md. 1989).   
382 Chief Commissioner R. Karl Aumann, Remarks while sitting on the 
Comparative Law Panel Nat’l Ass’n of Workers’ Comp. Judiciary Coll. (Aug. 22, 
2011) (on file with Author).  For a tour de force case in which the trial court came 
to a different factual conclusion from that of the Commission, see Bd. of Educ. v. 
Spradlin, 867 A.2d 370 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).  There, the Commissioner 
determined that the claimant, who had been injured in an altercation with a co-
worker, did not suffer an injury arising in the course of employment.  The trial 
judge, after a bench trial, determined the opposite.  In the course of a long opinion 
affirming, the appeals court stated, among other things, “[s]ince both the initial fact 
finder and the supervening fact finder enjoy the same prerogative independently to 
assess credibility and independently to weigh evidence, they may with equal 
validity reach different conclusions even upon the same record.  A fortiori, they 
may do so when the witnesses testify afresh at the trial de novo, quite possibly with 
differences the second time around both in the substance of their testimony and in 
their demeanors as they testify.” Id. at 378, n.4.  
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jury, the ultimate fact-finder, in the vast majority of cases will never 
have an opportunity to exercise its power.  
 
Missouri.  Under the Missouri Act, the Commission, not the 
ALJ, is the “. . . sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight and value to give to the evidence.”383  The same opinion 
recounts the rules that the “. . . Commission, as the finder of fact, is 
free to believe or disbelieve any evidence . . . . [I]n conducting our 
review, this Court reviews the findings of the Commission; however, 
‘[i]f the Commission incorporates the [ALJ’s] opinion and decision, 
the reviewing court will consider the Commission’s decisions as 
including those of the [ALJ].”384   
Still, appellate court opinions have stressed for a number of 
years the importance of deference to the hearing officer who actually 
encountered the witness.  “We agree . . . ,” a recent court opinion 
announced, that the “. . . Commission should duly consider an ALJ’s 
credibility determinations, and should articulate any reasons for 
differing therefrom as an aid to judicial review;” and the Commission 
cannot “. . . callously ignore, capriciously reject, or arbitrarily 
disregard . . .” the fact-findings of the ALJ.385  The leading case that 
informs this thinking dates from 1995:  
 
However, to say that the Commission is not obligated 
or bound to defer to the ALJ’s credibility 
determinations is not to say they may be slighted or 
ignored, either by the Commission or the appellate 
court.  Credibility is clearly a consideration for both 
the ALJ and the Commission, and the Commission 
should not make its credibility calls in a vacuum . . .. 
Furthermore, in reviewing the award of the ALJ, the 
Commission should properly consider that the ALJ 
                                                          
383 Vice v. Advantage Waste Servs., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
384 Id.  See MO. ANN. STAT § 287.495 (West 2011). 
385 Garrett v. Treasurer of Missouri, 215 S.W.3d 244, 247, 250 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007) (quoting Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 570-71, 574 
(Mo. Ct. App.1995)).  Nevertheless, the “. . . Commission need not defer to ALJ 
findings, credibility or otherwise, but is authorized to reach its own decisions.”  Id. 
at 247.        
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“had the witnesses before him and was thus in a 
position which gave him a great vantage ground over 
the members of the Commission who afterwards had 
[only] the opportunity of reading [a transcript of] the 
testimony.”386 
 
Veterans of Missouri practice report that it is rare for the 
Commission to reassess credibility.  “Seldom,” one defense lawyer 
writes, “will you see the commission take issue with any credibility 
findings the judge makes on the live witnesses, because, I believe, 
they think the judge is in the superior position to make that call.”387  
A claimant’s attorney, meanwhile, reports that the “Commission is 
required to defer to the ALJ on credibility determinations of 
witnesses that testify in-person.  While this deference is not absolute, 
I would say that it is ‘rare’ . . .  for the Commission to reverse an ALJ 
on the credibility determination of [such] a witness.”388 
Treatise writer Korte remarked that the Commission in recent 
years has “made it clear, in both public and private statements, that it 
did not intend to go out of its way to reverse ALJ awards on any 
                                                          
386 Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995).  The state supreme court, in a subsequent decision, modified the case 
somewhat for the manner in which the appellate court reviews the Commission’s 
final fact-findings.  Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222-23 
(Mo. 2003) (“A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains 
sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether 
the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence . . . . Whether the 
award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining 
the evidence in the context of the whole record.  An award that is contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in context, not supported by competent 
and substantial evidence.”).  In Hampton, the ALJ granted benefits, but limited 
them to permanent partial disability.  The Commission reassessed credibility, 
including that of the claimant, and awarded permanent total disability.  The 
Commission was affirmed despite an employer argument that the award “. . . was 
not supported by competent and substantial evidence and the award was against the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.”  Id. at 221.    
387 Memorandum from Kip Kubin, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on 
file with Author).  
388  Memorandum from Todd C. Werts, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire 
(Dec. 2, 2011) (on file with Author).  
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basis – it believed in the importance of letting the ALJs do their jobs 
without fear of undue interference.”389  He continues:   
 
[W]hen this Commission has reversed an ALJ’s 
credibility findings, it has almost always been very 
careful to point to specific inconsistencies between the 
testimony of the witness and other evidence in the 
record (usually medical evidence or the witness’s 
deposition testimony) as the basis for its reversal. The 
commission has consistently refrained from making 
judgment calls based [on] such things as a witness’s 
interest in the outcome of the claim, and . . .  never on 
the witness’s appearance, attitude or demeanor.390   
 
Missouri experts stress, however, that both the Commission and 
Appeals Court have a somewhat different rule when it comes to 
assessing the credibility of experts, such as physicians who testify via 
deposition.  In this realm, they accord less deference to fact-
findings.391  
 
New York.  Under New York law, the Board “[is] not bound 
by the WCLJ’s credibility determinations and [is] entitled to make its 
own findings.”392  The Board possesses “broad authority to resolve 
factual issues based on credibility of witnesses and draw any 
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.”393 
According to one WCLJ, “it is exceedingly rare [though not 
unheard of] that [the Board] would disturb a well-supported 
credibility finding.”394  An experienced defense lawyer posits, on the 
                                                          
389 Id. 
390 Memorandum from Michael Korte, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) 
(on file with Author). 
391 See infra Section VII(B).  
392 In re Ortiz v. Five Points Correctional Facility, 762 N.Y.S.2d 535 
(2003).  The statute that provides for the powers and duties of the New York 
Board’s judges is found at N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 150 (McKinney 2006).  
393 In re Myers v. Eldor Contracting Co., 705 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (N.Y. 
2000).  
394 Memorandum from Hon. John Farrell to the Author (Aug. 26, 2011) 
(on file with Author).   
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other hand, that “Board reversals of WCLJs on credibility questions 
occur more than just occasionally.”395  
One of the Board’s “guiding principles” since 2008 has been 
to recall that the judge “is in the best position to review credibility,” 
and hence that a “reversal on credibility should be based on (a) a 
specific inconsistency, or (b) otherwise state why a witness is found 
to be incredible, or (c) otherwise state why a witness is found to be 
credible, which is supportable by the record.  It should not be merely 
conclusory.”396  This principle also provides that “[i]n reversing, the 
writer or commissioner should state that basis clearly.”397   
 
Oregon.  Under the Oregon Act, “The board engages in that 
same weighing [of evidence] in its own evaluation of the record on 
de novo review.”398  Specialists in the field, however, report that 
reassessments of credibility are relatively rare.  According to a 
                                                          
395 Memorandum from Ronald A. Weiss, Esq., to the Author (Jan. 11, 
2012) (on file with Author).  For cases where the Board reassessed credibility and 
reversed the WCLJ’s decision, see Pavone v. Advance Auto Parts, 912 N.Y.S.2d 
771 (N.Y. 2010) (WCLJ found as fact that claimant injured his back while lifting 
and loading auto parts, but Board reversed, stating, “Although there is conflicting 
testimony in the record regarding the nature and frequency  of the deliveries, lifting 
and loading that claimant performed, we accord deference to the Board’s credibility 
determinations and its resolution of conflicting evidence.”); Caballero v. Fabco 
Enters., 909 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. 2010) (reversing WCLJ’s rejection of claimant’s 
testimony that she was “injured when she failed to navigate between a shoe display 
and a large box and she fell into the box,”  Board found that she did suffer such 
injury); Fortunato v. Opus III VII Corp., 867 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. 2008) (crediting 
claimant, a salesman, WCLJ found that he “suffered injuries after he was struck by 
a car as he attempted to cross a street while out on a sales call,” but the Board 
found him not credible). 
396 NEW YORK WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
(as summarized in a Memorandum to the Author from Timothy P. Schmidle, Ph.D. 
(Aug. 30, 2011) (on file with Author)).    
397 Id. 
398 Pietrzykowski v. Albertsons, Inc., 157 P.3d 1268 (Or. 2007).  See OR. 
REV. STAT. § 656.295(6) (2011). When the WCRI assessed the Oregon system in 
1995, they considered the rate of appeals from ALJ decisions to the Board to be 
high.  According to the authors, “system participants have several explanations for 
the appeal rate. First, the review is de novo based upon the written record ….”  
DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & JAMES F. DUNLEAVY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 
OREGON: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 101 (Workers Compensation Research 
Institute ed., 1995). 
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veteran practitioner, “If an ALJ has made a credibility determination, 
the Board will give deference to it and reversal of such is rare.  If the 
ALJ did not make a specific credibility determination, the Board will 
review the record and make its own determination.”399  Another 
expert states, “The Board takes the role of the ALJs seriously when 
they make credibility assessments . . .. That being said there are times 
when the Board will look at contemporaneous records or other parts 
of the transcript to make its own credibility determinations . . .. [T]he 
Board rarely reverses an ALJ when that ALJ specifically makes a 
credibility determination as part of the opinion, particularly based 
upon demeanor.”400 
 
South Carolina. Under the South Carolina Act, the 
“Appellate Panel is the ultimate fact finder . . . and is not bound by 
the Single Commissioner's findings of fact . . .. The final 
determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded 
evidence is reserved to the Appellate Panel.”401  A veteran claimant’s 
attorney, however, reports that “credibility findings made by the 
original hearing commissioner are rarely overturned by the 
commission’s appellate panel.”402  A defense attorney agrees, stating 
that for the full commission to reverse “is very rare in South 
Carolina. Our commission is relatively collegial and I think they give 
great weight to the findings of the single commissioner on credibility 
                                                          
399 Memorandum from Chris Frost, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire 
(Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with Author).       
400 Memorandum from Aaron Clingerman, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, 
Esquire (Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with Author).  Mr. Clingerman reports that the 
Oregon Board often signals its deference to the ALJ by recognizing a leading 
appellate case that emphasizes the importance of the ability of the judge to have 
assessed demeanor.  See Erck v. Brown Oldsmobile, 815 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Or. 
1991) (remarking, “Claimant is correct in his argument that on de novo review, a 
reviewing entity normally gives deference to findings made below, especially when 
they relate to witness credibility.”).  
401 Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2004).  See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3-20 (C) (2011). 
402 Memorandum from Ken W. Harrell, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esq. 
(Nov. 14, 2011) (on file with Author).       
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issues. On matters of law or non-credibility findings they are more 
apt to reverse.”403   
Another defense attorney advised this Author that the full 
commission will indeed, on occasion, reverse on credibility.404  He 
recounted a recent case in which the claimant testified that he had 
injured his leg when he fell from a tree in the midst of his work.  The 
evidence of the employer (whom he represented) was that claimant 
had been dared to jump twenty feet on a bet of $20.00.  The single 
commissioner credited the claimant, but the full commission, on a 
“cold record,” believed the employer’s witnesses and disallowed the 
claim.405   
 
Utah.  Under the Utah Act, the Appeals Board of the 
Commission is the final fact-finder.  “[T]he Commission,” indeed, 
“need not hold further hearings, and in its review of the record made 
before the Administrative Law Judge, may make its own findings on 
the credibility of the evidence presented.”406  Still, workers’ 
                                                          
403 Memorandum from O. Shayne Williams, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, 
Esquire (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with Author).   
404 Interview with Mikell H. Wyman, Esquire (Aug. 22, 2011) (on file 
with Author).  Mr. Wyman ventured that reversals on the grounds of credibility 
were “somewhere in between” the proffered choices of rare or occasional.    
405 Zepeda-Cepeda v. Priority Landscaping and Lawn Care, No. 2011-UP-
229, 2011 S.C. App. LEXIS 266, *8 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) ( rejecting claimant’s 
arguments that employers witnesses were not credible: “In workers’ compensation 
cases, the Full Commission is the ultimate fact finder . . . .The final determination 
of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Full 
Commission.”) (quoting Shealy v. Aiken County, 532 S.E.2d 438 (S.C. 2000)).   
406 Gates v. Labor Comm’n, No. 20010943-CA, 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 
268 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 607 P.2d 
807, 811 (Utah 1980)) (rejecting claimant’s argument that  he was “substantially 
prejudiced by the Commission's decision to substitute its own findings and 
conclusions for those of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) . . . .”).  In that case, 
an ALJ found that the claimant, Anderson, was not an employee, but instead an 
independent contractor of defendant, Gates Sr.  The Commission reversed, finding 
that Anderson was indeed an employee of that defendant.  The court was of the 
view that employer’s appeal was deficient, as it failed to acknowledge the evidence 
that the Commission had relied upon.  “In the absence of properly marshaled 
evidence,” the court stated, “even though the evidence relied upon by Gates Sr. 
might support a different finding, we must assume that the Commission's findings 
are correct.” Id. at *3.     
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compensation lawyers find that the Appeals Board substitutes its 
findings only on a rare or occasional basis.407  
 
Virginia.   The findings of the Deputy Commissioner in 
Virginia may be overthrown by the full commission,408 but in 
practice reassessment of credibility is said to be rare.409  Still, Deputy 
Commissioners are typically cautious in this regard, and will often be 
mindful to phrase findings of fact in explicit credibility terms to 
avoid reversal.  One of the Virginia Commissioners, in seeming 
                                                          
For a case that construed an earlier version of the law, to the same effect, 
see U.S. Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 607 P.2d 807, 810 (S. Ct. Utah 1980) 
(“Our statutes do not mandate or indicate that the Commission is bound by the 
findings of the Administrative Law Judge when the evidence is conflicting. On the 
contrary, Section 35-1-82.54 provides that when a case is referred to the full 
Commission, it shall review the entire record, and may make its own findings of 
fact and enter its award thereon. In doing so it may, in its discretion, take further 
evidence.”). 
407 Memorandum from Philip B. Shell, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire 
(Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with Author); Memorandum from K. Dawn Atkin, 
Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire (Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with Author); 
Memorandum from Richard R. Burke, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire (Nov. 10, 
2011) (on file with Author). 
408 Karban v. Universal Fiber Systems,  No. 2094-09-3, 2010 Va. App. 
LEXIS 274 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).  See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-201(2005) (entitled, 
“General duties and powers of the Commission”).  
409 Memorandum from Ms. Annie Williams to Author (Nov. 10, 2011) (on 
file with Author) (quoting Dan Lynch, Esquire).  According to Ms. Williams, 
reassessment of credibility and the fact is  
 
rare if non-existent  . . . The three Commissioners almost always 
rely on the facts as presented to the Deputy Commissioners. They 
believe that the Deputy Commissioners are better able to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses, claimant, etc. as they saw the 
testimony in person and determined the facts below.  Most of the 
appeals that go to the full Commission are regarding 
interpretation of the statutes and rules rather than facts.  As an 
addition, in Virginia, from the level of the full Commission, 
cases can be appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals and they 
absolutely never look at facts, only matters of law. 
 
Id.; Memorandum from Robert Rapaport, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 22, 2011) (on 
file with Author) (“The rule for the VWC is to give deference to the Deputy 
Commissioner’s finding on credibility.  I believe it is safe to say that the full 
Commission rarely reverses a Deputy’s finding on credibility.”).     
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acknowledgement of the Deputy Commissioner’s ability to better 
judge credibility, will likely remand a case where the fact-finding 
process seems incomplete or yielded a result that is somehow 
unsatisfactory.410These behaviors are likely informed by the courts’ 
emphasis on the common law precept about the importance of 
assessing demeanor:   
 
Although the commission is not bound by the 
credibility determination of a deputy commissioner, 
the commission cannot reject the determination 
arbitrarily . . . .  “If the commission does not follow 
the deputy commissioner’s findings when these 
findings are based on a determination of a key 
witness’s demeanor or appearance in relation to 
credibility, the commission must offer a rationale for 
its reversal and demonstrate on the record how the 
commission found the evidence [in]credible.”411    
 
B.  Commissions That Reassess Credibility With Some Frequency 
 
A number of states are better known as having commissions 
or boards that are willing, with some regularity, to reassess WCJ 
credibility determinations and alter awards as a consequence.  
However, one should recognize that, simply because a commission 
may potentially exercise its credibility reassessment powers, hardly 
means that the judge and the parties do not approach trial with 
seriousness.  As one respected judge remarked to this Author, for 
example, being reversed on credibility is a gravely considered matter.  
“My response” in such situations, he quipped, is that “the decision 
was right when it left my desk.”   
It is likely that some WCJs in this position chafe at having 
their findings reassessed, reversed, or changed by commission 
members.  This is so because, in the present day, the WCJ will likely 
be a career professional.  He or she will hence be an expert in both 
the law and in the craft of decision-making.  The commission 
                                                          
410 Interview with Hon. James Szablewicz, Virginia Chief Deputy 
Commissioner (Aug. 23, 2011).  
411 Karban, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 274.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-201 
(2005) (entitled, “General duties and powers of the Commission”).   
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member in charge of reviewing the case, in contrast, may not 
necessarily bear these traits because of the political nature of the 
office.   
Arkansas.   The Arkansas Commission is “the fact finder, and 
as such has a duty and statutory obligation to make specific findings 
of fact on de novo review based on the record as a whole . . . .”412  
Thus, the ALJ’s credibility determinations and findings may be 
overthrown upon review.  Such an action is said to occur on 
occasion, though as might be expected, the percentage varies among 
the thirteen Arkansas ALJs.413  A change in the appellate structure 
occurred in 1979, when appeals ceased going to county circuit courts.  
Appeals from the Commission are now prosecuted directly to the 
court of appeals.414  
The ability of the Commission to overrule credibility 
determinations has been treated in the state supreme court.  In a 1987 
opinion, a concurring justice objected to the redundancy of fact-
finding at two levels, particularly when the Commission did not see 
or hear the witnesses, and because the Commission was a political 
entity.415  Superimposed upon this unsatisfactory state of affairs was 
                                                          
412 Wilson v. Cargill, Inc., 873 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) 
(italics in original). 
413 Memorandum of James A. Arnold, II, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, 
Esquire. (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with the Author).   
414 See Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enter’s, 816 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1991).  
The court noted that its scope review consists of reviewing the Commission’s 
decision and, in addition:  
 
ignoring the findings of the ALJs . . . While we have gone so far 
as to allow the Commission to rely on an ALJ’s stated 
perceptions of the ”demeanor, conduct, appearance, or reaction at 
the hearing,” it has not been held that a court may use an ALJ’s 
remarks to reverse a credibility determination made by the 
Commission.  
 
Id. at 877.  
415 Webb v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 733 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1987) 
(Newbern, J., concurring).  With regard to the political make-up of the commission, 
the concurring opinion stated:  
 
Requiring management and labor representatives on such a 
reviewing body, so analogous to a court, is like assuring that our 
court of appeals or this court be composed of equal numbers of 
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the fact that the judging of compensation cases had become 
professionalized, with the title “referee” changed to ALJ, and with 
the ALJ exclusively undertaking the actual personal exposure to the 
parties’ witnesses.416  However, when the court again squared upon 
this issue just four years later, it declined to overthrow the statute.417  
The court relied upon stare decisis, but noted also that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had ratified the idea that an administrative agency 
may legitimately overthrow the findings of its subordinate agent.418     
 
                                                          
plaintiffs’ advocates and defendants’ advocates in tort cases. In 
any body exercising the function of legal review, the public is 
entitled to, and should, demand the putting aside of social 
philosophies which are the stuff of legislation . . . .   
 
Id. at 728.    
416 Id. at 727-28.  The justice stated, among other things:  
 
It would surely be wasteful . . . to hold the hearing with the live 
witnesses a second time, so the decision of the commission is 
much like that of an appellate court; it operates from a cold, or at 
best, warmed-over, record [created by the ALJ]  . . . . 
 
T]he ALJ position has been upgraded.  The ALJ is no longer just 
an aide to the commission or a referee . . . . 
 
Despite the fact that it is the ALJ who hears the witnesses and 
has the opportunity to see them face to face, we persist in 
holding that his or her decision is meaningless when a decision 
of the commission is on appeal . . . . 
 
[W]e should be thinking of creating a system in which the 
decisions of the ALJs are like those of juries, to the extent that 
the factual determinations should be reviewed only to determine 
if they are supported by substantial evidence . . . . 
 
Id.  See also Hamby v. Everett, 627 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ark. Ct. App  1982) (Glaze, 
J., dissenting) (“How this rule on review has become so well established is a real 
conundrum . . . . [A] Board or Commission which reviews a cold record on appeal 
is in a poor position to weigh the credibility of any witness.”).  
417 Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 816 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1991).    
418 Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 71 S. Ct. 456 (U.S. 
1951)).      
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Georgia.  The ALJ of the Georgia Board is not the final fact-
finder.  Upon the losing party’s appeal, the three-member Board (the 
Appellate Division), though not undertaking de novo review, may 
reassess credibility.  The statute provides that the “findings of fact 
made by the administrative law judge . . . shall be accepted by the 
appellate division where such findings are supported by a 
preponderance of competent and credible evidence ….”419  The 
change from de novo review to the present law occurred in 1994.  
The well-respected Georgia Board is known to reassess the 
facts on occasion.420  A veteran Atlanta attorney posits that the 
“Board can, and does, act to reverse some ALJ decisions, but not 
strictly because it simply interprets the evidence differently.  Rather, 
I think the Appellate Division takes very seriously the notion that the 
ALJ is in the best position to view the evidence and make factual 
determinations.”421  The Board will, he continues, “review the totality 
of the evidence to determine if it supports the particular legal issues 
and burdens of proof involved and, on occasion, will find the 
evidence lacking.  In my experience, that is not a common 
occurrence, and is not done unless there is a fairly obvious and 
legally significant flaw in the underlying evidence.”422   
With regard to the change from de novo review, the likely 
intent “was to reduce to some degree the appeals of ALJ decisions 
which, under a true ‘de novo’ system, virtually assured an appeal in 
                                                          
419 GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-103 (2009).  For a case in which the Board 
reversed the ALJ’s finding with regard to the occurrence of a traumatic back injury, 
see Georgia Mountain Excavation, Inc. v. Dobbins, 710 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2011) (noting, “‘the Appellate Division is authorized to assess witness 
credibility, weigh conflicting evidence, and draw factual conclusions different from 
those reached by the [administrative law judge] who initially heard the dispute.’” 
(citation omitted)).   
420 Memorandum of Gary M. Kazin, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire 
(Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with Author); Memorandum of Kelley Benedict, Esquire, to 
Mark Cowger, Esquire (Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with Author).    
421 Memorandum of Dan Kniffen, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on 
file with Author).  The Chair of the Georgia Board concurred with Mr. Kniffen’s 
assessment.  Memorandum of Hon. Rick Thompson, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on 
file with Author). 
422 Id. 
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every case.”423  WCRI researchers, reflecting on the change in 1995, 
observed that it came in the wake of a cost and litigation crisis—in 
the 1980s “[b]oth indemnity and medical costs spiraled upward, 
attorney involvement and hearing requests increased significantly, 
and lump sum settlements occurred even more frequently.”424  An 
earlier, pre-reform WCRI study commenting upon de novo review, 
found that “[m]ost public and private respondents characterize this as 
‘a second bite of the apple.’”  Still, “Although many public and 
private respondents express some dissatisfaction with de novo 
review, they do not consider it a significant problem.”425     
  
Illinois.   Reassessment of the facts is said to occur with some 
regularity under the Illinois practice.  In that state, cases are litigated 
before an Arbitrator of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.  
After the Arbitrator issues his decision, review (not “appeal”) may be 
undertaken by the Commission, which has “original jurisdiction” and 
is not bound by credibility determinations of the Arbitrator.426  The 
Act does provide that, “Whenever the Commission adopts part of the 
Arbitrator’s decision, but not all, it shall include in the order the 
reasons for not adopting all of the Arbitrator’s decision.”427  An 
appeal thereafter may be taken to the district court, and then to the 
appellate courts.428  The Commission is the final fact-finder. The 
                                                          
423 Memorandum of Dan Kniffen, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on 
file with Author).   
424  JOHN A. GARDNER, CAROL A. TELLES & GRETCHEN A. MOSS, COST 
DRIVERS AND SYSTEM CHANGE IN GEORGIA, 1984-1994 32 (1995).   
425 DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & STACEY M. ECCLESTON, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION IN GEORGIA: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 72 (Workers 
Compensation Research Institute ed., 1992).  
426 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 305/19.  See R&D Thiel v. Illinois Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n (Robledo), 923 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. 2010) (noting that the 
“Commission exercises original jurisdiction and is not bound by an arbitrator’s 
findings,” and that “when, as in this case, the Commission gives its reasons for 
making credibility findings contrary to those made by the arbitrator, our inquiry on 
review is whether the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”).    
 
427 Id.   
428 For a broad overview, see Brad A. Elward, Workers’ Compensation 
Reviews and Appeals: A Review and Suggestions for Change, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
493 (2002). 
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court, on appeal from the Commission decision, accords deference to 
the Commission decision and rarely reverses.429      
Prior to 1989, the Commission could accept certain additional 
evidence not presented to the Arbitrator.  In that year, the law was 
amended to disallow such post hoc submissions.430  A 1984 
amendment, notably for the first time, disallowed the practice of 
freely submitting any evidence to the Commission.431  One reason for 
these changes was expediting litigation in the midst of a litigation 
crisis;432 a related concern was that the ability to submit evidence 
upon review led to lawyers intentionally withholding vital evidence 
until the case reached the Commission stage.433  
According to a number of attorney reports, from to twenty to 
thirty-three percent of Arbitrator decisions are modified on review by 
the Commission.434  An attorney summarizing the Industrial 
Commission’s 2008 statistics stated as follows:  
 
Interestingly, when an injured worker filed an appeal 
to the Review level before the Commissioners, 
benefits were increased only 15% of the time.  In 
appeals by the worker, benefits were actually reversed 
or decreased in 13% of the cases.  The great majority 
of appeals by the worker resulted in no change of the 
Arbitration Decision in 72% of decisions in appeals 
filed by the employee. 
                                                          
429 Comments of Matthew Schiff, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 10, 2011) (on 
file with Author).  For composition of the Commission, see § 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
305/13. 
430  Brad A. Elward, Workers’ Compensation Reviews and Appeals: A 
Review and Suggestions for Change, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 493 (2002).  
431 See Adams Truck Lines v. Indus. Comm’n , 550 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill App. 
Ct. 1990) (Barry, P.J., concurring).  
432 Id. (concurring) (stating, in reference to 1984 amendment, “Against 
this backdrop of an increasing caseload and a lengthening delay between the filing 
of cases and their final resolution, the legislature amended” the law).  
433 Comments of Kim Presbrey, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 28, 2011) (on 
file with Author).  
434 Comments of Matthew Schiff, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 10, 2011) (on 
file with Author); Comments of David Menchetti, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 28, 
2011) (on file with Author); Comments of Kim Presbrey, Esquire, to Author (Nov. 
28, 2011) (on file with Author).  




In employer appeals to the Review stage, benefits 
were affirmed almost 66% of the time.  However, the 
employer was successful in obtaining a reduction or a 
decrease in benefits awarded from the Arbitration 
Decision in 21% of the appeals filed by an employer. 
Outright reversals were obtained in only 6% of the 
Review Decisions filed and benefits were actually 
increased in 6% of the decisions appealed from.435 
 
As might be expected, some Arbitrators have their decisions 
changed more than others.  The decision can and may well be 
changed in whole or in part.  Most frequently, the change in findings 
of fact will surround expert medical testimony.  For example, the 
Arbitrator will have said that the testimony of one particular medical 
expert establishes that “by a preponderance of the evidence, some 
fact exists,” but the Commission will reverse and find as fact that the 
burden was not met and that no such fact exists.  Less frequently, the 
Commission will change findings of fact surrounding such things as 
the claimant’s statement that an accident did indeed occur when the 
employer had questioned the allegation.436   
Lawyers are, of course, keenly aware that the Illinois 
Arbitrator does not make the final and binding factual 
determinations. If a lawyer believes that the Arbitrator to decide the 
case is unlikely to find facts in his favor, he may well “try the case 
for review,” i.e., litigating before the Arbitrator but fully expecting to 
be rearguing credibility upon review by the Commission.437    
The rule that the Commission exercises de novo review has 
long been established, as leading cases over many decades firmly 
                                                          
435 Brad Bleakney, 2008 Annual Report Illinois Workers Compensation 





436 Comments of Matthew Schiff, Esquire, to Author (Aug. 10, 2011) (on 
file with Author). 
437 Id.   
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established the principle.438  Illinois courts have not, however, always 
shown fidelity to the precept.439  In a 1988 case, the state supreme 
court produced language to the effect that where the Commission 
changes the Arbitrator’s credibility-based fact-findings, the 
reviewing court will apply “an extra degree of scrutiny” to see if such 
action was justified.440  This was so held in the controversial case, 
Cook v. Industrial Commission.441  Thereafter, for a period, a number 
                                                          
438 Rodriguez v. Indus. Comm’n, 21 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ill. 1939) (“the 
arbitrator in his consideration of the case is but the agent of the Commission, 
similar in character to that of a master in chancery or a referee in bankruptcy, so far 
as the character of the functions performed by the arbitrator is concerned.”).  In this 
case, the arbitrator awarded claimant steelworker an award on his lung disease 
claim, crediting claimant’s physician that the ailment was from shop dust.  The 
commission reversed, having recalled for testimony the employer’s physician.  
That expert had studied x-rays and had testified at both levels (especially after 
seeing a theretofore withheld x-ray) that claimant had advanced TB.  The circuit 
court, in an activist gesture, reversed the commission, remarking that the  
commission could not reverse the arbitrator in such circumstances.  The Supreme 
Court reversed, stating that commission review is “sui generis,” and that (1) that 
such review is de novo; and that (2) its decision was not, in any event, contrary to 
the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.   
See also Berry v. Indus. Comm’n, 459 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1984) (in case 
where circuit court had insisted that the “arbitrator is best to judge credibility,” 
court reverses, stating, it “is the peculiar province of the Industrial Commission to 
determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the testimony, and to determine the 
weight to be given to the evidence. Regardless of whether or not the Commission 
hears testimony in addition to that heard by the arbitrator, it exercises original 
jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator's findings.”) (court also noting 
institutional expertise of commission). 
439 Thanks to David Menchetti, Esq., Chicago, IL, who provided to the 
Author his CLE presentation, The Commission Reverses the Arbitrator: Extra 
Scrutiny? (on file with Author).   
440 Cook v. Indus. Comm’n, 531 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
441 Id. (“While recognizing that the Commission is in no way bound by an 
arbitrator’s decision, we note that the arbitrator’s decision is not without legal 
effect. . . . .  Further, we note that in performing its role as reviewer of the record, 
the Commission is at a practical disadvantage as compared to the arbitrator. The 
arbitrator, having heard the live testimony, is actually in a better position to 
evaluate that evidence. . . .Accordingly, in cases where the Commission has 
rejected the arbitrator’s factual findings without receiving any new evidence, we 
apply an extra degree of scrutiny to the record in determining whether there is 
sufficient support for the Commission’s decision.”).  
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of decisions seemed to exercise such review, or at least to have 
responded to Cook’s “extra degree of scrutiny” approach.442   
In the early 1990s, however, the court retreated from the rule 
and insisted that it had “repudiated” Cook.443  Still, within another 
decade, in 2007, the court stated (perhaps ill-advisedly) that it “may 
be time to reconsider” the Commission’s de novo power.444  In a 
2009 case, however, the court insisted that such language was dicta, 
and again admonished that Cook was repudiated.445  
 
Iowa.  The Commissioner under the Iowa Act is the final fact-
finder.  “The commissioner as trier of fact,” one court explained, “has 
the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the 
                                                          
 
442 Adams Truck Lines v. Indus. Comm’n, 550 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990); Kress Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 545 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).  
443 Komatsu Dresser Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 601 N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1992); Dillon v. Indus. Comm’n, 552 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).  
444 S&H Floor Covering, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 870 
N.E.2d 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).  In this case, the arbitrator ruled for the employer, 
but on review the commission found for the employee.  The circuit court affirmed, 
as did the appeals court.  The court, however, threw out a mischievous invitation:   
 
[E]mployer argues we should review our precedent that the 
Commission is not required to give deference to the arbitrator’s 
findings of credibility.  In the recent past, this court has been 
presented with more than a few cases where the Commission has 
made credibility findings contrary to those of the arbitrator.  It 
may very well be time to reconsider the Commission’s 
prerogative to determine credibility regardless of the arbitrator’s 
decision.   
 
Id. at 827.   
445 Hosteny v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 928 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. App. Ct.  
2009).  In this case, the arbitrator found for claimant.  The commission reversed 
and the circuit and appellate courts court affirmed.   Claimant appealed, arguing 
that the court should “abandon the deferential standard of review . . . in favor of a 
stricter standard when the Commission’s credibility findings are contrary to those 
of the arbitrator.”  The court, however, insisted that Cook “has since been 
repudiated in almost every reported case that has cited it . . . .” The case, the court 
admonished, “is a misstatement of the appropriate standard of review.  
Accordingly, we decline to apply to this case the extra-degree-of-scrutiny 
referenced in Cook.”  Id. at 483.  
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evidence . . . .” 446  He or she “may affirm, modify, or reverse the 
decision of a deputy commissioner or the commissioner may remand 
the decision to the deputy commissioner for further proceedings.”447  
According to one claimant’s attorney, “[t]he vast majority of 
decisions are simply adopted by the Commissioner who adopts the 
findings and rulings of the Deputy Commissioner.   Sometimes, 
though, the Commissioner will appoint a Deputy Commissioner”448 
to recommend a decision.  A defense lawyer, on the other hand, 
advised that the Commissioner “quite often” substitutes credibility 
judgments.449   
Two recent cases perhaps suggest that review of witness 
credibility is a sensitive issue.  In one case, the district court, on 
appeal from the decision of the Commissioner, was held to have 
inappropriately reassessed the latter’s credibility judgment.450  In 
another, an “acting commissioner,” via the process noted above, was 
held to have made his findings on legally insufficient evidence.451  In 
that case, the district court, and a concurring judge of the appeals 
court, utilized harsh language not commonly encountered in appellate 
opinions.452 In any event, the current Commissioner posits that he 
hews to the common law principle of deference to the Deputy 
Commissioner on issues of credibility.453  
                                                          
446 Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 526 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 
1995). 
447 IOWA CODE § 86.24 (2011).   
448 Memorandum of Ryan Beattie, Esquire, to Mark Cowger, Esquire (Jan. 
12, 2012) (on file with Author).  For a case where the Commissioner referred the 
review to a Deputy Commissioner, see Square D Co. v. Plagmann, 2011 Iowa App. 
LEXIS 1475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).  
449 Memorandum of Lee P. Hook, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2011) (on 
file with Author).    
450 Cedar Rapids Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 2011 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 103 
(Iowa 2011).  
451 See Beef Products, Inc. v. Rizvic, 806 N.W. 2d 294 (Iowa  Ct. App.  
2011). 
452 See id.  
453 Bouska v. St. Luke’s Hospital, File Nos. 5022542 & 5022543 
(Workers. Comp. App. March 23, 2009). Commissioner Godfrey stated: 
 
While I performed a de novo review, I gave considerable 
deference to findings of fact that are impacted by the credibility 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-1 
 
132 
Kansas.  The Kansas Board is the final fact-finder.  The law 
provides that the Board “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review 
all decisions . . . and awards . . . of administrative law judges . . . .”454  
This review “shall be upon questions of law and fact as presented and 
shown by a transcript of the evidence and the proceedings as 
presented, had and introduced before the administrative law 
judge.”455  Of note is a 2009 amendment to the laws governing 
appeals from administrative agencies to the court system.  The 
appellate courts are now to undertake a whole-record review, the 
parameters of which are defined in the statute.  Among other things, 
the court must take into account “any determinations of veracity by 
the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the 
witness and the agency’s explanation of why the relevant evidence in 
the record supports its material findings of fact.”456   
In a 2011 case, a claimant whose award had been reversed by 
the Board, on credibility grounds, asserted that it had done so 
improperly under the new statute.  The court, however, replied that 
the scrutiny referred to in the new statute applied to its review of the 
Board’s decision, not the Board’s review of the ALJ’s decision.  The 
court would not, as perhaps suggested by claimant, reweigh the 
competing evidence.  Still, under the amendment, “it may [be] the 
better practice for the Board to give its reasons when disagreeing 
with any credibility determinations of the ALJ. . . .  Such practice is 
                                                          
findings, expressly or impliedly, made by the deputy who 
presided at the hearing.  The deputy who presided at the hearing 
had the best opportunity to evaluate the demeanor of the persons 
who testified at the hearing. The presiding deputy has the ability 
to include the demeanor of a witness when weighing credibility 
to find the true facts of the case. My ability to find the true facts 
that are affected by witness demeanor and credibility cannot be 
expected to be superior to that of the deputy who presided at the 
hearing.  If anything, my ability when reviewing a transcript is 
likely inferior because I do not have the tool of witness demeanor 
to use in my evaluation.   
 
Id.   
454 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-555(c) (West 2011).   
455 Id.   
456 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(d) (West 2011).  See generally Redd v. 
Kansas Truck Ctr., 239 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2010) (discussing substantial evidence 
standard of review and how 2009 law changed standard).   
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based on the Board’s contemplation that its decision will be subject 
to judicial review with the amended standards” noted above.457            
According to a veteran attorney, the Appeals Board does 
make its own credibility determinations with a fair amount of 
frequency.  This is particularly so with “‘preliminary hearing 
appeals’ (which are mostly limited to compensability issues) with 
medical evidence (provider and hospital records come into evidence 
without the testimony of the doctor at preliminary hearings) . . . .”458  
In such cases “a Board member will independently weigh the 
evidence and typically not feel constrained by the findings or 
credibility determinations of the ALJ.”459  
 
Mississippi.  Under the Mississippi Act, workers’ 
compensation cases are adjudicated before ALJs of the three-
member, politically-appointed Workers’ Compensation Commission.  
The Commission has considerable powers to reassess credibility and 
the facts,460 and this has been said by some attorneys to occur with 
some regularity.  A Mississippi ALJ advised this Author that the 
“Commission may accept or not accept the ALJ’s findings about 
anything.  This includes the assessment of the credibility of the 
witness or claimant . . . .  In most claims, the Commission will accept 
most or all of the judge’s findings but may amend or reverse the 
dollar amount of an award of permanent disability or the date of 
maximum medical improvement or one such aspect of the claim – or 
may find that the judge has misapplied the law to the facts.”461   
                                                          
457 Rausch v. Sear Roebuck & Co., 263 P.3d 194, 197 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2011).  In this case, the employer denied that the claimant had suffered any injury 
while at work.  After a period of modified duty, she was subject to termination for 
cause.  As she exited, she advised the employer that she would “make them pay.”  
Id. at 198.  The ALJ found that the circumstantial evidence proved an injury, but 
the Board reversed, finding claimant’s testimony, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, incredible.  
 
458 Memorandum of Kim Martens, Esquire, to Author (Dec. 6, 2012) (on 
file with Author).  
459 Id.   
460 See Short v. Wilson Meat House, 36 So.3d 1247, 1251 (Miss. 2010) 
(the “Commission is the fact-finder and the judge of the credibility of witnesses.”). 
461 Memorandum of Hon. Linda Thompson, ALJ, to Author (Aug. 8, 
2011) (on file with Author).   
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The fact-finding process in Mississippi workers’ 
compensation has been a subject of interest recently, as a claimants’ 
attorney charged that the current Commissioners were biased against 
injured workers.  According to a study, “the commission’s three 
members voted to reject administrative law judge decisions favoring 
workers between 75 and 91 percent of the time.”462  The allegations 
have led to a “PEER review” by a state legislative agency, the Joint 
Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review.463     
 
North Carolina.   North Carolina is another state where the 
Industrial Commission, the final fact-finder,464 is willing, on 
occasion, to overthrow the Deputy Commissioner’s credibility 
determinations on a “cold record.”  Such overthrows include 
changing fact-findings which have been made based on 
considerations of witness demeanor.   A source who spoke with the 
Author anonymously believed that the Commission (as of 2009) 
made substantial changes in fact-findings in about fifteen percent of 
cases.465  A leader in the field, however, an attorney who represents 
                                                          
462 Joe Atkins, Mississippi Workers’ Compensation  Commission Rulings 
Under Review for Anti-worker Bias, FACING SOUTH[:] THE INSTITUTE FOR 
SOUTHERN STUDIES, http://www.southernstudies.org/2011/01/mississippi-workers-
compensation-commission-rulings-under-review-for-anti-worker-bias.html (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2011). 
463 Id. 
464 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85  (providing, inter alia, that “[i]f application is 
made to the Commission within 15 days from the date when notice of the award 
shall have been given, the full Commission shall review the award, and, if good 
ground be shown therefor, reconsider the evidence . . . .”). See Johnson v. S.Tire 
Sales & Serv., 599 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. 2004).  With regard to the North Carolina 
system, see generally J. Randolph Ward, Primary Issues in Compensation 
Litigation, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 443 (1995) (note: possibly dated given recent 
reforms). 
465 A Charlotte, NC, lawyer, in a website posting, estimates that in 30% of 
the cases the Industrial Commission will reverse on one ground or another.  He 
states, “The loser at the Deputy level will typically appeal to the Full Commission 
in my experience. The defendants may do it sometimes to delay payment to you, 
without any real expectation of winning. About 70% of the time the Full 
Commission will affirm what the Deputy decided, and the rest of the time they may 
modify the Deputy award or reverse most or all of it . . . .” Comments of Bob 
Bollinger, Esq., Discussion Board at WorkersCompensationInsurance.com (Dec. 
2007), available at 
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injured workers, stated to the Author, “I know of no hard statistics on 
this issue so it’s hard to say. The Court of Appeals has firmly 
determined that the full commission has the power to determine 
credibility issues based on the cold record and they do reverse every 
now and then, but I would have to say it happens ‘rarely.’”466 
Of note is the state supreme court’s tenacious rule (in effect 
since 1998), that the Full Commission is not required to make 
findings explaining why it was reversing the Deputy Commissioner’s 
credibility findings concerning a claimant’s testimony regarding the 
cause of the accident.467  This was the implication of a 1998 
landmark case, in which the court clarified:  
 
Whether the full Commission conducts a hearing or 
reviews a cold record, [the statute] . . . places the 
ultimate fact-finding function with the Commission – 
not the hearing officer. It is the Commission that 
ultimately determines credibility, whether from a cold 
record or from live testimony.  Consequently, in 
reversing the deputy commissioner’s credibility 
findings, the full Commission is not required to 
demonstrate, as [one of our precedents] states, “that 
sufficient consideration was paid to the fact that 
credibility may be best judged by a first-hand observer 
of the witness when that observation was the only 
one.”468  
 
According to another opinion:  
 




466 Memorandum of Leonard T. Jernigan, Jr., Esquire, to Author (Nov. 28, 
2011) (on file with Author).  
467 See Brown v. The Kroger Co., 610 S.E.2d 447, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005) (“we also disagree with defendants’ contention that in cases in which 
observation of the claimant’s actual physical behavior is a ‘crucial issue,’ the Full 
Commission should acknowledge the hearing officer’s credibility findings and 
offer a full explanation if it substitutes a different judgment for those findings.”). 
468 Adams v. AVX Corp., 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (N.C. 1998).  
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Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility 
determinations” and “allowing [this Court] to review 
the Commission’s explanation of those credibility 
determinations would be inconsistent with our legal 
system’s tradition of not requiring  the fact finder to 
explain why he or she believes one witness over 
another or believes one piece of evidence is more 
credible than another.469 
 
In a 2004 case that followed this holding, the Deputy 
Commissioner found as fact that an injured worker had not shown 
good faith in pursuing work, and he denied a request for permanent 
total disability.470  The Full Commission, however, found flatly to the 
contrary, and continued the claimant on total disability.471  On 
appeal, the employer argued that the Commission had “erred by 
failing to consider the Deputy Commissioner’s personal observations 
that plaintiff was exaggerating any pain he was experiencing at the 
hearing . . . .”472  The Court of Appeals was unmoved, citing the 1998 
precedent.473   
Furthermore, in a 2005 case that followed this holding, the 
Deputy Commissioner had found claimant’s testimony about a fall at 
home, said to have been a consequence of an at-work injury, to be 
incredible.474  The Full Commission, however, found her credible and 
awarded benefits.475  In the state supreme court, the employer argued 
that “in cases in which observation of the claimant’s actual physical 
behavior is a ‘crucial issue,’ the Full Commission should 
acknowledge the hearing officer’s credibility findings and offer a full 
explanation if it substitutes a different judgment for those 
                                                          
469 Arce v. Bassett Furniture Indus., No. COA10-1064, 2011 N.C. App. 
LEXIS 699, *9-10 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011) ) (quoting Deese v. Champion 
Int'l Corp.,  530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (N.C. 2000)).     
470 Johnson v. S. Tire Sales & Serv., 599 S.E.2d 508, 510-11 (N.C. 2004). 
471 Id. at 511.  
472 Id. at 515. 
473 Id.  
474 Brown v. Kroger Co., 610 S.E.2d 447, 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
475 Id. at 450.  
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findings.”476  In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals 
similarly relied upon the 1998 precedent quoted above.477   
 
C.  Jury Trial States 
 
In five states, the parties may seek a jury trial (or a bench 
trial, for that matter) even after the exhaustion of the administrative 
adjudication scheme.  In four of these states, Maryland, Ohio, 
Vermont, and Washington, the trial court is the final fact-finder and 
the arrangement obviously retains an element of its original form.  
The case of Texas is discussed above – the Author has, exercising his 
organizational discretion, categorized the state as maintaining 
administrative finality.  This is in light of the jurisdiction’s dramatic 
1989 reform which gave the Texas Hearing Officer significant fact-
finding power, and which truncated the jury trial right.478  
 
Maryland.  Under the Maryland Act, the “decision of the 
Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct; and . . . the party 
challenging the decision has the burden of proof.”479  In addition, 
“[The statute] . . . provide[s] . . . the prerogative of a trial de novo . . . 
of any or all of the factual issues initially determined by the 
Commission. . . . [T]he trial is de novo, but only on the questions of 
fact submitted to the Commission by way of some evidence or by a 
formal issue.” 480   The process can be gleaned from a 2011 case, in 
which the claimant was the punter for the Washington Redskins 
football team.481  The Maryland Commissioner granted benefits, but 
                                                          
476 Id. at 453.   
477 Id.    
478 See supra Section V(E).  
479 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.  § 9-745(b)(1), (2) (West 2011). 
480 Bd. of Educ. for Montgomery Cnty. v. Spradlin, 867 A.2d 370, 384 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (quoting Gen. Motors v. Bark, 555 A.2d 542, 545 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1989) and MAURICE J. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION IN 
MARYLAND 170-71(1970)) (Spradlin features an exhaustive description of trial 
process). 
481 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2011). 
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the employer appealed to the county court and sought a jury trial.482  
The jury, however, also found for the claimant.483   
The Maryland scheme poses a special task for the lawyer, as 
he or she must have expertise both in administrative proceedings 
before the commissioners and trial skills as well.  As discussed 
above, relatively few contested cases unfold on appeal in a jury 
trial.484   
 
Ohio.  Under the Ohio Act, contested cases are heard before 
administrative agency officers before a jury trial would ever 
unfold.485  A case is first heard by the District Hearing Officer 
(DHO), with any appeal thereafter to a Staff Hearing Officer 
(SHO).486  Then, with permission, a case will be reviewed by the 
Industrial Commission.487  The review is de novo at each level.488   
Any subsequent appeal is taken to a county trial court, which will 
convene a jury or bench trial.489  At this level, factual determinations 
may once again be made.490  A limitation exists: “The claimant or the 
employer may appeal an order of the industrial commission . . . in 
any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to 
the extent of disability to the court of common pleas . . . . ”491 
In a 2006 case, the state supreme court addressed the issue of 
whether a party’s due process rights were violated by the trial court’s 
mandate that all testimony at time of jury trial was to be by 
                                                          
482 Id. at 680.  
483 Id.       
484 See supra Section V(A).   
485 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.511 (West 2011) 
486 Id. § 4123.511 (D),(E). 
487 Id. § 4123.511(E). 
488 Comments of Frank Gallucci, Esq. to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file 
with Author). 
489 Id. § 4123.512(A). 
490 Id. § 4123.512(D). 
491 Id. § 4123.512(A) (emphasis added).  The entire process just described 
may be gleaned in Luckett v. Ryan,  2011 Ohio App. No. 1-10-49, 2011 Ohio Ct. 
App. LEXIS 2545, *2-5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011 Jun. 20, 2011) (claimant was 
unsuccessful through several levels, including jury trial, in expanding accepted 
injury from scalp laceration to more involved orthopedic injuries).   
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videotape.492  The claimant in that case unsuccessfully asserted that 
“his right to a jury includes the right to present his own testimony 
and that of his witnesses live and the right to have the jury see him as 
the case is presented.”493  The court rejected this argument, 
respecting the authority of the trial judge to manage his cases, and it 
remarked that no constitutional right to a workers’ compensation jury 
trial existed.494  The court did indicate that the “preferred practice” 
was direct interface between the parties and the jury,495 but it was 
unwilling to say that videotape was impermissible.496  
A claimant’s attorney with a heavy caseload estimates that, of 
the appeals he takes from the Industrial Commission to the trial court 
(referred to as “512” appeals), not more than 10%, perhaps 5%, will 
unfold in a jury trial.497  The other cases will settle on appeal; indeed, 
the fact of an appeal and demand for a jury trial may work to 
leverage settlement.498   
 
 Vermont.  Under the Vermont Act, “either party may appeal 
to the superior [trial] court of a county wherein a civil action between 
the parties would be triable.  Either party shall be entitled to a trial by 
jury.”499 However, “[t]he jurisdiction of [the superior court] . . . shall 
                                                          
492 Arrington v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1004, 1006 (2006).  
493 Id. at 1011.  
494 Id.  
495 Id. at 1014.    The court added that, in so ruling: 
 
        [W]e are not blinded by the promise of technology and its integral 
role in contemporary society. Questions as to the proper 
integration of technology into law are complicated ones. In cases 
in which technology permeates the courtroom, we must guard 
against the suggestion that technology can be used for “so 
arranging the world that we don’t have to experience it.” 
 
 Id. (quoting MAX FRISCH, HOMO FABER 178 (Michael Bullock trans., 1959)).  
496 Id. at 1006. 
497 Comments of Frank Gallucci, Esq. to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file 
with Author). 
498 Id.   
499 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 670 (West 2011). 
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be limited to a review of questions of fact or questions of fact and 
law certified to it by the commissioner . . . . ”500   
As foreshadowed above, the jury trial is only reached after 
administrative remedies have been exhausted.501  In this regard, the 
final agency fact-finder is the Commissioner of the Department of 
Labor.502  The Commissioner employs full-time hearing officers 
(currently two) to undertake the hearing process.503  The hearing 
officers consider the cases and prepare a proposed decision for the 
Commissioner.504  The Commissioner does indeed possess the power 
to change a hearing officer’s decision.505  However, in practice, if the 
Commissioner were to have a question about the case, she would 
likely ask the hearing officer to address the same, or return the 
decision to be reheard and/or rewritten.  According to the current 
Director of the Workers’ Compensation & Safety Division, these 
occasions are rare.506  “Fine-tuning” of decisions is much more 
common.507  Most “hard” fact-findings of the hearing officer are not 
questioned.508   
According to the Director, about 30% to 40% of the 
Commissioner adjudications are appealed to the superior court (that 
is, the county court).509  The law, notably, supports a direct appeal to 
the Vermont Supreme Court if only legal error is alleged.510  If the 
losing party wants facts reassessed, an appeal must be prosecuted to 
the superior court for trial.511  In a 2010 case, the supreme court 
emphasized the meaning of such de novo review:  
 
                                                          
500 Id. tit. 21 § 671. 
501 Id.   
502 Id.   
503 Id.   
504 Id.   
505 Id. tit. 21 § 671. 
506 Comments of J. Stephen Monahan, Esq., Director of the Workers’ 
Compensation & Safety Division, to Author (Dec. 20, 2011) (on file with Author).    
507 Id.     
508 Id.     
509 Id.     
510 Id.      
511 Roethke v. Jake’s Original Bar and Grill, 772 A.2d 492, 493 (Vt. 
2001).  
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The [trial] court’s review of the Commissioner’s 
decision “involves a retrial de novo.” (Citation 
omitted.)  That means, as the trial court found, that 
insurer is not limited to the arguments raised below, 
and preservation — or lack thereof — is not at issue.  
(Footnote omitted.)  The doctrine of collateral estoppel 
is similarly not relevant here because there has not yet 
been a final judgment on the merits.512    
 
Washington. Under the Washington Act, contested cases are 
litigated before an Industrial Appeals Judge (IAJ), who issues a 
proposed decision and order.513  Any appeal is prosecuted thereafter 
to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA).514  An aggrieved 
party may then seek review in the county (superior) court.515   
The Act provides that in such appeals, “only such issues of 
law or fact may be raised as were properly included in the notice of 
appeal to the board, or in the complete record of the proceedings 
before the board.” 516  In addition, the superior court proceeding 
“shall be de novo, but the court shall not receive evidence or 
testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the board 
or included in the record filed by the board in the superior court . . . . 
”517  The same statute provides, “In all [such] court proceedings . . . 
the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct and 
the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.”518  
Furthermore, the court is directed to “advise the jury of the exact 
findings of the board on each material issue before the court.” 519  
                                                          
512  Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 371 
(Vt. 2010) (quoting Farris v. Bryant Grinder Corp./Wausau Ins. Co., 869 A.2d 131, 
135 (2005)).   
513 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.52.104 (West 2010). 
514 Id.  § 51.52.106. 
515 Id. § 51.52.110. This process can be seen unfolding in Puget Sound 
Energy, Inc. v. Lee, 205 P.3d 979 (Wash. Ct. App.  2009).   
516 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.52.115 (West 2010).  
517  Id.  
518  Id.  
519 Id.  
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The statute’s admonition that no further evidence is permitted 
at trial has the most razor-like of teeth.520  “The Superior Court 
appeal,” one veteran notes, “is nothing more than reading the record 
to the judge or jury.”521 He further estimates that, of the BIIA 
“hearings which conclude with a decision and order, [5-10%] go on 
to the Superior Court.  Of those 75% are tried to a jury.”522  Another 
lawyer confirms that jury trials are not uncommon:  
 
Cases proceeding to trial at Superior Court are not 
rare. They are most frequent involving pension cases 
and allowance of injury where the issue is 
occupational disease.  As a percentage of all cases 
administratively adjudicated the number is probably 
less than 1%.  But at any given time in this County 
there is usually at least one compensation case being 
tried every week.523   
 
A third lawyer notes the custom and practice of transcript 
recitation:  
 
It is . . . common . . . for a jury to be empanelled in 
Superior Court.  In Washington, the transcript adduced 
at the Board . . . is read to the jury.  No live testimony 
is presented in Superior Court.  (It is an incredibly 
boring experience for a juror, I am sure!)  Sometimes 





                                                          
520 See id.  
521 Memorandum from Christopher Sharpe, Esq. to Mark Cowger, Esq. 
(Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with Author).  
522 Id.    
523 Memorandum from Patrick H. LePley, Esq. to Mark Cowger, Esq. 
(Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with Author).  
524 Memorandum from Thomas L. Doran, Esq. to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 
9, 2012) (on file with Author).  
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VII.  NUANCES IN THE FACT-FINDING ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Wisconsin, Due Process, and the Credibility Consultation 
 
Under the Wisconsin Act, the ALJ is not the final fact-
finder.525  An aggrieved party may, in this regard, petition the Labor 
& Industry Review Commission (LIRC) for review of the ALJ’s 
decision and the “commission shall either affirm, reverse, set aside or 
modify the findings or order in whole or in part, or direct the taking 
of additional evidence.”526  Such review “shall be based on a review 
of the evidence submitted.”527  “The hearing examiner,” one decision 
explains,   “may make initial determinations on witness credibility, 
but these determinations are subject to the commission’s independent 
review.”528 
The Wisconsin process is remarkable for its significant nod 
towards due process.  In this regard, if the Commission has concerns 
over the credibility of a witness, prior to its changing of a credibility-
based fact-finding, it must convene a “credibility conference” with 
the ALJ who actually saw and heard the witness.529  Further, to 
change such credibility determinations, the LIRC must set forth 
reasons.530  According to the treatise writer Domer, the LIRC often 
                                                          
525 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18 (West 2011). 
526 Id. § 102.18(3). 
527 Id. 
528 Hakes v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 523 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1994).  
529 See Shawley v. Indus. Comm’n, 114 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Wis. 1962) 
530  See Braun v. Indus. Comm’n, 153 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Wis. 1967) (relying 
on Shawley v. Indus. Comm’n, 114 N.W.2d at 876.).  Interface between hearing 
officer and Commission is perhaps a longstanding tradition.  When Professor Dodd 
studied the Wisconsin system, he noted that examiners sent to remote locations to 
conduct hearings were 
 
at periodic intervals given a week at the commission’s 
headquarters in Madison to prepare reports on the cases he had 
heard.  When this was done the examiner sought out the 
commissioners and, in a conference with him, presented the case 
as it developed at the hearing and indicated what he thought the 
order of the commission should be.  If the commissioner 
approved, the examiner was directed to draw the findings of fact 
and the award or the dismissal.   
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convenes credibility conferences, particularly when the ALJ has 
flatly rejected the credibility of the claimant.531  In the end, however, 
outright reversals of the ALJ on credibility grounds are estimated at 
five percent “by anecdotal authority.”532 
A leading precedent illustrating the Wisconsin process comes 
from the 1972 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Transamerica Ins. Co. 
v. Dep’t of Industry.533  In that case, the hearing examiner had limited 
a claimant’s benefits, having credited an expert who had apparently 
been called by the employer.534  After a credibility conference, the 
Commission modified the findings and, in a summary set of findings, 
found the claimant totally disabled.535  When the case reached the 
state supreme court, the employer asserted that its due process rights 
had been violated because the Commission had not set forth its 
reasons for rejecting the fact-findings of the examiner.536  The court 
ultimately affirmed, but agreed in principle that merely setting forth 
replacement fact-findings, without an explanation for the change, 
would no longer be tolerated:       
 
The parties to litigation, workmen’s compensation 
claims included, are entitled to know, not only that the 
department set aside the findings of an examiner but 
why it did so – not only what independent findings the 
department found proper, but on what basis and 
evidence it made such findings.  Particularly is this 
true where credibility of witnesses is involved. 
Fundamental fairness requires that administrative 
agencies, as well as courts, set forth the reasons why a 
                                                          
 
DODD, supra note 53, at 258.  He further noted, “In 99 cases out of a 
hundred, the commission approved the examiner’s view of the case.”  Id.    
531 Memorandum from Thomas M. Domer, Esq. to Author (Nov. 16, 
2011) (on file with Author).  For a recent case reflecting that such a conference was 
held, see Hall v. Sch. Dist. of St. Croix Falls, 778 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. Ct. 
App.2009).    
532 Id.      
533 Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus., 195 N.W.2d 656 (Wis. 1972).   
534 Id. at 659. 
535 Id. at 660. 
536 Id. at 661. 
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fact-finder’s findings are being set aside or reversed, 
and spell out the basis for independent findings 
substituted.537 
 
The court stated, as a consequence: 
 
[W]e do not expect to have again to search a record 
either for the basis of independent findings as to 
credibility of witnesses or the reasons for [the] 
department setting aside an examiner’s findings as 
“probable error.”  Trial courts can be expected to 
reverse department findings and remand for the 
completion of the record whenever the department 
rejects the findings of its examiner and makes its own 
findings involving credibility of witnesses and fails to 
accompany such reversal and making its own findings 
with an opinion stating why it has rejected the facts 
found by the examiner and why it has made its own 
and differing findings of fact.538  
 
In a 1994 case, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument 
that more was required than a credibility conference and a statement 
of reasons before the Commission could reassess fact-findings.539  In 
that case, an employee asserted that she had injured her back and leg 
at work.540  The hearing examiner awarded benefits, but the 
Commission discredited the claimant’s testimony as riddled with 
inconsistencies.541  On appeal, the claimant asserted that, for due 
process to be afforded, “the record must disclose who consulted with 
the hearing examiner, when the consultation was made and how the 
consultation proceeded.”542  Further, the claimant contended that the 
“commission should adopt a standardized procedure by which its 
consultations are held.  [She] argues that the adoption of standardized 
                                                          
537 Id.  at 663. 
538 Transamerica Ins. Co., 195 N.W.2d at 664. 
539 Hakes, 523 N.W.2d at  157-58. 
540 Id.at 156. 
541 Id. 
542 Id. at 157.  
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procedures is warranted because the availability of compensation 
benefits for injured workers is so important and because the effect of 
a wrong decision has such dire consequences.”543  In response, the 
court held that due process was already accorded by the existing 
system, and the proposed undertaking “[sought] to delve into the 
mental processes the commission used in making its determinations 
of fact. [The court held that] [t]he law . . . [did] not require this.”544   
That the appellate court may require a detailed Commission 
adjudication is suggested by a 2011 case.545  There, the ALJ credited 
the employer (a small businessman) when he testified that he 
terminated (viz., refused to re-hire) claimant for incompetence and 
not out of alleged retaliation for his having suffered a work injury, 
missing work, and stating that he was going to have to undergo 
another disabling surgery.546  The Commission reversed, 
“determining that [claimant] was the credible party and that 
[employer] had, in fact, refused to rehire [claimant] because of [his] 
work-related injury . . . .”547  On employer’s appeal, the court 
carefully parsed the Commission decision, compared it with the 
record, and held that “the inadequacy of LIRC’s accompanying 
memorandum opinion is the basis for our decision to set aside its 
order. ‘Fundamental fairness’ requires that LIRC set forth the reasons 
why the ALJ’s findings are being reversed and LIRC must ‘spell out 
the basis for [its] independent findings.’”548   
 
B.  Judging Credibility of Expert Medical Witnesses 
 
In a substantial evidence jurisdiction, deference to the fact-
finder usually extends to all credibility determinations, lay and 
expert.549  This is certainly the rule in Pennsylvania, though the WCJ 
                                                          
543 Id. 
544  Hakes, 523 N.W.2d at  158. 
545 See Open Hearth Homes, LLC v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n,  
No. 2010 AP 1225, Wis. Ct. App. Lexis 363, at *11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). 
546 Id. at *3-4. 
547 Id. at *4-5. 
548 Id. at *11. 
549 See, e.g., Ullmann v. City of Tampa Parks Dep’t, 625 So. 2d 868, 873 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Tiburcio v. United Parcel Service, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. 
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must provide his or her reasons for crediting and discrediting the 
critical evidence.550  
In a jurisdiction where the commission, or even appellate 
court, reserves the right to make its own findings, however, courts 
recognize a dichotomy in this area.  Many believe that the common-
law rule about deference to the trial judge “applies more to lay 
witnesses than expert medical witnesses.  After all, (1) expert 
witnesses have to base conclusions on evidence, and (2) medical 
testimony comes down to persuasiveness more than credibility.”551  
As established above, for example, the Commission in 
Missouri is the final fact-finder, but a policy seems to prevail that it 
will give great deference to the ALJ on issues of witness 
credibility.552  Several lawyers report, however, that this deference is 
usually afforded to the credibility of lay witnesses. The Commission 
is less likely to accord deference to credibility determinations made 
by the ALJ relative to experts testifying by deposition:   
 
If there is one area where the commission has been 
more activist than any other in credibility 
determinations, it has been with weighing the opinions 
of experts (who, in Missouri, almost universally 
testify by deposition). The commission has been most 
attentive to assuring that [a] proper foundation has 
been laid for an expert’s opinion, and that the opinion 
is based on un-contradicted evidence found in the 
record.  It tends to characterize its findings as 
concerning the “persuasiveness” of the expert’s 
opinions, and this commission’s awards are replete 
with decisions saying a doctor was not persuasive in 
one case, while finding the same expert persuasive in 
                                                          
LEXIS 1873, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); Huntington v. State of 
Wyoming, 163 P.3d 839, 843 (Wyo. 2007).    
550 See infra Section IX(C)(2) (discussion of Pennsylvania doctrine).  
551 Memorandum from Hon. David Wertheim, WCLJ (now retired) to Author 
(Aug. 30, 2011) (on file with Author).  
552 See supra Section VI(A). 
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another, always including a careful recitation of the 
basis of its determination.553 
 
“The commission,” another attorney writes, “sees itself in the 
same position to judge the testimony in depositions as is the 
administrative law judge, so they have no qualms in reweighing that 
evidence.”554   
Of some irony is that Missouri appellate courts, which are 
ostensibly undertaking  substantial evidence/whole record review,555 
may also be detected reassessing the credibility of experts.556  In a 
2006 case, for example, the claimant alleged an ongoing disability 
from myofascial pain afflicting his shoulders.557  The ALJ and 
Commission rejected this assertion.558  The Court of Appeals 
reversed, stating that the uncontradicted expert medical proofs 
showed that he did suffer from the malady, and that the inferences 
relied upon by ALJ and Commission were not sufficient.559  The 
“ALJ simply lacked the expertise,” the court noted, to conclude that 
claimant’s problems really had their genesis in non-work-related slip 
                                                          
553 Memorandum from Michael Korte, Esq., to Author (Dec. 7, 2011)  (on file with 
Author).  To the same effect is Mr. Todd Werts, Esq.:   
 
[I]t is “rare” . . . for the Commission to reverse an ALJ on the 
credibility determination of a witness who testified in person.  I 
think the matter becomes a little more complicated with medical 
testimony given by deposition . . . [I]t is not uncommon for the 
Commission to disagree with an ALJ on the medical testimony.   
 
Memorandum from Todd Werts, Esq., to Author (Dec. 2, 2011) (on file with 
Author).  The disagreement, however, often “is over which expert better supports 
his or her opinion and may not necessarily be a credibility issue, so much as an 
issue with the doctor’s logic or medical basis for his/her opinion.” Id.   
554 Memorandum from Kip Kubin, Esq., to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file 
with Author).    
555 See Vice v. Advantage Waste Servs., Inc., 298 S.W.3d 145 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
556 Memorandum from  Michael Korte, Esq., to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on 
file with Author).  This is a phenomenon long noted, also, by the Larson treatise.  
See LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[3], [4].   
557 Kuykendall v. Gates Corp., 207 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).   
558 Id. at 697. 
559 See id. at 712. 
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and fall incidents.560   According to the court, “[w]hile we ‘defer to 
the Commission’s decisions regarding the weight given to witnesses’ 
testimony, and are bound by the Commission’s factual 
determinations when the evidence supports either of two opposed 
findings,’ . . . here there was no credible medical evidence opposing 
Dr. Eaton’s findings.”561 
 This reasoning, notably, recalls the so-called “sit and squirm” 
cases of the Social Security Disability cases.562  In the 1980s, a 
number of federal court cases were filed indicating that the Social 
Security Disability (SSD) ALJ could not discredit a claimant on the 
issue of physical impairment in the face of uncontradicted medical 
testimony.  In the most illustrative case, the ALJ, in dismissing the 
claim, stated:  
 
At no time during the hearing was the claimant 
observed to be suffering any physical or mental 
discomfort, nor was physical pain or discomfort 
evidenced by any facial grimaces or restlessness.   
 
The medical evidence reveals that although the 
claimant suffers some discomfort from her 
impairments, they do not appear severe.563   
 
This reasoning was found insufficient, in the face of 
uncontradicted medical evidence, to support denial of the claim.564  
                                                          
560 Id. at 711.  
561  Id. (citation omitted).    
562 For use of this term, see Norris v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1154, 1158 (11th 
Cir. 1985).    
563 Benson v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1981).   
564 Id.  One court provided a practical reason for the rule.  See Wilson v. 
Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1984): 
  
[T]he ALJ engaged in what had been condemned as “sit and 
squirm” jurisprudence.   In this approach, an ALJ who is not a 
medical expert will subjectively arrive at an index of traits which 
he expects the claimant to manifest at the hearing.  If the 
claimant falls short of the index, the claim is denied. . . . [T]his 
approach . . . will not only result in unreliable conclusions when 
observing claimants with honest intentions, but may encourage 
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This phenomenon is, in any event, also one of the Tennessee 
practice. There, contested cases are heard in the trial courts via bench 
trials.565  Rather remarkably, the appellate courts still have the power 
to assess credibility on appeal.  In this latter regard, review of issues 
of fact “is de novo upon the record of the trial court accompanied by 
a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the 
preponderance of evidence is otherwise.”566  Tennessee courts 
generally would not presume to change a trial judge’s credibility 
judgment about a live witness, but without any hesitation they could 
potentially change a judgment about expert testimony given by 
deposition.567  A veteran specialist admonishes, “in particular, the 
testimony of expert witnesses and other witnesses who testify by 
deposition is routinely reweighed based upon the theory that the trial 
judge is in no better position than the appellate court to evaluate the 
testimony of a witness who testifies by deposition.”568 
The language of the Tennessee appellate precedents bears out 
the dichotomy.569  “Where the trial judge has seen and heard the 
witnesses,” a recent opinion states, “especially if issues of credibility 
and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable 
deference must be accorded those circumstances on review . . . .”570  
This is so “because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to 
                                                          
claimants to manufacture convincing observable manifestations 
of pain, or, worse yet, discourage them from exercising the right 
to appear before an [ALJ] for fear that they may not appear to the 
unexpert eye to be as bad as they feel.   
 
Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
565 See supra Section III (discussion of court administration in Tennessee).    
566 Griffin v. Walker Die Casting, Inc., No. M2009-01773-WC-R3-WC, 
2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1020, at *5-6 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2010) (citing TENN. CODE ANN § 
50-6-225(e)(2) (2008)).  The court also said that “[w]here the issues involve expert 
medical testimony and all the medical proof is documentary, as in this case, the 
reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of 
that testimony.”  Id.  
567 Memorandum from Cully Ward, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 6, 
2012) (on file with Author). 
568 Memorandum from Tony Farmer, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Jan. 6, 
2012) (on file with Author).  
569 See Binkley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. M2002-00278-
WC-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. Lexis 3 (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2003). 
570 Id. at *2. 
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observe the witnesses’ demeanor and to hear the in-court 
testimony.”571  On the other hand, “When the issues involve expert 
medical testimony that is contained in the record by deposition, 
determination of the weight and credibility of the evidence 
necessarily must be drawn from the contents of the depositions, and 
the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions with regard to 
those issues.”572     
The Arizona appellate courts demonstrate a unique opinion on 
the issue.  There, the law requires that expert physicians must testify 
live and not by deposition.573  This is an extraordinary rule among 
states.  On the issue of whether the WCJ benefits from having the 
expert physically present in the courtroom, an Arizona ALJ states: 
[This] is an issue that is often discussed in our judges’ 
meetings since we have gone to “telephone” testimony 
of expert witnesses if the expert so requests . . . . 
  
[I]n-person testimony is nice since you can also ask a 
question or two if you need a clarification and also cut 
through the stuff that is not relevant.  The phone 
allows that but doesn’t allow the lawyers to show 
records that the doctor doesn’t have, which sometimes 
impacts cross.  Once I hear a doctor’s testimony, I 
usually allow the telephone appearance as I have a 
feel for his or her credibility . . . . [O]ne benefit to the 
deposition approach is you have the transcript and can 
review certain sections of detailed testimony on 
complex medical issues with more time than you can 
when you are taking notes in a hearing . . .. So in 
general, when it is a first timer expert I like the live 
testimony requirement of Arizona but when we allow 
                                                          
571 Id.  
572 Pennewell v. Hamilton-Ryker, No. W2006-1046-WC-R3-WC, 2007 
Tenn. LEXIS 795, at *8 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007) (reading claimant’s expert’s 
deposition and concluding that he had speculated on cause, and holding that, as a 
result, claimant had not met her burden of proof).  But cf. U.S. Cas. Co. v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1951) (opining that viewing live the 
physician’s demeanor can impact a credibility determination).  
573 Comments of Hon. Luann Haley to Author (Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with 
Author).  
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telephone appearance, as we do now at the judge’s 
discretion, deposition would be just as good . . . . 574 
 
C.  Live Versus Deposition Testimony 
 
The issue of whether commissions and courts should accord 
deference to credibility judgments based on deposition testimony has 
been raised in a variety of contexts.  Courts often indicate that the 
policy surrounding deference due a trial judge on credibility 
collapses when the judge has not actually seen and heard the 
witnesses but has instead read deposition transcripts.  This is a 
regular trope of Tennessee appellate courts.575  The general thinking 
is as follows:  
 
Even when the subject matter of a case makes it likely 
that credibility will affect the result, the evidence may 
be presented in such a manner that demeanor evidence 
is absent or is irrelevant to the determination of 
credibility.  This occurs when a case is presented on 
stipulated facts, or on affidavits and depositions.  
                                                          
574 Id.    
575 See, e.g., Davidson v. Bus. Pers. Solutions, No. E2010-02366-WC-R3-
WC, 2011 Tenn. Lexis 1213, at *9 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2011): 
 
When credibility and weight to be given testimony are at issue, 
considerable deference must be afforded the trial court when the 
trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ 
demeanor and to hear in-court testimony. . . .  No such deference 
is extended to a trial court's findings when reviewing 
documentary evidence, such as depositions.  
 
Id.   The court in Orrick, an earlier decision, set forth the rule as quoted in 
Davidson, and added:  
 
We agree with the Panel that the trial court erred in adopting Dr. 
Gaw’s 8% impairment rating for facial disfigurement.  Our de 
novo review of the depositions and other documentary medical 
evidence leads us to the conclusion that the trial court erred in 
crediting Dr. Gaw’s testimony over that of Dr. Jaffrey with 
respect to the loss of supporting structure to the face. 
 
 Orrick v. Bestway Trucking, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tenn. 2006). 
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Under these conditions, decision on the record by a 
substitute is clearly proper, since the original decision 
maker would have decided the case on the record 
himself.576 
 
A Montana judge posited, in this context, “deference makes 
no logical sense where the Workers’ Compensation Court simply 
reads the same deposition that we read.  In that situation, we are in as 
good a position to evaluate the medical testimony as the trial 
judge.”577 
On occasion, the rule may even be found in a jurisdiction 
where the WCJ is the final fact-finder.  Under the New Mexico Act, 
for example, review of the WCJ’s findings is undertaken on a 
substantial evidence/whole record basis.578  Still, in one case, the 
court recently overthrew a WCJ fact-finding, stating, “[B]ecause the 
medical causation evidence was presented by deposition, the WCJ 
findings on causation are not entitled to the usual deference accorded 
findings of fact.”579   Under the Connecticut Act, meanwhile, the 
commissioners are well established as final fact-finders.580  Still, 
limited authority seems to exist that on appeal deference to findings 
should not follow when the commissioner has relied upon a reading 
of depositions.581     
 
 
                                                          
576 Note, Replacing Finders of Fact – Judge, Juror, Administrative 
Hearing Officer, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1328 (1968).  
577 Hanks v. Liberty N.W. Ins. Corp., 62 P.3d 710, 716 (Mont. 2002) 
(Trieweiler, J., dissenting).   
578 Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). 
579 Pinkerton v. Gibbs, No. 29,872, 2010 N.M. App. Lexis 410, at *5 
(N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2010). 
580 Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 93 A. 245 (Conn. 1915).  
581 See, e.g., Biasetti v. City of Stamford, 1 A.3d 1231, 1237 n.5 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2010).  In this case, claimant, who suffered from Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD), argued on appeal that the Compensation Review Board should 
not have accorded deference to the commissioner’s crediting of the employer’s 
medical expert, as he had testified by deposition.  The court, in rejecting this 
argument, distinguished a prior case by noting that here the commissioner had also 
based his denial of claimant’s PTSD claim on rejection of his lay evidence.    
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VIII.  THE AUTOMATIC STAY ISSUE 
 
Under the orthodox rule, a common, even natural, corollary 
was that a request for review of the hearing officer’s decision 
operated to automatically stay the effect of the decision or 
recommended decision.582  After all, the hearing officer or referee 
was an agent of the Board.  To this day, notably, under the Indiana 
Act, an appeal from a single member of the Board to the full board 
does not, under the Act’s language, purport to stay the decision.  The 
law, indeed, does not reference any suspension of an obligation to 
pay.583  Still, a preeminent Indiana defense lawyer comments, “An 
appeal to the Full Worker’s Compensation Board is technically a 
hearing de novo . . . . [T]here is no mention of a stay in the statute or 
otherwise, but the practical effect would seem to be the equivalent of 
a stay.  No payment is made until the appeal process is complete.”584       
Presently, many states, chiefly those abiding by the orthodox 
rule of commission as fact-finder, provide for an automatic stay.585  
This is, however, hardly an ironclad rule.  For example, a request for 
review or appeal in California586 and Washington587 does not result in 
an automatic stay.    
The issue of a stay on benefits pending review on appeal to 
commission or court has always been an important one.   The “public 
policy behind the adoption of workers’ compensation acts,” is, after 
all, “to provide necessary day-to-day financial support to an injured 
worker and the worker’s dependents.”588  If the WCJ’s award is a 
                                                          
582 See DODD, supra note 53, at 394-395 (taking for granted that appeal 
usually operated as a stay, thus causing delay in payment to injured workers, and 
endorsing exceptions of California and Massachusetts).   
583  See IND. CODE § 22-3-1-3 (LexisNexis 2011). 
584 Memorandum from Robert A. Fanning, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. 
(Oct. 7, 2011) (on file with Author).  
585 This is the rule, for example, in Arkansas.  Memorandum from David 
L. Schneider, Esq., to Mark Cowger (Oct. 7, 2011) (on file with Author).  See ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 11-9-711.  This is also the rule under the Georgia Act.  Memorandum 
of Hon. David Imahara, ALJ, to Author (Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with Author).  
586 CAL. LABOR CODE § 5910 (West 2012).  See Ulrich v. Workmen’s 
Compensation Appeals Board, 123 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (Cal. Ct. App.1975).   
587 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 51.52.050(b) (West 2012). 
588 Ex parte Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance, 662 So. 2d 1133, 1137 
n.3 (Ala. 1998). 
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paper tiger, deprived of any meaningful significance until some 
remote review, this policy may be defeated.  The earliest observers of 
workers’ compensation systems recognized the phenomenon.  Dodd, 
for example, stated that it “clearly appears that the burden of the 
delay occasioned by court review of a compensation award [and the 
attendant stay on benefits] rests primarily on the claimant.”589  This 
was true in the 1930s and it can be true today.  In Utah, for example, 
an appeal from ALJ to Appeals Board creates an automatic stay.  
According to a claimant’s attorney:  
 
The stay remains on appeals to the Court of Appeals 
or Utah Supreme Court except in cases of permanent 
total disability [PTD] . . . .  In non-[PTD] claims, 
benefits are never paid on appeal . . . . Since our 
Motions For Review to the Commissioner were taking 
three years (this is being fixed) by the time a case got 
through the Utah Supreme Court, it was normally six 
or seven years since the original claim was filed . . . . 
[This is d]evastating to injured workers.590 
 
The act of making the WCJ the final fact-finder in a 
jurisdiction has not always been accompanied by a corresponding 
setting-aside of the automatic stay.  Indeed, in 1999 a WCRI 
researcher reported that “[a]mong 22 of the 36 jurisdictions with an 
administrative appellate forum an appeal stays the formal hearing 
decision without qualification.  In five jurisdictions, an appeal stays 
part of the formal hearing decision.”591  Among these were 
jurisdictions where the WCJ had been made the fact-finder.  Under 
the Minnesota Act, for example, “The decision from the formal 
hearing and obligation to pay will be stayed pending the appeal (if 
timely appealed) until a final determination is made by the Workers’ 
Compensation Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court for the State 
of Minnesota.  Then the obligation to pay kicks in.”592  The states of 
                                                          
589 DODD, supra note 47, at 395. 
590 Memorandum from Dawn Atkin, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. (Oct. 13, 
2011).   
591  BALLANTYNE, supra note 18, at 56.  
592 Memorandum from Charlene K. Feenstra, Esq., to Mark Cowger, Esq. 
(Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with Author). 
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Colorado593 and Connecticut594 also seem to be in this category.  
However, many states, like Connecticut, have provisions indicating 
that non-disputed amounts are to be paid despite any appeal.595   
It is odd that the law is so backward in jurisdictions where 
reform is focused on expediting the potential delivery of benefits 
through more immediate finality in adjudication.  The National 
Commission was certainly of the view that the stay should be 
abolished, although it did not record this assertion as one of its 
“essential recommendations.”596   The Report states as follows:  
 
The decision of the hearing examiner could be 
appealed to the appeals board, which could overrule 
the hearing examiner on questions of fact and of law.  
The decision of the hearing examiner, however, 
should be presumed correct and the appeal should not 
stay the examiner’s award.597    
 
The availability of the stay is known to prompt liable 
employers to prosecute appeals.   This hard-to-resist act is often 
undertaken regardless of the likelihood of ultimate appellate success.  
Rather, the perverse motivation is delay, coupled with the sanguine 
hope that the claimant will be leveraged to a more modest 
compromise settlement.598  Whatever the intent, researchers have 
                                                          
593 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-43-301(12) (2011).   
594 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-301 (2012). 
595 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-301(d) (2012). 
596 NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, supra note 53, at 
129 (Emphasis added).  
597 Id.  
598 See BALLANTYNE, supra note 425, at 73.  According to these WCRI 
researchers, workers’ attorneys alleged that the availability of automatic stay 
“create[d] a perverse incentive for employers and insurers, who can use appeals . . . 
to gain leverage during negotiations.”  Id.  This was also the assertion in Ex parte 
Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance, 662 So. 2d 1133 (Ala. 1995) (claimant 
alleging that employer took advantage of the posting of bond simply to leverage 
him to settle: employer allegedly “intentionally discontinued the payments in hopes 
that [he] would consent to a post-judgment settlement of his claim at terms far less 
favorable” than those of the circuit court award.”).          
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often found that appeal is more likely given availability of an 
automatic stay.599 
 
IX.  ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN ASSIGNING THE FACT-FINDING 
FUNCTION 
 
In many states, reform-minded legislatures, motivated by a 
desire to streamline dispute resolution, have equipped the WCJ with 
final fact-finding power.600  While in some jurisdictions, the WCJ has 
long been the final fact-finder, other states have had to undertake 
fundamental institutional changes for WCJs to gain this status.601  
Through a process of evolutionary convergence, the WCJ in the 
present day, in about half of the states, is not master, but 
chancellor.602        
A number of issues are implicated by the WCJ ascension to 
such extraordinary power.   It is worthy to inquire whether this 
approach has in fact brought increased efficiency, accuracy, and other 
benefits.  Another issue is whether investing the WCJ with such 
power creates concerns of its own – in particular, accountability.     
 
A.  Streamlining Adjudicatory Processes 
 
“Efficiency” is often said to be a rationale for making the 
judge in any system the final fact-finder.603  In a discussion of the 
central panel movement, one commentator notes:  
With respect to many issues, especially issues of fact, the 
ALJ’s decision will reflect the result of an impartial evidentiary 
hearing, so allowing the agency an opportunity to modify the ALJ’s 
                                                          
599 Id. (noting that one reason that many employer appeals were 
prosecuted at the time was the effect of the automatic stay); DUNCAN S. 
BALLANTYNE AND TELLES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN WISCONSIN: 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 72, 113 (Workers Compensation Research Institute 
ed.,1992) (“Appeal to LIRC stays the judge’s decision, providing some incentive to 
appeal when benefits have been awarded.”).  
600 See supra Section V(F).   
601 See supra Section V(G).   
602 See supra Section I (quick reference table categorizing states).  
603 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: Balancing 
Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 6 
(1999). 
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findings introduces an inefficiency, especially if the agency is 
required to reevaluate some or all [of] the evidence previously 
presented before the ALJ.604 
This analysis applies in the workers’ compensation sphere.  
Assuming that the WCJ is competent and impartial, it seems wasteful 
and inefficient for a commission, upon the losing party’s appeal, to 
re-examine the record and come up with its own factual 
determinations.  More importantly, the pendency of the appeal can be 
wasteful for the parties, as both injured worker and employer, 
waiting for the final decision on the facts to be issued, frequently 
place their affairs on an indefinite hold.  
When a workers’ compensation commission can reassess the 
facts, and it is known for doing so, it is irresistible for counsel for the 
losing side to recommend such an appeal.605  The universal resolve of 
the losing party is to seek the proverbial “second bite of the apple.”606   
Researchers, in interviewing system participants of various states, 
including Michigan,607 Missouri,608 Oregon,609 and Virginia,610 over 
recent decades invariably received such reports.        
                                                          
604 Id. 
605 Comments of David Menchetti, Esq. to Author (Nov. 28, 2011) (on file 
with Author) (indicating that with de novo review from Arbitrator to Commission 
in Illinois, a lawyer’s instinct is to seek review); Comments of Kim Presbrey, Esq., 
Chicago, IL, to the Author (Nov. 28, 2011) (same). See also Malcom B. Parsons, 
The Substantial Evidence Rule in Florida Administrative Law, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 
481, 518 (1953) (“[T]he sheer volume of appellate cases in Florida is greatest in 
those procedural areas in which the substantial evidence rule has been so 
formulated as to foster the greatest likelihood of upsetting administrative findings, 
and that here the petitioners have usually not been individuals of limited means but 
rather corporations engaged in the transportation or insurance businesses.”). 
606 DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & CAROL A. TELLES, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION IN MISSOURI: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 70 (Workers 
Compensation Research Institute ed.,1993). 
607 HUNT, supra note 268, at 43 (referring to both the policymakers’ 
frustrations that, as of 1985, a “five-year backlog of cases” existed at the Appeal 
Board and the aggravating effect of de novo review which meant that “the loser at 
the hearing level could get another chance on appeal.”).      
608 BALLANTYNE, supra note 606, at 70. 
609 See BALLANTYNE, supra note 398.  
610 DUNCAN S. BALLANTYNE & CAROL A. TELLES, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION IN VIRGINIA: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 14 (Workers 
Compensation Research Institute ed., 1994). 
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WCRI researcher, Ballantyne, commenting on pre-reform 
Georgia practice, stated: 
 
A combination of factors account for the 46 percent 
rate of appeals to the board.  Insurers, attorneys, and 
board officials state that de novo review encourages 
appeals by permitting a “second bite of the apple”; an 
appeal stays the judge’s decision; there is little cost to 
appeal; and the outcomes suggest that there is a 
reasonable chance (thirty three percent) that appeal 
will result in a different outcome.611  
 
Further, with the availability of de novo review, some lawyers 
view the failure to seek such review as malpractice.612 
This phenomenon strongly suggests that where the 
commission lacks such power, and the WCJ is the final fact-finder, 
the losing party will be less likely to entertain and accept a 
recommendation for an appeal.  This dynamic may, however, be 
impacted if appeal results in an automatic stay.  
In any event, in Pennsylvania, where the WCJ is the final 
fact-finder, counsel for the losing party usually counsels the client 
against an appeal when the loss has turned on a negative credibility 
determination.613  This is because the law establishing the 
Pennsylvania WCJ as the final fact-finder has been around for 
decades, and the Pennsylvania Appeal Board is obedient to that rule 
and ignores demands that credibility be reassessed.614  Appeal rates 
from Pennsylvania WCJ awards are minimal and reversals on 
credibility are unheard of.615  WCRI researcher Peter Barth made a 
similar finding in his 1987 study of the Connecticut system:  
                                                          
 
611 BALLANTYNE, supra note 425, at 73.   
612 Comments from Frank Gallucci, Esq. to Author (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file 
with Author) (stating also that in light of the successive levels of de novo review in 
Ohio, “If there’s denial on it, my staff knows to appeal.”).   
613 Comments to the Author of Barbara E. Holmes, Esq. (April 16, 2012) 
(on file with Author).  
614 This statement is based on the Author’s experience.  
615 The Author has been a Pennsylvania WCJ since 1993, and he has been 
reversed by the Appeal Board on credibility grounds only once during that period.  




Few appeals are successful. . . .  Many denials of 
appeals have been based on the CRD’s [viz., 
Compensation Review Division’s] consistent position 
that a commissioner’s conclusion cannot be reviewed 
when it rests on the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses.  This view, perhaps in 
conjunction with the low rate of success, largely 
explains the small number of appeals to the CRD.616 
 
Perhaps Georgia practice may be contrasted.  There, the ALJ 
of the Georgia Board is not the final fact-finder. 617  Upon the losing 
party’s appeal, the three-member Board of the Appellate Division, 
though not undertaking de novo review, may reassess credibility.618  
According to the Chief ALJ, in a recent year, 800 final decisions 
were issued and a full 689 were subject to an appeal to the Appellate 
Division.619  (Most decisions were ultimately affirmed.  Still, it is not 
unheard of for the well-regarded Georgia Board to reassess the 
facts.)620  
The most prominent example of streamlining adjudication 
through reform is, of course, the abolition of the Texas trial de novo 
procedure.621  Investing the Hearing Officer’s decision with finality, 
and restricting the availability of trial, eliminated the acute litigation 
crisis in the Texas system.622     
                                                          
On that occasion, the writer had awarded benefits to a claimant, and the 
Commonwealth Court, on the worker’s further appeal, restored the award.   
616 PETER S. BARTH, supra note 22, at 24. 
617 See supra Section VI(B). 
618 See id.  At the Appellate Division, the award of the ALJ must be 
upheld if supported by the law, and by a preponderance of the evidence. GA. CODE 
ANN. § 34-9-103 (2011).   
619 Hon. Melodie Belcher, Chief ALJ, Remarks at the National 
Association of Workers’ Compensation Judiciary College Comparative Law Panel 
(Aug. 22, 2011).     
620 See supra Section VI(B).   
621 See supra Section V.   
622 See supra Section V(F).  As discussed above, eliminating the jury trial 
de novo in Texas was intended to address a litigation crisis.  See id.  Some critics 
have charged that the restrictions on attorney’s fees, when coupled with the 
limitations on trial remedies, has unfairly leveraged injured workers.  See id. 
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Making the WCJ the final fact-finder should also streamline 
dispute resolution by promoting voluntary settlement, compromise or 
otherwise, as early as possible during the litigation.  In general, of 
course, if both sides to a contested case possess a reasonable belief, 
or anxiety, that they may not prevail, they will likely be amenable to 
the idea of settlement.  If this risk of loss is one potentially to be dealt 
by a first-level WCJ whose critical findings are final, the likelihood 
of early willingness to consider voluntary settlement should be 
enhanced.623  This is so as no “second bite of the apple” – that is, 
commission reassessment of the facts – will be available to delay the 
voluntary settlement decision.  Under the Pennsylvania practice, this 
assertion seems to be borne out.  The parties are much more likely to 
want to enter into a compromise settlement before the WCJ makes 
his or her ruling than after the same – that is, while the losing side’s 
likely fruitless appeal to the Board is pending.    
The Author is not of the school that believes that every 
workers’ compensation case should be compromise-settled, and too 
many such settlements can and have subverted a workers’ 
compensation system.624  Still, many cases that are subject to a bona 
fide dispute can and should be settled as soon as possible.  Injecting 
finality into the initial fact-finding and adjudication should promote 
this goal.625   
 
                                                          
623 For a theoretical discussion of this phenomenon, see BALLANTYNE, 
supra note 30, at 29-30.  Among other things, the authors state:  
 
Economic theory gives us a fundamental insight into the decision 
to settle: The parties’ expectations about the outcome at formal 
hearing determine their willingness to settle. Two forces seem to 
be at work here. First, the higher expected cost of a formal 
hearing, the more likely the settlement. Second, the greater the 
disparity in the parties’ expectations, the more likely a formal 
hearing.  
  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
624 See Torrey, supra note 157, at 443-44 (pointing out negatives in the 
Pennsylvania C&R scheme).     
625 It is important to remember, however, that many factors go into the 
parties’ decision whether or not to settle and at what point to settle in the litigation 
process. 
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B.  Advantages in Making the WCJ the Fact-Finder 
 
The Florida and Arizona courts that ruled that the first-level 
compensation judge should be the final arbiter of credibility did so, in 
part, based on the reasoning that it was the judge, not some remote 
board, that actually saw and heard the witnesses.626  Of course, this 
preference finds its heritage in the common law, which generally 
calls for deference to the fact-findings of the individual who heard 
the witnesses and assessed their demeanor.627  This factor endures as 
an additional benefit of investing the WCJ with final fact-finding 
authority.   Having the WCJ as final fact-finder should, in short, 
enhance the accuracy of decision-making.628   
To this Author, two values – efficiency and accuracy – are the 
most powerful arguments for making the WCJ the final fact-finder.  
Two further arguments, however, exist in favor of investing the judge 
with this power.  These are the values of independence in the judging 
process and promoting transparency and fairness.  The Author has 
discussed the efficiency value above.  The values of accuracy, 
independence, and transparency are discussed below.       
 
1. Finality and Accuracy in Decision-making 
 
Courts reviewing workers’ compensation cases have endorsed the 
common-law view629 that the credibility determinations of the first-
                                                          
626 See supra Section V(D).    
627 Timony, supra note 8, at 903.  See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. 
at 496 (indicating that an agency, though not bound by ALJ decision, should not 
ignore the findings of fact and credibility determinations contained in initial federal 
ALJ order).  
628 See generally Rossi, supra note 603, at 6 (identifying accuracy as a 
benefit of ALJ adjudicatory finality).  
629 Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 872 (2nd Cir. 1949) (“Trial on oral 
testimony, with the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses in open 
court, has often been acclaimed as one of the persistent, distinctive, and most 
valuable features of the common-law system . . . . For only in such a trial can the 
trier of the facts (trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses’ demeanor; and that 
demeanor – absent, of course, when trial is by affidavit or deposition –  is 
recognized as an important clue to witness’ credibility.”).   
For a tour de force treatment of the importance of demeanor evidence, see 
James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U.L. REV. 903 (2000). The 
author questioned the ability of the district court judge to reverse the credibility 
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level hearing officer should be accorded deference, if not finality.  
This is so because of the WCJ’s advantage of having seen and heard 
the witnesses.  To so venture in the workers’ compensation context 
was unremarkable even in the 1930s.630   
 
As a 1966 Arizona court declared, in holding that the WCJ 
was the final fact-finder: 
 
It is the referee who hears the testimony, observes the 
demeanor of the petitioner, and is best able to judge 
the reliability and credibility of the witnesses who 
have testified at the hearing.  Absent testimony before 
them, the Industrial Commission in reviewing the 
hearings before the referee, is in the same position as 
an appellate court in that both the Commission and the 
appellate court must evaluate the evidence from the 
record presented.631  
 
                                                          
determinations of  a federal magistrate.  This is a “more dubious exception to the 
modern trend of live testimony . . . ”  He noted the Supreme Court’s comment that 
a “district court’s reversal of those findings that are based upon the magistrate’s 
observation of the witness’s demeanor ‘could well give rise to serious questions’ of 
due process.”  United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).   See also Note, 
Replacing Finders of Fact – Judge, Juror, Administrative Hearing Officer, 68 
COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1968).     
630 See  CAMPBELL, supra note 95, at 970 (1935) (“It is the most trite of all 
observations that the impression received by one who has presided at the trial . . . 
may be altogether different from that received by one from a mere perusal of a 
transcript and a record of the trial . . . . [The] trial court. . . is thus in a  better 
position to pass upon the weight or sufficiency of the evidence.”).    
631 Powell v. Indus. Comm’n, 418 P.2d 602, 606 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966), 
reversed, 423 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1967).  The Court of Appeals’ decision was, after 
reversal, ratified by the legislature, and the above declaration is now in the law.  
See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (U.S. 1951) (indicating 
that an agency should not ignore the findings of fact and credibility determinations 
contained in an initial federal ALJ order).  
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Perhaps it was on this reasoning that the National 
Commission, in its 1972 report, admonished that the “decision of the 
hearing examiner. . . should be presumed correct . . . .632   
Many further articulations of this benefit may be found in 
court precedent.  A leading New Mexico court opined, in this regard:   
 
An appellate court does not observe the demeanor of 
live witnesses, cannot see a shift of the eyes, sweat, a 
squirm, a tear, a facial expression, or take notice of 
other signs that may mean the difference between 
truth and falsehood to the fact finder. Even an 
inflection in the voice can make a difference in the 
meaning. The sentence, “She never said she missed 
him,” is susceptible of six different meanings, 
depending on which word is emphasized.633 
 
It is not only demeanor that supports the common-law view.  
“A live witness, facing a possible attack on his credibility, serves two 
significant purposes.  First, the trier of fact can observe the witness’s 
demeanor, and second, he can inspire the witness to testify truthfully 
to ‘ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding process.’”634  This may 
be called the “deterrent effect” of live testimony, “as it may prevent 
the dishonest witness from testifying untruthfully, and thus, increases 
the acceptability of trial outcomes.”635   
Of interest are the rulings of Pennsylvania courts.  In this 
regard, no constitutional mandate exists that the fact-finder must 
personally see and hear the witness in every administrative law 
case.636  However, in a workers’ compensation case, if a party seeks 
                                                          
632 NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMP. LAWS, THE REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS108 
(1972). 
633 Tallman v. ABF, 767 P.2d 363, 366 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).  
634 Timony, supra note 8, at 918 (quotation omitted).  
635  Id. at 933. 
636 Peak v. Unemployment Comp’n Bd. Rev., 501 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1985).  
In this case, the claimant contended that “an administrative decision based on . . . a 
[transcript only] finding is arbitrary governmental action in violation of due process 
. . . .”  Id. at 1385  The claimant advanced “the proposition that the legislature can 
constitutionally entrust an administrative power to find facts resolving conflicting 
evidence on grounds of credibility only to the board or official who conducts the 
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cross-examination of a witness, he or she is entitled to have the WCJ 
be present.  The judge may not oblige the parties to take 
depositions.637  
Not all are, however, convinced that assessment of witness 
credibility is dispositive of the issue of whether the ALJ should be 
the final arbiter of credibility: 
 
[One] study  . . . raises questions about the principal 
advantage of ALJs, often cited in support of their final 
order authority in either limited or full form, the ALJ’s 
presence during the witnesses’ testimony.  While 
intuition suggests that the person who hears the 
witness testify is in a better position to judge 
credibility, the results of cases reviewed on appeal in 
North Carolina do not support it.  ALJ 
recommendations (presumably based in part on 
credibility determinations) are affirmed at about the 
same rate as agency decisions, even when the key 
issue is one of fact.  This is consistent with research 
that establishes that viewing the appearance and 
demeanor of the witness does not improve the fact 
finder’s ability to identify deception on the stand . . . . 
Moreover, any advantage derived from hearing the 
witness relates primarily to “adjudicative” facts of 
who, what, when, and where.  Demeanor evidence is 
less likely to be persuasive when expert testimony is 
at issue.638 
                                                          
hearing at which the record is made . . . .”  Id.  The court rejected this argument.  If 
the UCBR provides some level of reasons for its decision, thus accommodating 
substantial evidence review, due process is afforded; no constitutional right exists 
to have one’s property rights determined by a fact-finder who has actually seen and 
heard the testimony.  Indeed, such is not required by the federal Administrative 
Procedures Act.  In so ruling, the court limited the import of another precedent.  
See Treon v. Unemployment Comp’n Bd. Rev.,  453 A.2d 960 (Pa. 1982).  
637 Otis Elevators v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harding), 651 A.2d 667 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).  See TORREY, supra note 70, § 13:103.   
638 Flanagan, supra note 16, at 1397 (citing, among other things, Gregory 
L. Ogden, The Role of Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses 
in Fact Finding: The Views of ALJs, 20 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 




These are thoughtful comments.  And, of course, with regard 
to expert medical testimony, many courts put them into practice.639  
Further, other factors like plausibility, corroboration, consistency, 
and lack of secondary motivations, all of which can be gained by a 
cold record, can be critical to the final credibility determination.640 
Still, it is difficult to conceptualize the increasingly remote 
commission being in a better position than the WCJ to judge 
credibility in workers’ compensation cases.  Even those content with 
appellate panel reassessments of credibility will allow as a fiction the 
idea that an absent party can accurately judge lay witness credibility. 
The superiority of judge finality is especially manifest in 
workers’ compensation cases.  The omnipresent issue is, after all, the 
presence or absence of pain and impairment and the consequent 
alleged inability to work.  Determinations on these issues are, by 
their very nature, dependent on direct interface with the injured 
worker.  Many, if not most, contested cases deal with subjective 
factors that are resistant to determination from transcripts.           
Further, under the Pennsylvania practice, and those of a 
number of states,641 the WCJ actually encounters the claimant – and 
on occasion other critical witnesses – in a series of hearings.  The 
WCJ gains a benefit from this process: the opportunity to see and 
hear the witnesses on a number of occasions.  The benefit accrues 
because the witness’ testimony at an initial hearing may well be 
coached, whereas at a subsequent meeting he or she may be more 
natural.  By the third and final hearing, an insincere witness may 
have totally “forgotten the script” and the WCJ may then be 
presented with a more truthful picture of the events in question.  This 
“re-evaluative,” live, fact-finding experience, cannot be replicated by 
review of a cold record.  The Author has defended this series of 
                                                          
(2000) (finding that state ALJs do not rely on demeanor evidence)) (citation 
omitted).    
639 See supra Section VII(B).   
640 See generally John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LITIGATION No. 3, 
A.B.A. Spring, 2007, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/abapubs/lrc/pdfs/kane.pdf.   
641 BALLANTYNE, supra note 18, at 50 (identifying fifteen jurisdictions 
“that typically hold multiple formal hearing sessions.”).  
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hearings642 against the reasonable charge that, if not tightly 
administered, the procedure can lead to delay and excessive attorney 
costs.  “The only gift the killer Time bestows,” however, “is to allow 
us to see, on later viewings, what it was that we missed the first time 
around.”643  The WCJ, in short, lives with his or her cases,644 and is 
in the best position to find the facts.   
 
2. Assuring Independence in Fact-Finding 
 
“The banners of judicial dignity,” it has been said, are the 
related principles of independence and impartiality.645  These values 
could be enhanced by making the WCJ the final fact-finder.  If a 
system removes the fact-finding task from a politically-appointed 
commission, and places the responsibility with an independent, 
professional judge, any inappropriate politics in the adjudication 
process should be ameliorated.    
In the workers’ compensation context, the traditional 
independence concern has been that executive branch officials, lobby 
groups, or individuals, will try to pressure commissions or judges to 
make findings or legal conclusions in some particular way, to in turn 
vindicate some internal or external goal.  Such efforts deprive the 
fact-finder of “decisional” independence,646 and certainly the 
commission or ALJ that rolls over in the face of such pressure will 
commit an ethical violation.  The traditional impartiality concern, 
                                                          
642 TORREY, supra note 70, § 13:124.         
643 GORE VIDAL, PALIMPSEST 578-79 (1995) (invoking Proust).     
644 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).  
645 Symposium, Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial 
Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts,  25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 715 
(1997) (“The independence of the judiciary ensures the rule of law, and ensures 
that validly enacted laws are enforced and given their full scope.  If judges 
implement an agenda, pursuant to legislative or other lobbying, the result would be 
“to substitute political will for the rule of law.”).  See also John L. Gedid, ALJ 
Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33 (2002).  
646 See Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp.2d 722, 725 (E.D. Ark. 1999).  In 
this case, an Arkansas workers’ compensation ALJ was fired by the Commission, 
and she alleged “that her exercise of quasi-judicial independence and impartiality, 
as reflected in her written opinions, caused her to be discharged.”  Id.  According to 
the federal court, “This case . . . plainly involves quasi-judicial ‘decisional 
independence.’”  Id. at 724-25. 
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meanwhile, has been that a judge or commissioner will find facts one 
way or the other because of politically-motivated factors or other 
bias.  Iowa system participants, for example, told a WCRI researcher 
in 2004 “that the politically appointed appellate person (the division 
commissioner) can influence the value of cases depending in the 
leanings of the appointing governor.”647      
Of course, no adjudicatory system can possess or maintain its 
integrity without a commitment to the values of independence and 
impartiality.648  A distinguished Colorado ALJ admonishes, “The 
decisional independence of judges, including judges of the 
administrative law judiciary, is the cornerstone of our constitutional 
separation of powers….” “The administrative law judge’s obligation 
to be decisionally independent,” he posits, “is the same as the 
obligation of a judicial branch judge.”649  This is certainly the case in 
workers’ compensation adjudication.  To recall Larson’s admonition, 
the commission “while deciding controverted claims . . .  is as far 
toward the judicial end of the spectrum as it is possible to go without 
being an outright court.”650    
Under many administrative structures, the commission is by 
design a political entity.651  In theory, the commission knows that, 
when sitting as fact-finder in a contested case, its political role is set 
aside.  It becomes an impartial fact-finder no less than the common 
pleas court.  Still, experience suggests that commissions can be 
                                                          
647BALLANTYNE, supra note 374, at 92. 
648 Judicial ethics codes invariably admonish that the ALJ is to preserve 
judicial independence.  The Ethics Code of the Pennsylvania Workers’ 
Compensation Act, for example, mandates, in a hortatory tone, “A workers’ 
compensation judge shall . . . (13) Uphold the integrity and independence of the 
workers’ compensation system.” 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2504(13).   
649 Edwin L. Felter, Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary: 
The Right and Wrong Kind, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 157, 162 (2008).  See also 
generally Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision 
Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 
25 J. NAT’L ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2005).       
650 LARSON,  supra note 1, § 79:90.    
651 See, e.g., Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Mich. Dept. of Labor, 384 
N.W.2d 728, 749 (Mich. 1986)  (“Members of boards and commissions are 
generally appointed by the Governor and sometimes by the Legislature. The 
members are accountable only to the appointing authority . . . .”).   
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subject to external pressures or, of their own accord, act politically in 
the judging process. 
The issue is a delicate one.  In a renowned Michigan episode 
of the 1980s, for example, civil service-protected referees, who had 
been dismissed from their employment, sued for their jobs.  They 
alleged that it was unlawful, as injecting politics into the fact-finding 
process, for the legislature to substitute in their place a “Board of 
Magistrates,” who were subject to political appointment and time-
limited terms.  The court, in a bit of irony, held that it was in fact 
unremarkable for someone in the position of judge to be subject to 
political accountability.  The court, indeed, found that the enhanced 
fact-finding authority of the Magistrate, one of the innovations of the 
1983 amendments, argued for further political accountability: 
 
The legislative decision to constitute persons whose 
decisions have that importance as members of a board 
or commission who serve by gubernatorial 
appointment for fixed terms for the purpose of 
removing them from civil service and subjecting their 
appointment and retention to the political process is 
entirely consistent with constitutional principles that 
contemplate that persons exercising certain kinds of 
power shall or may be made politically accountable.  
That legislative decision making workers’ 
compensation hearing officers more accountable in the 
political process was made in conjunction with the 
legislative decision to make their decisions more final 
and hence more important.652 
 
  In any event, a rare public example of a threat to 
independence – admirably resisted – occurred in South Carolina.  
There, pro-business reforms had failed to enact strict adherence to the 
AMA Guides by the South Carolina commissioners.653  Instead, the 
commissioners were not prohibited from considering other factors to 
                                                          
652 Id.    
653 Governor says order did not change law on awarding disability 
benefits, RISK AND INSURANCE ONLINE (Nov. 6, 2007), 
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=152421737.   
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potentially increase an award.654  The Governor, however, in 2007 
issued an order to the commissioners “in all contested cases to 
strictly apply either [the] AMA Guides or any other accepted medical 
treatise or authority in making their injury compensation 
determinations . . . .”655  Many observers correctly viewed this 
directive, Executive Order 2007-16, to constitute an assault on the 
judicial independence of the commissioners.656  An attorney 
representing claimants filed a federal court lawsuit over the order.657  
And, in fact, the commissioners unanimously refused to comply with 
the order, replying that “it will continue to apply the standards set 
forth in the act, and that adjudications under the state comp system 
will be conducted with ‘impartiality, independence and in accord 
with law.’”658  A law professor, meanwhile, authored a deft criticism 
in the journal of the South Carolina Bar.659  Ultimately, the Governor 
abandoned his effort to leverage the commissioners to strictly apply 
                                                          
654 Id.   
655 31-10 S.C. Reg. 4 (Oct. 26, 2007).   
656 John Freeman, Ethics Watch: Executive Order 2007-16, 19 SOUTH 
CAROLINA LAWYER 8 (November 2007).   
657 Monaco v. South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission, No. 
6:07-cv-4150-GRA, 2008 WL 163059 (D.S.C. Jan. 15, 2008).   
658 Id.    
659 John Freeman, Ethics Watch: Executive Order 2007-16, 19 S.C. 
LAWYER 8 (Nov. 2007): 
  
[I]f the Order’s intent is to pressure or intimidate the 
commissioners as judges hearing public legal disputes, then it is a 
most disturbing document.  People who are involved in the 
administration of justice are not to be threatened.  This is central 
to having a nation that operates under a credible rule of law. . . . 
If the Order’s intent was to pressure commissioners – that is, 
judges – to change the law quietly on a case-by-case basis out of 
fear for their jobs, it would represent conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and would be highly improper if not 
illegal. . . .    
   
An attempt to change existing law by executive order puts the 
commissioners in an untenable ethical position, for it asks them 
to forsake their obligation to follow the law, which they are 
sworn to do, and move in another direction, which for them is 
unethical territory.     
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the AMA Guides and he agreed that he did not have the authority to 
do so.660  
This South Carolina episode was a rare public exposition of 
politics and the politically-appointed commission.  The more 
common charge is that the proclivities of the commission members 
have caused them to rule, upon appeal of the WCJ’s decision, in a 
pre-conceived or otherwise biased manner.661  As noted above, for 
example, members of the claimants’ bar insist that the Mississippi 
Commission is biased in favor of the employers’ side.662  A similar 
assertion was made by an Arkansas claimants’ attorney, who filed a 
legal ethics complaint against two Arkansas Commission members, 
claiming that they and other commission officials were “excessively 
pro-employer and [were] trying to drive him out of workers comp 
practice.”663  
The superior design would also feature the final fact-finder 
WCJ being invested with employment protections.  Every judge can 
and should be accountable in terms of ethics, skill, and 
productivity.664  Still, via employment protections, he or she can 
exercise the fact-finding function unconcerned about discharge or 
discipline by a politically-motivated agency displeased with his or 
her decisions.665   
                                                          
 
Id.  
660 Governor drops move to require comp commission to accept new 
standards, RISK AND INSURANCE ONLINE (Aug. 26, 
2008),http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=144386416 (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2012); Governor Comes Around to Commission’s View, WORKERS’ COMP 
NEWS (Summer 2008), http://www.scselfinsurers.com/newsletters/2008-
summer.pdf. 
661 See discussion supra Section VI (preliminary comments).   
662  Id.  
663 Doug Smith & Max Brantley, Lawyer Files Ethics Complaint Against 
Workers Comp Commission, Arkansas Times, Apr. 7, 2005, 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/lawyer-files-ethics-complaint-against-workers-
comp-commission/Content?oid=868487.  
664 See infra Section IX(C)(1).  
665  See generally Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark. 
1999).  In this case, an Arkansas ALJ was fired by the Commission, and she 
alleged “that her exercise of quasi-judicial independence and impartiality, as 
reflected in her written opinions, caused her to be discharged.”  Id. at 724.  
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The most familiar device is, as discussed above, the creation 
of a “central panel” of executive branch judges that is independent of 
the various agencies of state government and, hence, free of the 
political pressures that may exist within the agency.666  As noted 
above, workers’ compensation adjudicators have not typically been 
included in a central panel.667  The states of Colorado, Michigan (a 
recent development), Minnesota, and Wyoming are notable 
exceptions.668 
An approach in lieu of a central panel is erection of a 
“firewall” in the state agency between administration and 
adjudication.669  In a 1996 Pennsylvania reform, for example, the 
legislature established within the Department of Labor & Industry an 
“Office of Adjudication” that operates separately from the “Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation.”670  The latter is responsible for 
enforcing the statute, providing oversight, and executing policy, 
while the former is responsible for mediation and adjudication.   
 
3. Promoting Transparency 
 
The transparency of the workers’ compensation process, that 
is, its “openness and comprehensibility,”671 is promoted by having 
the WCJ as the fact-finder.  Certainly this is so for the injured 
                                                          
666 Edwin L. Felter, Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 
53 ADMIN. L.  REV. 403 (2001) (arguing for central panels, and enumerating things 
the legislature can do to ensure ALJ independence); Julian Mann, III, 
Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 
1641 (2001) (explaining that the North Carolina “Office of Administrative 
Hearings is established to ensure that administrative decisions are made in a fair 
and impartial manner to protect the due process rights of citizens who challenge 
administrative action and to provide a source of independent administrative law 
judges to conduct administrative hearings in contested cases  . . . and thereby 
prevent the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the 
administrative process.”).    
667 See id.   
668 See supra Section V(A).    
669 See generally Jeff Bush & Kristal Wiitala Knutson, The Building and 
Maintenance of “Ethics Walls” in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2004).   
670 See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501-2502.  
671 MASHAW, supra note 24, at 90.  
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workers and employers that are the parties to the contested case.672  
For most people, it is counterintuitive to believe that someone 
reading a cold transcript can do better at finding the facts than the 
judge who sat through the testimony.  “[P]ersonal contact between 
fact finders and witnesses is deeply ingrained in the American legal 
system,”673 but such contact is also an expectation in a society where 
citizens take their rights seriously.  
Adjudication based on live testimony of witnesses is also 
important in engendering confidence in the public about adjudication.  
“The function of a trial,” after all: 
 
is not only to ensure the correct and just resolution of 
a dispute, but to serve as a substitute for self-help so 
that the government may maintain its monopoly on the 
use of force.  A trial serves this function best to the 
extent it satisfies the expectations of the litigants 
involved.  Thus the appearance of scrupulous fairness 
may be as important as fairness itself and a litigant 
may consider a trial more fairly conducted where the 
judge who hears the evidence also makes the 
decision.674 
 
 The idea that a board or commission far removed, physically 
and temporally, from the trial can overthrow the fact findings of the 
same surely strikes the layman as strange.  It is an unfair cliché to 
posit that workers’ compensation proceedings are Kafkaesque.  
However, if in so saying we mean that an individual may begin “to 
see himself as an object, susceptible to infinite manipulation by ‘the 
system,’”675 proceedings involving de novo review seem to fit the 
bill.   
 
                                                          
672 See id.   
673  Neil Fox, Telephonic Hearings in Welfare Appeals: How Much 
Process is Due?, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 453 (1984) (rejecting idea that 
telephone hearings are sufficient to protect due process, asserting that credibility 
cannot be assessed over the phone).   
674 Note, Replacing Finders of Fact – Judge, Juror, Administrative 
Hearing Officer, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1325-26 (1968).  
675 MASHAW, supra note 24, at 91. 
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C.  The Challenge of Making the WCJ the Fact-Finder: 
Accountability 
 
A significant challenge, judge accountability, accompanies 
investing a single individual with the extraordinary authority of final 
fact-finding.  A number of approaches to ensuring accountability 
exist and have been discussed at length in the legal literature.676   
 
1. Accountability via Hiring Assessment, Performance Evaluation, 
and Ethical Codes 
 
The traditional method of assuring judicial accountability is, 
of course, the appeal.677  Many commentators, however, have 
pointed out that in “mass justice” programs presided over by 
administrative agency personnel, appellate review alone is not 
sufficient to satisfy the accountability goal.678  The first additional 
                                                          
676 The Author, notably, is routinely subject to efforts at ensuring his 
accountability.  These include (1) the import of an aggrieved party’s appeal – or the 
prospect of the same; (2) an initial employment interview to determine the potential 
for impartiality and even temperament; (3) ongoing yearly performance 
evaluations; (4) evaluation by the local bar association; (5) compliance with the 
Pennsylvania Act’s requirements for continuing education in the field; and (6) 
fidelity to the law’s ethical code.  
677 Assuring accountability is addressed, of course, via diligent 
employment by intra-agency and judicial review of the substantial evidence, whole 
record, and “clearly erroneous” standards of review.  See Rossi, supra note 603, at 
12 (“properly applied, standards of review can restore the constitutional balance 
that may be lost by the increasing trend towards ALJ final order authority.”).  
LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[6] et seq.) (identifying various formulations 
applied in workers’ compensation statutes).  
678 This assertion is a major proposition of the classic article by social 
insurance scholar Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some 
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and 
Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 
(1974).  The article focuses on processes such as first-level examiner review of 
SSDI and other claims, but the analysis transfers to the present context.  Among 
other things, Mashaw states that:  
 
the elements of fairness or fair procedure normally associated 
with due process of law in adjudicatory proceedings are 
inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claims 
adjudications.  Due process in the social welfare context therefore 
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approach is to ensure at the outset that the potential judge is one of 
high caliber.  As Justice Frankfurter commented in precisely this 
context, “The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any [appellate 
review] standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and 
the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its 
work.”679 
Toward this end, the potential judge must be of such a 
personal disposition, that is, temperament, that he or she can be 
trusted to treat the parties in an impartial manner.  It is critical that a 
candidate hired for a WCJ position can preside over contested case 
proceedings in a professional manner that will instill in the parties a 
feeling that they are being treated fairly.680   An individual invested 
with final fact-finding power in cases that involve both sensitive 
personal issues and large amounts of money must possess these 
qualities.  
Another approach is for the judge’s administrative superiors 
to annually assess performance in a corporate-style employee 
performance evaluation.681  Under the Pennsylvania Act, authority 
                                                          
requires redefinition to include management processes which will 
tend to assure the accuracy of claims adjudications.  
 
Id. at 775.  Those attributes include “specific notice of adverse factual and legal 
claims, opportunity to produce testimony and argue orally, opportunity to cross-
examine adverse witnesses, a neutral adjudicator, [and] a decision based wholly 
upon the evidentiary record compiled.” Id.  See also Koch, supra note 3, at 284 
(1994).  
679 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).  Under 
the Michigan reforms of 1985, the legislature sought to professionalize the process.  
The Michigan Act provides for magistrates’ written exams, interviews of 
magistrate candidates, and the criteria of evaluating the performance of magistrates.  
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.210; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.212.  See generally 
Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Mich. Dept. of Labor, 384 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Mich. 
1986).   
680 See generally Koch, supra note 3, at 295 (“The way one approaches the 
process of judging irrevocably affects the fairness and accuracy of the ultimate 
determination . . . The selection process must be made sensitive to behavior and 
personality factors . . . .”).   
681 See Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence 
by use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB.  L. J. 1053 (2002).  
The Model State Administrative Procedures Act, notably, supplies the Office of 
Administrative Hearings with the power “to establish standards and procedures for 
the evaluation, training, promotion, and discipline of administrative law judges . . .”  
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for such assessments was, as an example, added to the law as part of 
1996 reforms which sought to fully professionalize the WCJ corps.682  
Under this EPR process, judges are rated annually on the criteria of 
job knowledge and skills, work results (which would cover such 
things as the ability to be impartial), effective communication, 
“initiative/problem solving,” interpersonal relations, and work 
habits.683  The evaluation is recorded on a general-use state form, and 
the judge’s administrative superior completes the form by reference 
to an extensive document, “Performance Expectations: Workers’ 
Compensation Judge.”684  This form categorizes performance into 
management of cases, conduct of hearing and ADR proceedings, 
issuance of decisions, and compliance with continuing education 
requirements. 
Another type of WCJ evaluation are those by bar associations 
and industry groups.  These have been undertaken in Pennsylvania 
and in Colorado (by the bar)685 and Montana (by industry),686 and 
certainly others.  In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (the City of 
Pittsburgh), the local bar developed a concern that a number of the 
WCJs displayed significant deficits in terms of legal skills, work 
ethic, and temperament.  The bar maintained a liaison committee 
through which lawyer complaints about judge performance could be 
communicated to the chief judge, but this effort had not unfolded 
with success.687  The bar felt that it had “no other outlet” to 
communicate its dissatisfaction, and in 2008 it included the eight 
                                                          
Model State Admin. Proceedures Act § 4-301(4) (1981). See also McNeil, supra 
note 101, at 539.   
682 See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2501(h).   
683 Pennsylvania WCJ Performance Evaluation (State Form) (completed 
sample on file with Author).   
684 “Performance Expectations” (on file with Author).   
685 See CAROL A. TELLES & SHAWN E. FOX, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 
COLORADO: ADMINISTRATIVE INVENTORY 5-6 (1996) (noting that ALJ’s had 
recently been rated by the bar on the following criteria: Judicial behavior; adequacy 
of preparation; knowledge of the law; compliance with the rules of evidence and 
procedure; and completeness and clarity of decisions).  
686 See MONTANA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE 2010 JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF THE MONTANA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT (2010), available at    
http://www.montanachamber.com/uploads/docs/Voting%20Review%202009/2010
%20Workers'%20Compensation%20Court%20Review.pdf.       
687 This statement is made based on the Author’s personal knowledge.   
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WCJ’s in its every-four-year Judicial Evaluation Survey.688  In the 
end, roughly ninety lawyers (presumably the workers’ compensation 
specialists) returned evaluations that rated the WCJs on the criteria of 
impartiality, legal ability, diligence, and temperament.689  
Pennsylvania Act amendments of 1996, meanwhile, 
established a statutory Code of Ethics applicable to WCJs.690  Such 
codes are common among state administrative law adjudicatory 
schemes, and prior to this 1996 change, indeed, an administratively-
imposed ethical code was in place in Pennsylvania.691  Imposition of 
and compliance with such codes are critical to ensure WCJ 
accountability, particularly those with final fact-finding authority.692   
 
2. Accountability via “Reasoned Decisions” and the Pennsylvania 
Experience 
 
A WCJ who is invested with final fact-finding power should 
be required to set forth reasons for his or her credibility 
determinations.693  As the social insurance scholar Jerry Mashaw 
                                                          
688 Comments of Christopher Wildfire, Esq., Pittsburgh, PA, to the Author 
(Aug. 9, 2011).  
689 ALLEGHENY COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 2008 JUDICIAL SURVEY (on 
file with the Author).  The Author is unaware of how the Commonwealth may have 
viewed and/or responded to these third-party evaluations.   
690 See 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2504.   
691 DAVID B. TORREY & ANDREW E. GREENBERG, PA. WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION: LAW & PRACTICE,  
§ 1:57 (Lawyers Cooperative 1st ed. 2000) (noting that the 1996 
amendment ultimately led to the early 2000 abolition of the 1994 Administrative 
Code ethical provisions).    
692 For the Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State ALJs, prepared by 
the NAALJ, see 
http://www.famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/Education/mcjcsalj.htm (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2011).  See generally Felter, supra note 649; Krent & DuVall, 
supra note 649; Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges: 
Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 
11 WID.  J.  PUB.  L. 7 (2002).   
693 See Stephen I. Richman, Reasoned Decisions In Workers’ 
Compensation Cases, 63 PA. BAR ASS’N QUARTERLY 32 (1992); Stephen I. 
Richman, Struggle for Reason and Accountability: Current Concepts of Causation, 
Aggravation and Substantial Evidence in Occupational Disease Claims, 90 DICK. 
L. REV. 363 (1985-1986).    
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asserts, the provision of reasons in an adjudication lends legitimacy 
to decision-making; indeed, “the discourse of whyness and of reason-
giving is more important [in administrative law] . . . than anywhere 
else in American law.”694  And, indeed, several state workers’ 
compensation acts have codified the rule that the WCJ must provide 
reasons for his or her decision.  Among these states are Michigan695 
and Nebraska.696   
In the present day, due process is the animating force that 
demands that administrative law adjudicators provide reasons for 
their decisions.  Still, in the workers’ compensation context the 
preferred method of adjudication has always been to accompany the 
award or denial with reasons.  One of the original Connecticut 
commissioners recommended, in 1915, a memorandum giving 
reasons for the decision.  He set forth this admonition, “however this 
may violate the injunction of Lord Mansfield to decide without 
giving reasons . . ..”  “The memoranda,” he added, perhaps 
                                                          
694 Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason 
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 18 (2001).  
A related method of assuring accountability is diligent employment by 
intra-agency and judicial review of the substantial evidence, whole record, and 
“clearly erroneous” standards of review.  See Rossi supra note 603, at 12 
(“properly applied, standards of review can restore the constitutional balance that 
may be lost by the increasing trend towards ALJ final order authority.”).  See 
LARSON, supra note 164, § 130.05[6] et seq. (identifying various formulations 
applied in workers’ compensation statutes).  
695 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.847 (providing that “the worker’s 
compensation magistrate, in addition to a written order, shall file a concise written 
opinion stating his or her reasoning for the order including any findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.”).  
696 Rule 11(A) of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court provides as 
follows:  
 
Reasoned Decisions. All parties are entitled to reasoned decisions 
which contain findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon 
the whole record which clearly and concisely state and explain 
the rationale for the decision so that all interested parties can 
determine why and how a particular result was reached. The 
judge shall specify the evidence upon which the judge relies. The 
decision shall provide the basis for a meaningful appellate 
review. 
 
NEB. WORKERS’ COMP. CT. R. 11(A). 
    
Spring 2012 Master or Chancellor?  179 
optimistically, “may furnish interesting household literature which 
will be read and possibly translated and often digested at leisure . . ..  
These memoranda are the media also of a good deal of good advice, 
often rather homiletic in its form of expression, to the parties whose 
interests are concerned.”697    
This proposition has been the subject of exhaustive review in 
the Pennsylvania system, where throughout the 1970s and 1980s a 
grave concern existed over cursory and unsatisfactory decision 
making by many workers’ compensation referees.  This concern went 
directly to the reality that fact-finders had been invested with 
considerable power and were not accountable for the decisions that 
they were making.  At least one lawyer, the indefatigable leader of 
the reform effort, was of the view that some referees were abusing 
their power, ignoring evidence and refusing to provide reasons for 
their decisions.698      
Under the resulting 1993 reform amendments, Section 422 of 
the Act was altered to read as follows: 
 
All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to 
a reasoned decision containing findings of fact and 
conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole 
which clearly and concisely states and explains the 
rationale for the decisions so that all can determine 
why and how a particular result was reached.  The 
workers’ compensation judge shall specify the 
evidence upon which the adjudicator relies in 
conformity with this section.  The adjudication shall 
provide the basis for a meaningful appellate review.699 
 
The foregoing language, notably, reflects the model statute 
proposed in 1992 by the International Association of Industrial 
                                                          
697 BRADBURY, supra note 14, at 977-78 (remarks of Commissioner 
George H. Beers).   
698 Comments of Stephen I. Richman, Esq., to the Author (Aug. 25, 2011) 
(on file with the Author).  See also Stephen I. Richman, Reasoned Decisions In 
Workers’ Compensation Cases, 63 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 32 (Jan. 1992).   
699 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 834 (West 2011).  
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Accident Boards and Commissions (IAIABC).700   
Critics of the workers’ compensation system were unhappy 
that the 1993 amendments did not lead to a regime of better fact-
finding and more rigorous review, and they called for further reform.  
The 1996 amendments added an additional clause to Section 422:  
 
When faced with conflicting evidence, the [WCJ] must 
adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or 
discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted 
evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an 
irrational reason; the [WCJ] must identify that 
evidence and explain adequately the reasons for its 
rejection.701 
 
These amendments have made a difference in the 
Pennsylvania practice.  WCJs in Pennsylvania who do not abide by 
the statute and fail to set forth reasons for their decisions will likely 
receive a remand from the Appeal Board or Commonwealth Court.702  
It is notable, however, that the state supreme court has not required 
the Pennsylvania WCJ to set forth specific reasons for crediting or 
discrediting a witness when he or she has actually observed the 
individual’s demeanor.  According to the Supreme Court, when the 
WCJ actually views the witness, a simple, fairly conclusory 
statement of credibility or non-credibility is sufficient.  With regard 
to expert depositions, however, and presumably depositions of 
others, some articulation of the bases of the credibility determinations 
must be set forth.703     
 
                                                          
700 Newsletter of American Bar Association, Tort & Insurance Practice 
Section, Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability Law Committee 20 
(Winter 1994). 
701 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 834. 
702 See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (UPS), 831 A.2d 
784 (Pa  Commw. Ct. 2003). 
703 Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transport), 828 A.2d 
1043 (Pa. 2003).  The dissent believed that all credibility determinations should be 
explained.  Id. at 1055 (Newman, J., concurring and dissenting).  For commentary, 
see Corey Iannacone, Reasoned Decisions Under the Workers' Compensation Act, 
14 WIDENER L.J. 691 (2005).     
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X.  CONCLUSION 
 
A process of evolutionary convergence has resulted in a 
major change in the role of the workers’ compensation judge.  To 
utilize the now familiar analogy, he or she effectively sits, in roughly 
half the states, not as special master but chancellor.704  Of some irony 
is that the Connecticut Supreme Court, writing in 1915, long ago 
endorsed such a scheme.  “If the Act permits each cause to be 
appealed and tried de novo . . . its objects will be defeated, and more 
delay, less certainty, and more expense will ensue to the claimant 
than with the single trial of the old method.”705 
The WCJ has ascended to such status in a number of large 
states, including Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania.706  Meanwhile, in many states where the commission 
remains the fact-finder, the WCJ’s fact-findings are normally 
accorded significant deference.707  These include such states as 
Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, and Virginia.  Even in a state like 
Arkansas, where the Commission is said to reassess credibility with 
some regularity, a justice has remarked upon the notable 
professionalization and “upgraded” status of the judges who hear 
workers’ compensation cases.  “The ALJ,” he admonished, “is no 
longer just an aide to the commission or a referee.”708   
As submitted above, the Author is persuaded that the values 
of efficiency, accuracy, independence of judging, and transparency 
make this development a positive one.  To so posit is neither bold nor 
exotic.  Chief Justice Hughes, in holding legitimate the Longshore 
Act’s federal Deputy Commissioner as final fact-finder, admonished 
in 1942, “To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose 
of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and 
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact 
                                                          
704 See supra Section I (quick reference table categorizing states).  
705 Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 93 A. 245, 248 (Conn. 1915) (ratifying 
statutory scheme under which adjudication of single commissioner was final as to 
the facts, without review of same on direct appeal to superior court).   
706 See supra Sections V(D), V(E).   
707 See supra Section VI(A).     
708 Webb v. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 733 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ark. 1987).   
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which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an 
administrative agency especially assigned to that task . . . .”709   
Of note is that while the Author has used the phrase “trend” in 
this article, the gravitation seems to have subsided.  The Author’s 
research does not reveal a change to any major system since West 
Virginia’s amendments in 1995.710  This phenomenon is likely to be 
explained in part because of the coextensive relenting of the worst of 
the cost and litigation crises that unfolded in the wake of post-
National Commission reforms.711   
It is a cliché to posit that with significant power comes great 
responsibility.  Still, the aphorism is applicable in this context.  The 
WCJ should be made the fact-finder, but an appropriate structure 
must be in place to ensure accountability.  “Every legal system,” after 
all, “strives to meet the dual goals of efficiency and fairness.  The 
problem is, of course, that efficiency – quick and sure resolution of 
claims and disputes – does not always serve the interests of 
fairness.”712 
The reader may recall, in this vein, the unique Pennsylvania 
experience, where the WCJ in 1972 was made final fact-finder and at 
once accorded broad civil service protections.  These positive 
developments took the politics out of judging, but a pattern of abuse 
in many regions developed relative to the fact-finding process. This 
pattern of abuse engendered public and lawyerly distrust of the 
                                                          
709 Crowell v. Benson, 52 S. Ct. 285, 291, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (U.S. 1942).     
710 According to the Author’s research, Alaska did create, for the first-
time, intra-agency review in 2005.   
711 See Barry Lipton & Karen Ayres, Workers’ Compensation Cost 
Drivers Through the Years, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: WHERE HAVE WE COME 
FROM? WHERE ARE WE GOING? 21 (R. Victor & L. Carrubba, eds., WCRI 2010) 
(addressing costs and referring to 1985 to 1990 as the “Meltdown”; 1991 to 1994 as 
“Reform”; and 1991 to 2001 as “The Cycle Bottoms Out”).  
712 Emily Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers’ Compensation Reform: 
A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Legislation,  98 
W. VA. L. REV. 23, 161 (1995) (continuing on to posit that “[f]airness requires time 
and resources which provide the litigants an opportunity to be heard on issues of 
fact and law; fairness also requires attentiveness to maintaining equal access to 
justice for all litigants.”).  
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system.713  In response, an advocacy developed that would once 
again restrict WCJ authority and invest intra-agency review with 
enhanced power.  As recounted above, this advocacy in the end 
produced the requirement of reasoned decisions, an accountability 
innovation with teeth that has improved adjudication in the state.   
This innovation was and is entirely appropriate.  The fact-
finding process is of immense, even pivotal, importance in the 
process of adjudication.  As an early treatise writer, who was also a 
California workers’ compensation referee, posited, “the power to 

























                                                          
713 See Stephen I. Richman, Struggle for Reason and Accountability: 
Current Concepts of Causation, Aggravation and Substantial Evidence in 
Occupational Disease Claims, 90 DICK. L. REV. 363 (1985-1986).    
714 CAMPBELL, supra note 95, at 1365.    
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XI.  APPENDICES 
 
A.  Table 1: Title, Power, Process 
 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND ADJUDICATORY POWER 
FIFTY STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LHWCA (2012) 
 (“WC” = Workers’ Compensation)  












Structure, Adjudication & 
Appeal,  
with Judicial Standard of 
Review  
of Fact-Findings Reference   
(Note: All appellate courts 
review for error of law) 
Alabama Trial Judge of the 
County Circuit 
Court 
Yes WC cases litigated in civil court; 
appeal to Court of Civil Appeals 
and then, with permission, to 
state supreme court, where 
review is substantial evidence.  
See Ex parte Hayes, 70 So. 3d 
1211 (Ala. 2011). 
Alaska WC Board of 
Dept. of Labor & 
Workforce 
Development716 
Yes WC cases litigated before WC 
Board.  Since 2005, decisions of 
the Board appealed to the Alaska 
WC Appeals Commission (Board 
remains final fact-finder); judicial 
review in Alaska Supreme Court, 
where review is substantial 
evidence.  Lewis-Walunga v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 249 
P.3d 1063 (Alaska 2011).   
Arizona  ALJ of the 
Industrial 
Commission 
Yes WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
with right to an essential 
reconsideration before same 
ALJ;717 direct appeal to Court of 
Appeals (no intra-agency 
                                                          
715 Workers’ Compensation Judge, Pennsylvania Department of Labor & 
Industry, Pittsburgh, PA.  Contact: dtorrey@pa.gov.       
716 Alaska: Two members of a quasi-judicial hearing panel of the Alaska 
WC Board constitute a quorum for taking action on a disputed benefits claim. 
717 Arizona: For a description of this process, authored by the Chief ALJ, 
see p.8, Indus. Comm’n of Arizona, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, available at  
http://www.ica.state.az.us/Commissioners/Forms/2009AnnualReport.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2011).   
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review); appeal thereafter to state 
supreme court.  Court of Appeals 
shows deference to Industrial 
Commission fact-findings.  
Stewart v. Indus. Comm’n, 2011 
Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 756 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). 
Arkansas ALJ of the WC 
Commission 
No WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
with appeal to full WC 
Commission, which undertakes 
de novo review and is final fact-
finder; judicial review in Court of 
Appeals and thereafter, with 
permission, in state supreme 
court.  Review is substantial 
evidence.  Hudak-Lee v. Baxter 
County Reg'l Hosp. & Risk 
Mgmt. Res., 2011 Ark. LEXIS 31 
(Ark. 2011).     
California WCJ of the WC 
Appeals Board  
No WC cases litigated before WCJ, 
with appeal to the WC Appeals 
Board, which may reweigh the 
evidence.  Appeal thereafter is to 
Court of Appeals and, thereafter, 
with permission, to state supreme 
court.  Review is “substantial 
evidence in light of the entire 
record.” County of Kern v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals 
Bd., 200 Cal. App. 4th 509 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
Colorado ALJ of Office of 
Administrative 
Courts  
Yes WC cases litigated before a 
“central panel” ALJ, with appeal 
to the Industrial Claims Appeals 
Office (ICAP or “panel”), which 
undertakes substantial evidence 
review.  Appeal thereafter is to 
the Colorado Court of Appeals 
and then state supreme court.  
Review is substantial evidence.  
Hire Quest, LLC v. Indus. Claim 
Appeals Office, 2011 Colo. App. 
LEXIS 1522 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2011).    
Connecticut Commissioner of 
the WC 
Commission 
Yes WC cases litigated before a single 
Commissioner, with appeal to the 
Compensation Review Board of 
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the WC Commission; no 
reweighing of the evidence.  
Appeal thereafter is to the Court 
of Appeals (note: state supreme 
court may hear such appeal via 
transfer).  Review for “clearly 
erroneous” findings.  Brymer v. 
Town of Clinton, 31 A.3d 353 
(Conn. 2011).718  
Delaware Industrial 
Accident Board 
or, upon consent, 
hearing officer 
(all of Dept. of 
Labor, OWC) 
Yes WC cases litigated before Board 
or its hearing officer; judicial 
review in Superior Court and 
thereafter in state supreme court.  
Review is substantial evidence.  
Robbins v. Helmark Steel, 2011 
Del. LEXIS 527 (Del. 2011).  
Florida Judge of Comp’n 
Claims (JCC), 
Office of JCC’s, 
Florida Division 
of Administrative 
Hearings   
Yes WC cases litigated before JCC, 
with appeal to 1
st
 Dist. Ct. 
Appeals (special jurisdiction over 
WC cases), with appeal thereafter 
to state supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  Wintz v. 
Goodwill, 898 So. 2d 1089 (Fla.  
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).719  
Georgia ALJ of the Legal 
Division, Board 
of WC  
No WC cases litigated before an 
ALJ, with appeal to a three-
member Board (the Appellate 
Division); in their judicial 
capacity, the three members of 
the Board function as an 
appellate review panel, which 
hears and reviews cases when a 
party files an appeal from an 
award of an ALJ; appeal 
thereafter to Superior Court, 
                                                          
718 Connecticut: Brymer v. Town of Clinton, 31 A.3d 353, 359  (Conn. 
2011) (a “factual finding is clearly erroneous only in cases in which the record 
contains no evidence to support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but the 
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.”).    
719 Florida: Wintz v. Goodwill, 898 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005) (the “standard of review in worker’s compensation cases is whether 
competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is 
possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments 
rejected below.”).    
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then to state supreme court.  
Review is “any evidence.” 
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund 
v. City of Atlanta, 713 S.E.2d 
706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).720   
Hawaii Hearings Officer 
of the Director of 
the Disability 
Compensation 
Division, Dept. of 
Labor 
No WC cases litigated before 
Hearings Officer, appeal to Labor 
& Industrial Relations Appeals 
Board (LIRAB); judicial review 
thereafter in Intermediate Court 
of Appeals, and then in state 
supreme court.  Review for 
“clearly erroneous” findings.  
Alkire-Clemen v. Castle Med. 
Ctr., 2010 Haw. App. LEXIS 32 
(Haw. Ct. App. 2010).   




No721 WC cases litigated before the 
Industrial Commission or its 
referee; full Commission may 
grant reconsideration and alter 
findings; appeal thereafter to 
Idaho Supreme Court, which 
undertakes substantial evidence 
review.  Fife v. Home Depot, 
Inc., 260 P.3d 1180 (Idaho 
2011).  
Illinois Arbitrator of the 
WC Commission 
No WC cases litigated before an 
Arbitrator of the Commission; 
review thereafter by Commission, 
which has “original jurisdiction” 
and is not bound by credibility 
determinations of arbitrator; 
appeal thereafter to district court, 
then to appellate court (which has 
a “Workers’ Compensation 
Commission Division”), and then 
                                                          
720 Georgia: Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. City of Atlanta, 713 S.E.2d 
706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (“In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the 
State Board of Workers Compensation must be affirmed by a superior court and by 
the Court of Appeals when supported by any evidence in the administrative record.  
Erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on 
erroneous theories of law, however, are subject to the de novo standard of review.”)  
721 Idaho: As a party may appeal directly from a referee’s decision to the 
Idaho Supreme Court, in some circumstances the first level fact-finder may be the 
final fact-finder. 
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to state supreme court.  
Review is for whether findings of 
fact are “against the manifest 
weight of the evidence.” Jacobo 
v. Ill. Workers' Comp. 
Comm'n, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 
1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).722  





No WC cases litigated before a single 
member of the WC Board; appeal 
thereafter to full board, which 
generally does not take further 
evidence. Judicial review 
thereafter in Court of Appeals 
(supreme court may take case by 
transfer).  Review is substantial 
evidence.  Ind. Spine Group, PC 
v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 959 
N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 2011). 
Iowa  Deputy 
Commissioner,  




No WC cases litigated before the 
Deputy Commissioner; any party 
aggrieved by a decision of 
Deputy Commissioner may 
appeal to the Commissioner, who 
“may affirm, modify, or reverse 
the decision of a deputy 
commissioner or the 
commissioner may remand . . . .”  
Appeal thereafter to District 
Court, and then to Supreme 
Court; these two courts undertake 
substantial evidence review.  Bell 
Bros. Heating & Air 
Conditioning v. Gwinn, 779 
N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2010). 
Kansas ALJ of the 
Division of WC, 
Dept. of Labor 
No WC cases litigated before an 
ALJ.  Appeal de novo to WC 
Appeals Board, which reviews 
the record made by the ALJ.  
Appeal thereafter, based on 
substantial evidence, to Kansas 
Court of Appeals, and thereafter 
                                                          
722 Illinois: Jacobo v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm'n, 959 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011) (“The Commission’s determination on a question of fact will not be 
disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. For a 
finding of fact to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite 
conclusion must be clearly apparent.”).  
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to state supreme court. Bryant v. 
Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc., 
257 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2011).723  
Kentucky ALJ of the Dept. 
of Workers’ 
Claims  
Yes WC cases litigated before an ALJ 
of the Commission; appeal 
thereafter is to WC Board, which 
undertakes review for whether 
decision of ALJ is “clearly 
erroneous,” or whether ALJ has 
otherwise been arbitrary and 
capricious; appeal thereafter to 
Court of Appeals and then to 
state supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  Abel 
Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348 
S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011).724 
Louisiana WCJ of the 
Office of WC, 
Workforce 
Commission 
Yes WC cases litigated before a WCJ 
of the Office of WC; appeal to 
Court of Appeals and then to 
state supreme court.  Review is 
for whether the fact-findings are 
in manifest error or clearly 
wrong. Poissenot v. St. Bernard 
Parish Sheriff's Office, 56 So. 3d 
170 (La. 2011).  
Maine Hearing Officer 
of the WC Board  
Yes  WC cases litigated before a 
hearing officer of the WC Board.  
Full board review may be 
acquired of the decision of 
hearing officer if the decision 
involves an issue that is of 
significance to the operation of 
                                                          
723 Kansas: Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc., 257 P.3d 255 (Kan. 
2011) (“An appellate court's review of questions of fact in a workers compensation 
appeal is limited to whether, when reviewing the record as a whole, the Board's 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, which is a question of 
law.”). 
724 Kentucky: Abel Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011) 
(“Legal errors would include whether the ALJ . . . made a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, rendered an arbitrary or capricious decision, or committed an abuse of 
discretion. A party who appeals a finding that favors the party with the burden of 
proof must show that no substantial evidence supported the finding, i.e., that the 
finding was unreasonable under the evidence. Evidence that would have supported 
but not compelled a different decision is an inadequate basis for reversal on 
appeal.”) 
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the workers’ compensation 
system.  Potential appeal 
thereafter is to the state supreme 
court, which is not obliged to 
accept such appeal.  Doucette v. 
Hallsmith/Sysco Food Servs., 21 
A.3d 99 (Me. 2011).725  
Maryland Commissioner of 
the WC 
Commission  
No WC cases litigated before a single 
Commissioner of the 
Commission. Appeal thereafter to 
trial court (county circuit court), 
where trial (including jury trial) 
de novo is possible; under statute, 
“the decision of the Commission 
is presumed to be prima facie 
correct.”  Review is substantial 
evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Holmes, 7 A.3d 13 (Md. 2010).   
Massachusetts Administrative 






Yes WC cases litigated before the 
Division of Dispute Resolution.  
If no agreement is reached at 
Conciliation, AJ convenes an 
informal conference and 
thereafter issues a temporary 
order; either party may thereafter 
appeal and request a formal de 
novo hearing with the AJ; appeal 
thereafter to Reviewing Board, 
made up of six Administrative 
Law Judges (ALJs). Two panels 
of three ALJs function as 
appellate body of the DIA; appeal 
thereafter to state supreme court.  
Review of fact-findings is under 
the “arbitrary and capricious” 
test.  DiFronzo's Case, 945 
N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 2011).726  
                                                          
725 Maine: Doucette v. Hallsmith/Sysco Food Servs., 21 A.3d 99 (Me. 
2011) (“For purposes of a workers’ compensation hearing, a hearing officer’s 
decision, in the absence of fraud, on all questions of fact is final. Me. Rev.  
Stat. Ann. tit. 39-A, § 322(3) . . . .”).   
726 Massachusetts: DiFronzo's Case, 945 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 2011) (“The 
court may thus reverse or modify a decision of the board when … it is based upon 
an error of law or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law . . . . The court accordingly considers whether the decision 
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Yes WC cases litigated before a 
Magistrate; appeal thereafter to 
the Michigan Compensation 
Appellate Commission,727 and 
then to the Michigan Court of 
Appeals and state supreme court.  
Review is “any competent 
evidence.”  Bennett v. Mackinac 
Bridge Auth., 808 N.W.2d 471 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2010). 
Minnesota Compensation 
Judge of the WC 
Division, Dept. of 
Administrative 
Hearings 
Yes WC cases litigated before a 
compensation judge.  Appeal 
thereafter to a special Workers’ 
Compensation Court of Appeals, 
and supreme court thereafter.  
Review is whether findings are 
“manifestly contrary to the 
evidence or unless the evidence 
clearly requires reasonable minds 
to adopt a contrary conclusion.”  
Falls v. Coca Cola Enters., 726 
N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 2007).  




No WC cases litigated before ALJ of 
the Commission.   Appeal 
thereafter to Commission, and 
then to Circuit Court and state 
supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence, which is 
equated with review for arbitrary 
and capricious findings. Gregg v. 
Natchez Trace Elec. Power 
Ass’n, 64 So. 3d 473 (Miss. 
2011).      
Missouri ALJ of the 
Division of WC, 
Dept. of Labor 
No WC cases litigated before an ALJ 
of the Division.  Appeal 
thereafter to the Labor and 
Industrial Relations Commission, 
and then to Court of Appeals and 
state supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  Hampton v. 
                                                          
is factually warranted and not arbitrary or capricious, in the sense of having 
adequate evidentiary and factual support and disclosing reasoned decision 
making.”).  
727 Michigan: Effective August 1, 2011, the Workers' Compensation 
Appellate Commission became the Michigan Compensation Appellate 
Commission.    
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Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 
S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003).728 




Yes WC cases litigated before the WC 
Court (one judge).  A direct 
appeal thereafter may be taken to 
the Montana Supreme Court, 
which exercises substantial 
evidence review.  Wright v. Ace 
Am. Ins. Co., 2011 Mont. LEXIS 
45 (Mont. 2011).729  




Yes WC cases litigated before a single 
trial judge of the seven-member 
WCC, with appeal on substantial 
evidence review to three-member 
review panel of the WCC.  
Appeal thereafter to Court of 
Appeals and/or to state supreme 
court.  Review: findings of trial 
judge have “the effect of a jury 
verdict and will not be disturbed 
unless clearly wrong.”  Straub v. 
City of Scottsbluff, 784 N.W.2d 
886 (Neb. 2010). 
Nevada Hearing Officer 
of the Department 
of Administration 
No WC cases litigated before a 
Hearing Officer.  Appeal 
thereafter de novo to the Appeals 
Officer, who is the final fact-
finder.  Judicial review follows in 
                                                          
728Missouri: Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 
2003) (“A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains 
sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether 
the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence…. Whether the 
award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining 
the evidence in the context of the whole record.  An award that is contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in context, not supported by competent 
and substantial evidence.”). 
729 Montana: Wright v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2011). 
(“In reviewing the Montana Workers’ Compensation Court’s [WCC’s] factual 
findings . . . the supreme court confines its review to determining whether 
substantial credible evidence supports the findings actually made by the [WCC] . . . 
Because the supreme court is in as good a position as the . . . [WCC] to assess 
testimony presented . . . by way of deposition, it reviews deposition testimony de 
novo.  However, even [in this situation], it is ultimately restricted to determining 
whether substantial credible evidence supports the [WCC’s] findings.”). 
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the district court and then in state 
supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  Vredenburg 
v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084 






No WC cases litigated before a 
hearing officer; de novo review 
thereafter before Compensation 
Appeal Board (CAB), which 
hears evidence.  Judicial review 
thereafter in state supreme court.  
Review is “whether the findings 
are supported by competent 
evidence in the record.”  Appeal 
of S. N.H. Health Sys., Inc., 2011 
N.H. LEXIS 96 (2011).730 
New Jersey Judge of 
Compensation, 
Division of WC, 
Dept. of Labor & 
Workforce 
Development 
Yes WC cases litigated before JWC; 
judicial review in Superior Court 
and thereafter in state supreme 
court.  Review is “sufficient 
credible evidence.”  Sager v. 
O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862 
A.2d 1119 (N.J. 2004).731   
New Mexico WCJ, WC 
Administration 
Yes WC cases litigated before the 
WCJ.  Appeal thereafter to Court 
of Appeals, and then by 
permission to state supreme 
court.  Review is substantial 
evidence on the “whole record.”   
                                                          
730 New Hampshire: Appeal of S. N.H. Health Sys., Inc., 2011 N.H. 
LEXIS 96 (2011) (“The Supreme Court . . . will overturn a [WC]  Board’s decision 
only for errors of law, or if the Court is satisfied by a clear preponderance of the 
evidence before it that the decision is unjust or unreasonable. The Board's factual 
findings are prima facie lawful and reasonable . . . .  In reviewing the Board's 
findings, the Court’s task is not to determine whether it would have found 
differently than did the Board, or to reweigh the evidence, but rather to determine 
whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the record . . . .”). 
731 New Jersey: Sager v. O.A. Peterson Constr. Co., 862 A.2d 1119 (N.J. 
2004) (“Whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on 
sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a 
whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to 
judge of their credibility and, in the case of agency review, with due regard also to 
the agency’s expertise where such expertise is a pertinent factor.”).  
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Ortiz v. Overland Express, 237 
P.3d 707 (N.M. 2010).732       
New York Workers’ 
Compensation 
Law Judge of the 
WCB 
No WC cases litigated before WCLJ.  
Appeal thereafter to Board, and 
then to Appellate Division of 
Supreme Court (trial court).  
Review thereafter, on substantial 
evidence basis, in New York 
Court of Appeals.  Matter of 
Conyers v. Van Rensselaer 
Manor, 914 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. 





of the Industrial 
Commission 
No WC cases litigated before the 
Deputy Commissioner.  Appeal 
thereafter to the Full 
Commission, which is the final 
fact-finder.  Judicial review in 
Court of Appeals and, thereafter, 
in state supreme court.  Review is 
“any competent evidence.”  
Mauldin v. A.C. Corp., 719 
S.E.2d 110 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
North Dakota ALJ of the Office 
of Administrative 
Hearings 
No WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
who makes a recommendation to 
Workforce Safety & Insurance 
(WSI) on whether WSI’s decision 
is correct; WSI conducts review 
“to ensure that the facts and the 
law support the decision” and 
issues final order; appeal 
thereafter to district court, and 
then to state supreme court.  
                                                          
732 New Mexico: Ortiz v. Overland Express, 237 P.3d 707 (N.M. 
2010) (“The . . . Supreme Court reviews factual findings of the [WC] judge under a 
whole record standard of review.  A whole record standard of review mandates that 
the . . . court reviews both favorable and unfavorable evidence to determine 
whether there is evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to 
support the conclusions reached by the fact finder. The purpose of findings of fact 
is to set out the ultimate facts of the case, and they must be read together and the 
conclusions of law flow therefrom. To determine whether a challenged finding is 
supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court views the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the agency decision, but may not view favorable evidence 
with total disregard to contravening evidence. To warrant reversal, the supreme 
court must be persuaded that it cannot conscientiously say that the evidence 
supporting the decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the whole 
record furnishes.”). 
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Review is “whether a reasoning 
mind reasonably could have 
determined that the factual 
conclusions reached were proved 
by the weight of the evidence 
from the entire record.”  Landrum 
v. Workforce Safety & Ins. 
Fund, 798 N.W.2d 669 (N.D. 
2011).  
Ohio District Hearing 
Officer (DHO) of 
the Industrial 
Commission733  
No  WC cases litigated before DHO, 
with appeal to Staff Hearing 
Officer (SHO), and then, with 
permission, to Industrial 
Commission.  Appeal available 
thereafter to trial court, which 
will convene jury or bench trial; 
at this level, facts may be found 
again.  Appeal thereafter to Court 
of Appeals and state supreme 
court; said courts will not 
“disturb the decision of the 
common pleas court … unless 
that decision is against the 
manifest weight of the evidence.”  
Coleman v. City of 
Hamilton, 2011 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3920 Ct. (Ohio Ct. App. 
2011).  




Yes WC cases litigated before a single 
judge; awards are final unless 
appealed to a panel of three WC 
Court judges, or directly to the 
Supreme Court; an order of the 
three-judge panel may be 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  
Review, since 2010, is under the 
“clear weight of the evidence” 
standard.  HAC, Inc. v. Box, 245 
P.3d 609 (Okla. 2010). 
Oregon  ALJ of the 
Hearing Division 
of the Board  
No WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
with appeal to the Board, which 
can make new or additional 
findings; judicial review in Court 
                                                          
733 Ohio: The decision of the “Staff Hearing Officer” (SHO) of the 
Industrial Commission, however, can be final as to the fact-findings if the 
Commission denied review.  
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of Appeals, then to state supreme 
court.  Review is substantial 
evidence.  Dynea USA, Inc. v. 
Fairbanks (In re Comp. of 
Fairbanks), 250 P.3d 389 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2011).   
Pennsylvania WCJ of the Dept. 




Yes WC cases litigated before WCJ; 
appeal thereafter to WC Appeal 
Board, which reviews for 
substantial evidence and error of 
law.  Appeal thereafter to 
Commonwealth Court and then, 
with permission, to state supreme 
court.  Review is substantial 
evidence.  City of Philadelphia v. 
WCAB (Kriebel), 29 A.3d 762 
(Pa. 2011).     




Yes734 WC cases litigated before trial 
judge of the WCC, with appeal 
on “clearly erroneous” standard 
to Appellate Division of WCC.  
Judicial review in state supreme 
court.  Review is “legally 
competent evidence.”  McGloin 
v. Trammellcrow Servs., 987 






No WC cases litigated before a single 
commissioner; appeal thereafter 
to a panel of three 
commissioners, then to a panel of 
six commissioners (“Full 
Commission”); for injuries after 
2007, judicial review is to Court 
of Appeals, and then state 
supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  Johnson v. 
BMW Mfg. Corp., LLC, 2011 
                                                          
734 Rhode Island: Appellate Division may be able to reassess credibility if 
it first finds that trial judge has made findings of fact that are “clearly erroneous.”  
The Supreme Court does not exercise such review. McGloin v. Trammellcrow 
Servs., 987 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2010) (“The Supreme Court's review on certiorari is 
limited to examining the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.  
The … Court does not weigh the evidence, but rather reviews the record to 
determine whether legally competent evidence supports the findings . . . .”). 
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S.C. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2011).735       
South  
Dakota 
ALJ of the 
Department of 
Labor 
No WC cases litigated before an ALJ 
with appeal to the Secretary of 
the state DOL; judicial review in 
circuit court and then state 
supreme court, which undertakes 
“clearly erroneous” review and 
reserves the right to reweigh 
credibility, particularly when the 
evidence is documentary in 
nature, including testimony by 
deposition.  McQuay v. Fischer 
Furniture, 808 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 
2011).736    
Tennessee Trial Judge  
of the Circuit 
Court 
No WC cases litigated before a trial 
judge of the circuit court; appeal 
to state supreme court, including 
the Special WC Appeals Panel; 
credibility can be reassessed on 
appeal:  “The standard of review 
of issues of fact is de novo upon 
the record of the trial court 
accompanied by a presumption of 
correctness of the findings, unless 
the preponderance of evidence is 
otherwise.” Griffin v. Walker Die 
Casting, Inc., et al., 2010 Tenn. 
LEXIS 1020 (Tenn. Sp. WC App. 
Panel at Nashville 2010).   
Texas Hearing Officer 
of the WC 
Commission 
No WC cases litigated before hearing 
officer after mandatory benefit 
review conference, with appeal to 
                                                          
735 South Carolina: Johnson v. BMW Mfg. Corp., LLC, 2011 S.C. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 594 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“Substantial evidence is not a mere 
scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but 
is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable 
minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify 
its action.”). 
736 South Dakota: McQuay v. Fischer Furniture, 808 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 
2011) (“We review an agency’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous 
standard . . . . However, when ‘an agency makes factual determinations on the basis 
of documentary evidence, such as depositions or medical records,’ our review is de 
novo.”) (quoting, among other things, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-36).    
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Appeals Panel.  On basic issues 
of compensability and eligibility, 
appeal de novo to district (trial) 
court for bench or jury trial; in 
such cases, trial court is final 
fact-finder.  On collateral issues, 
court undertakes substantial 
evidence review.  Appeal 
thereafter to Court of Appeals, 
and then to state supreme court.  
Review of a jury verdict is “legal 
sufficiency.”  Transcon. Ins. Co. 
v. Crump, 274 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 
App. 2008), reversed on other 
grounds, 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 
2010).737 





No WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
with appeal to Utah Labor 
Commission Appeals Board; 
judicial review thereafter in Court 
of Appeals, and then in state 
supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence in light of 
the whole record. Carradine v. 
Labor Comm'n, 258 P.3d 636 
(Utah Ct. App. 2011).      
Vermont Hearing Officer, 
Vermont 
Department of 
Labor (for the 
Commissioner)   
No WC cases litigated before 
Commissioner, though hearing 
officer makes record for 
Commissioner, Department of 
Labor, who is the initial fact-
finder.  Appeal de novo to trial 
court on certified issues, which 
may include factual issues.  
                                                          
737 Texas:  Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 274 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. App. 2008), 
reversed on other grounds, 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2010) (“In a legal sufficiency 
review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge 
every reasonable inference that supports the verdict . . . . We must credit evidence 
that supports the judgment if reasonable jurors could and disregard contrary 
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not . . . . If the evidence falls within the 
zone of reasonable disagreement, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the 
fact finder . . . . Unless there is no favorable evidence, or if the contrary evidence 
renders supporting evidence incompetent or conclusively establishes the opposite, 
we must affirm . . . . ‘The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether 
the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the 
verdict under review.’”).  
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Appeals on legal issues only are 
prosecuted directly to supreme 
court.  Appeal beyond jury trial is 
to state supreme court.  Review 
from Commissioner is (this 
writer’s interpretation) any 
evidence. Colson v. Town of 
Randolph, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 130 
(Vt. 2011).738  Review from jury 
trial is whether the evidence 
taken in the most favorable light 
for the prevailing party fairly and 
reasonably tends to support the 
verdict.  Rae v. Green Mountain 






No WC cases litigated before Deputy 
Commissioner, with appeal to 
Full Commission; judicial review 
thereafter in the Court of Appeals 
and the state supreme court.  
Review is whether findings are 
“plainly wrong or without 
credible evidence.”  Gilbane v. 
Guzman, 717 S.E.2d 433 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2011).  
Washington Industrial 
Appeals Judge 
(IAJ), of the Bd. 
of Indus. Ins. 
Appeals (BIIA) 
No WC cases litigated before IAJ 
(who issues a proposed D&O), 
with appeal to BIIA. Appeal 
thereafter to superior court (trial 
court), which may involve a jury 
trial.  Judicial review to Court of 
Appeals, then to state supreme 
court.  Review is substantial 
evidence.  Rogers v. Dep't of 
Labor & Indus., 210 P.2d 355 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009).     
West Virginia ALJ of the Office 
of Judges, 
Yes WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
with recourse thereafter to Board 
                                                          
738 Vermont: Colson v. Town of Randolph, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 130 (Vt. 
2011) (“[the] appellate court is bound by the Commissioner’s findings so long as 
they are supported by the evidence.  The appellate court will affirm if the 
Commissioner’s conclusions are rationally derived from the findings and based on 
a correct interpretation of the law. It will overrule only if no evidentiary support 
exists for the findings or if the decision is based on evidence so slight as to be an 
irrational basis for the result reached.”).   





of Review, which is essentially 
appellate review.  Appeal, with 
permission, to state supreme 
court.  Review is whether 
findings are “clearly wrong.” 
Casdorph v. W. Va. Office Ins. 
Comm'r, 690 S.E.2d 102  (W. Va. 
2009).739  
Wisconsin ALJ of the WC 
Div., Dept. of 
Workforce 
Development 
No WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
with appeal to the Labor & 
Industry Review Commission.  
Judicial Review in the circuit 
court, with appeal thereafter to 
Court of Appeals and then to 
state supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  DeBoer 
Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 804 
N.W.2d 658 (Wis. 2011). 
Wyoming  Hearing 




Yes WC cases are litigated before 
Hearing Examiner, then judicial 
review in District Court; appeal 
to state supreme court.  Review is 
substantial evidence.  McCall-
Presse v. State (In re Worker's 
Comp. Claim of McCall-








Yes WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
appeal to Compensation Review 
Bd. (CRB), DC DES; judicial 
review in D.C. Court of Appeals.  
Review is substantial evidence.  
Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep't of 
Empl. Servs., 10 A.3d 619  (D.C. 
2010).  
LHWCA ALJ of the US 
Department of 
Labor,  Office of 
ALJ’s (OALJ) 
Yes WC cases litigated before ALJ, 
appeal to Benefits Review Board; 
judicial review in U.S. Court of 
Appeals and then to U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Review is 
                                                          
739 West Virginia: Casdorph v. W. Va. Office Ins. Comm'r, 690 S.E.2d 
102 (W.Va. 2009) (“decision of the board may be reversed or modified by the 
supreme court . . . only if the decision is [inter alia] . . . so clearly wrong based 
upon the evidentiary record that even when all inferences are resolved in favor of 
the board’s findings, reasoning and conclusions, there is insufficient support to 
sustain the decision.”).    
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substantial evidence based on the 
whole record.  P&O Ports Tex., 
Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 446 Fed. 
Appx. 724 (5th Cir. 2011).740 
 
B.  Table 2: Law Regarding Stay and Selected Authorities 
 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND ADJUDICATORY POWER 
FIFTY STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LHWCA (2012) 
(“WC” = Workers’ Compensation)  
 

































Co., LLC v. 
Harris, 2009 
Ala. Civ. App. 
LEXIS 489 
(Ala. Civ. App. 
2009). 
Alaska WC Board 




Yes No ALASKA 
STAT. 





233 P.3d 604 
(Alaska 2010). 
Arizona ALJ of the Yes No742 ARIZ. REV. Vandever v. 
                                                          
740 LHWCA: P&O Ports Tex., Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 446 Fed. Appx. 724 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“court reviews the decisions of the . . . (BRB) for errors of law and 
applies the same substantial evidence standard that governs the BRB’s review of 
the . . . (ALJ)’s . . . factual findings. The findings of the ALJ must be accepted 
unless they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a 
whole or unless they are irrational.  Substantial evidence . . . considered as a whole 
is a strict and limiting standard of review. Substantial evidence is evidence that 
provides a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably 
inferred or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”) 
741 Alaska: Two members of a quasi-judicial hearing panel of the Alaska 
WC Board constitute a quorum for taking action on a disputed benefits claim. 
742Arizona: An automatic stay does apply upon a party’s request for 
reconsideration; no stay on further appeal to Court of Appeals.   








(2012).   
Indus. 
Comm’n, 714 
P.2d 866 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1985). 
Arkansas ALJ of the 
WC 
Comm’n 












171 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1994).  














293 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005).  









Wecker v. TBL 
Excavating, 
908 P.2d 1186 
(Colo. Ct. App. 
1995). 
Connecticut  Comm’r 
of the WC 
Comm’n 
Yes Yes CONN. GEN. 
STAT.  
§ 31-298, 







(Conn. App. Ct. 








of Dept. of 
Labor, 
OWC) 
Yes Yes 19 DEL. 
CODE ANN.  
§ 2301A  
§ 2301B  
(LexisNexis 
2012). 
Steppi v. Conti 
Elec., Inc., 991 
A.2d 19 (Del. 
2010).  






Yes No FLA. STAT. 
ANN. 
§ 440.271,   
§ 440.33,  




Builders, Inc. v. 
Van Overloop, 
951 So. 2d 40 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. 
    




Hearings   
2012). App. 2007).  





No Yes GA. CODE 
ANN.   
§ 34-9-47,  
§ 34-9-48,  






Inc. v. Dobbins, 
710 S.E.2d 205 

















Freedle v. City 




(Haw. Ct. App. 
2007). 





No  Yes IDAHO CODE 
ANN.  
§ 72-506(1),    
§ 72-717  
(LexisNexis 
2012). 
Stewart v. Sun 
Valley Co., 94 
P.3d 686 (Idaho 
2004).   
Illinois Arbitrator 
of the WC 
Comm’n 
No No 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 
ANN.  
§ 305/19 (e),   
§ 305/19 (f)  
(LexisNexis 
2012).  
















No Yes IND.  
CODE  
§ 22-3-1-3  
(LexisNexis 




AG One Co-Op 
v. Scott, 914 
N.E.2d 860 





No Yes IOWA CODE  
§ 86.2, 
§ 86.24,  
Beef Prod., Inc. 
v. Rizvic, 806 
N.W.2d 294 






§ 86.26  
(LexisNexis 
2011).  
(Iowa Ct. App. 
2011).  
 





No No KAN. STAT. 
ANN.   
§ 44-555c,  
§ 44-556  
(LexisNexis 
2011).   
Rausch v. Sears 
Roebuck & 
Co., 263 P.3d 
194 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2011).  





Yes Yes KY. REV. 
STAT.  
§ 342.215,  
§ 342.275,  









(Ky. 2006).  





Yes Yes LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN.   
§ 23:1291(c), 
§ 23:1310.1,   





Corp., 917 So. 
2d 514 (La. Ct. 





Yes743 No ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
tit. 39-A, 
§ 152,  
§ 318, 
§ 320,  
§ 322(3) 
(LexisNexis 
2011).   
Higgins v. H.P 
Hood, Inc., 926 
A.2d 1176 (Me. 
2007). 
Maryland Comm’r 
of the WC 
Comm’n  
No No LABOR & 






Corp. v. Bark, 
555 A.2d 542 
(Md. Ct. Spec. 














(Mass. 1993).  
                                                          
743 Maine: If Hearing Officer makes a special request, review by the Full 
Board may be undertaken.  See 39-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 320. 
    
















Yes No MICH. 
COMP. 
LAWS SERV. 




Mudel v. Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 614 
N.W.2d 607 






of  Admin. 
Hearings 
Yes Yes MINN. STAT.  




Stately v. Red 
Lake Builders 
et al., 2010 MN 
Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 99 
(Minn. WC Ct. 
App. 2010).   










Short v. Wilson 
Meat House, 36 
So. 3d 1247 
(Miss. 2010). 















(Mo. Ct. App. 
2009).  
Montana WCJ of the 
Workers’ 
Comp. Ct.  










Ins. Corp., 175 
P.3d 893 
(Mont. 2008).  






Yes No NEB. REV. 
STAT.  
§ 48-152,  
§ 48-156,  
§ 48-177,   
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§ 48-179,  
§ 48-18  
(LexisNexis 
2012).  






No No NEV. REV. 
STAT.  
§ 616C.315,  
§ 616C.330,  
§ 616C.340,  






















A:42-a,    





A.2d 224 (N.H. 
2010).  





of Labor & 
Workforce 
Devel. 
Yes No N.J. STAT. 




Sager v. O.A. 
Peterson 
Constr. Co., 
862 A.2d 1119 





Yes No N.M. STAT. 
ANN.  
§ 52-5-2,  
§ 52-5-8 
(LexisNexis 
2012).   
Ortiz v. Estate 
of Baros, 237 
P.3d 707 (N.M. 
2010).  





No  No N.Y. 
WORKERS’ 
COMP.  
§ 140,  
§ 142, § 150 
(LexisNexis 
2012). 













No Yes N.C. GEN. 
STAT.  




Johnson v. S. 
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North 
Dakota 




No No N.D. CENT. 
CODE.  


















No No OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 
§ 4123.512  
(LexisNexis 





(Ohio Ct. App. 
2011). 





Yes No 85 OKLA. 
STAT.  








164 P.3d 1057 
(Okla. 2007).  












Inc., 157 P.3d 
1268 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2007).  






Yes No Section 
423(a) of the 
WC Act,  
77 PA. STAT. 
ANN.  § 853, 
Section 
423(c) of the 
WC Act,  
77 PA. STAT. 
ANN. 






769 A.2d 1243 
(Pa. Commw. 





Yes No R.I. GEN 
LAWS   
Diocese of 
Providence v. 
                                                          
744 Ohio: The decision of the “Staff Hearing Officer” (SHO) of the 
Industrial Commission, however, can be final as to the fact-findings if the 
Commission denies review.  











Vaz, 679 A.2d 















Co., 599 S.E.2d 
604 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2004).  
South  
Dakota 
ALJ of the 
Department 
of Labor 








Store, Inc., 729 
N.W.2d 377 
(S.D. 2007).  





No No TENN. CODE 
ANN.  







Casting, Inc., et 
al., 2010 Tenn. 
LEXIS 1020 
(Tenn. Sp. WC 
App. Panel at 
Nashville 
2010).   
Texas Hearing 
Officer of 
the Dept. of 
Insurance, 
DWC 
No No TEX. LAB. 
CODE ANN.   
§ 410.165,   
§ 410.168,   




State Office of 









No Yes UTAH CODE 
ANN.  
§ 34A-2-
801,   
§ 34A-1-303 
(LexisNexis 
2012).   
Carter v. Labor 
Comm’n 
Appeals Bd., 
153 P.3d 763 







No No 21 VT. 
STAT. ANN.   
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(for the 
Comm’r)   
A.2d 367 (Vt. 





No Yes VA. CODE 
ANN. 
§ 65.2-201, 






2010 Va. App. 
LEXIS 274 










No No WASH. REV. 
CODE  
§ 51.52.104,  
§ 51.52.106,  
§ 51.52.110,  









Ct. App. 2008).  
West 
Virginia 





Yes No W. VA. 
CODE  





Glass Co. v. W. 
Va. Office of 
Ins. Comm’r, 
664 S.E.2d 761 
(W. Va. 2008).  





No Yes WIS. STAT. 
§ 102.18,  




Wis. Dept. of 











Yes No WYO. STAT. 
ANN. 
§ 27-14-601,  















Yes No D.C. CODE  
§ 32-





Transit Auth. v. 
DC DES 
(Browne), 926 
A.2d 140 (D.C. 
2007).  
                                                          
745 District of Columbia: Law referenced is “DC Workers’ Compensation 
Act of 1979, as amended, D.C. CODE § 32-1501 et. seq. (private sector).”  Law 
regarding review was amended in 2004.   
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LHWCA ALJ of the 
US 
Department 




Yes No 33 U.S.C.  
§ 921 
(2012). 
Bath Iron 
Works v. 
Fields, 599 
F.3d 47 (1
st
 Cir. 
2010).  
 
